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ABSTRACT
The objective of this dissertation is to examine the agricultural trade policies of 
Turkey and determine the impact of various relevant policy scenarios on the welfare and 
distribution of income within the agricultural sector as well as between producers and 
consumer groups. The main goal o f this research is to quantify the impact o f trade 
liberalization resulting from multilateral agricultural trade agreements and the formation 
of regional trading blocs on Turkish agriculture and, consequently, the income distribution 
effects in the various producer and consumer groups.
The study utilizes a partial equilibrium framework Modele Internationale Simplifie 
de Simulation (MISS) to analyze the impacts of various policy decisions and scenarios on 
the welfare of producers, consumers, and the budget. In this study, ten agricultural 
products that each play significant roles in terms o f production, consumption, and trade are 
examined. These products are; lamb, dairy milk, com, wheat, rice, oilseeds, cotton, sugar, 
tobacco, and poultry. Producer and Consumer subsidy equivalents which show overall 
protection in these sectors, are used to represent the weights perceived by the policy 
makers. Results show that Turkish Political Preference Function (PPF) values are higher 
in integration but decreases in free trade. The Nash equilibrium occurred at the point where 
Turkey chooses integration with the EU while the EU chooses the Agenda 2000 reform 
provisions. Results also show that distribution of income estimated by the Gini coefficient 
does not change significantly with freer trade but deteriorates with the integration.
vii
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
Developing countries often face the dilemma of whether to support farmers or to 
provide cheap and sufficient agricultural products for low income consumers. At the same 
time, the incomes of various producer groups within agriculture can vary depending on 
political power and lobbying. New and developing trading blocs and accompanying 
multilateral trade negotiations aiming at freer trade require that policy makers face new 
problems given dynamic domestic and international policy linkages.
Developing countries tend to have complex agricultural policies. Some o f these 
policies are used to reach non-agricultural goals including the collection of tax revenues 
and redistribution of income in the economy. Also, policy makers change trade policy 
tools to adjust tothenewworld trade environment (Hammer and Knudsen, 1990). Turkey 
has various levels of international agricultural trade policies that affect income distribution 
in the economy between the various groups such as producers and consumers. Turkish 
agricultural policies are aimed at providing a standard level of income in the agricultural 
sector. On the other hand, as a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), Turkey 
agreed to reduce its tariffs and other protection levels (GATT, 1994). This policy change 
will impact Turkish agriculture as a whole, the individual agricultural sectors, and 
consumers. Also, the European Union (EU) will continue to expand gradually and Turkey 
is eager to be part of this union. The EU plans to make some reforms regarding its 
agricultural policies to become more competitive and to comply with the WTO’s rules
1
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Ingersent et al., 1998). These types o f scenarios will have considerable effect on Turkish 
agriculture through changes in producer and consumer welfare as well as budget costs.
This research will analyze the agricultural policies of Turkey and the welfare and 
distributional effects o f Turkish agricultural trade policies in a post-Uruguay Round 
environment using a Political Preference Function (PPF) analytical tool. The effect of 
WTO concessions, the integration with the EU, and consequences of various policy 
actions on the welfare o f interest groups and on the Turkish sectoral income distribution 
will be reviewed. In this way, policy-makers can weigh the effects o f agricultural policies 
and the accompanying trade liberalization among agricultural producers and between 
producers and consumers.
Problem Statement
Agricultural trade policies in Turkey are designed to help increase the Turkish 
farmer’s income level (GATT, 1994). However, trade policies, such as tariffs, 
subsidies, and price supports have income distorting effects in the agricultural sector. At 
present, the main policy instruments are support prices, subsidized credit, and input 
subsidies. In its Uruguay Round offer, Turkey agreed to gradually reduce its protection 
levels over ten years. On the other hand, the WTO rules may affect income distribution 
in different ways. In the Uruguay Round of the multilateral trade negotiations of the 
GATT, several provisions were made concerning market access, domestic support, and 
export competition in agriculture (Ingersent and Rayner, 1994). In terms o f market access, 
it was agreed that developed countries would decrease existing and new tariffs by an 
average of 36 % over 6 years, and developing countries 24 % over 10 years. In export
2
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competition, expenditures will be reduced by 36 % over 6 years, and developing countries 
24 % over 10 years. In domestic subsidies, the aggregate level o f trade distorting support 
will be reduced by 20 % over 6 years, and developing countries over 10 years (International 
Agricultural Trade Research Consortium, 1994). These key elements o f the WTO 
agreement will have a noticeable effect on Turkish agriculture and, as a result, the income 
distribution between the groups in the economy. Policy-makers in Turkey have limited 
information regarding the consequences o f WTO related trade policy issues on the 
distribution of income among Turkish agricultural producers and consumers. The goal 
o f this study is to provide this crucial information.
Justification
Since agricultural trade policies affect income levels and distribution of income 
among sectors, it is essential to know the consequences of different policies applied to the 
Turkish agricultural sector. This study will incorporate the income distribution effects of 
international agricultural trade policies of Turkey within a game theoretical framework 
such that the T urkish government maximizes the incomes of various producers, consumers 
given the budget cost of agricultural policies. The information produced by this study will 
enhance policy decisions for agricultural sectors and consumer groups of the Turkish 
economy. Also, the outcome of this study can be useful in determining the income 
distributional effects of the WT O agreement on T urkish agriculture and answer the question 
o f whether trade liberalization efforts benefit the developing economies in terms of 
income level and distribution of income within the agricultural sector and between the 
various interest groups, such as producers and consumers. In addition, policy-makers can
3
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make the necessary policy adjustments with respect to welfare and income distribution 
between groups by reviewing the distributional effects of multilateral trade agreements. 
Objectives
This research will examine the agricultural trade policies o f Turkey and determine
the impact of various relevant policy scenarios on the welfare and distribution of income
within the agricultural sector as well as between producers and consumer groups. The
main goal of this research is to quantify the impact of trade liberalization resulting from
multilateral agricultural trade agreements and the formation of regional trading blocs on
Turkish agriculture and, consequently, the income distribution effects in the various
producer and consumer groups. The four specific objectives are to:
I - review the relevant agricultural trade policies of Turkey, and other relevant 
countries,
2- develop a theoretical model explaining the effect o f the WTO agreement and 
other relevant policy scenarios on the welfare and distribution of this welfare in 
Turkish agriculture,
3- specify an empirical model and evaluate this model to obtain consumer and 
producer surpluses and change in income among the producer groups and between 
producers and consumers using a political preference function within a game 
theoretical framework, and
4- provide implications and policy recommendations concerning producer 
welfare and income distribution from trade in the Turkish economy.
Procedures
A base year, 1995, is chosen for the empirical analysis. Ten commodity groups 
are distinguished in terms of production and consumption in Turkey. These are lamb, 
dairy milk, com, wheat, rice, oilseeds, cotton, sugar, tobacco, and poultry. To initialize
4
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the model, protection ratios for the base year will be calculated for producers and 
consumers in Turkey. These protection ratios, combined with production and 
consumption levels, will be used as a base from which all simulations will be conducted. 
This study will utilize the producer subsidy equivalents (PSE) and consumer subsidy 
equivalent (CSE), which are aggregate measures of support that summarize the effects of 
various government policies in a single value for producers and consumers, respectively 
(USD A, 1994). The PPF weights will be estimated through the PSEs for various producers 
and weighted aggregation of the CSEs for consumers, respectively. These weights will then 
be used to estimate the welfare changes for producers and consumers. Given the PPF 
values of various trade policy scenarios of Turkey, the optimal strategies for Turkey will 
be found using a non-cooperative game framework. Income distributional effects of 
various scenarios will be analyzed using the Gini coefficient. In this way, distributional 
impacts of trade polices on various producer groups will be determined. Following this 
analysis, policy recommendation regarding producer and consumer welfare will be made. 
Literature Review
Literature in this area mainly consists of studies that utilize the PPF approach in 
agricultural policy analysis for a single or multi country framework and income 
distribution studies that search the effects of various policy decisions on the distribution 
of income within the agricultural sector. In one of the earliest single country PPF studies, 
Rausser and Freebaim (1974) apply the PPF method to the US beef import policy. During 
the 1960s, the high meat prices and the import quota on beef were controversial issues 
in the US. They analyze the welfare effects of beef trade policy on the consumer in terms
5
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of the cost o f a market basket o f meat commodities. Based on classical utility theory, they 
assume that consumer welfare is a function of the quantities of goods consumed. 
Consumers are disaggregated into five classes according to their household income. 
Welfare of cattle producers is represented by two variables measuring the aggregate gross 
margin to breeding cow-calf producers and to cattle feeders. They use quadratic functional 
forms for welfare and utility and estimated the PPF by using time series data. They found 
that, over the period 1959-1969, policy makers weighted a two dollar increase in beef 
producer returns as approximately equivalent in social value to a one dollar decrease in 
consumer meat costs. These results are consistent with the actual beef trade policy 
decisions for the periods analyzed.
Oehmke and Yao (1990) estimate a policy preference function that explains the 
government’s choices of target prices, government held wheat stocks, and level of public 
wheat research funding for the US wheat market. Their PPF depends on producer surplus, 
consumer surplus and budget expenditures. They conclude that the government provides 
positive levels of research funds mainly because they increase consumer surplus while 
benefits to producers are quite small. Abler and Sukhatme (1998) model the determinants 
of Indian wheat and rice policy using the PPF. They assume that the Indian government 
chooses policies that maximize a PPF. They examine the policies toward international 
trade, grain procurement, public grain distribution, and production inputs. Abler and 
Sukhatme indicate that urban interests, such as industrial workers, employers, and 
government bureaucrats, are politically strong and favor low food prices. On the other 
hand, in the last two decades, farm interests have become significant. For this reason, they
6
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outline a static, partial equilibrium model to simulate the determinants o f Indian wheat and 
rice policy. They choose a quadratic production function and derive the output supply and 
variable input demand. The supply price is a weighted average of the procurement price 
and the open-market price. Utility from the consumption of each commodity by each group 
is assumed to depend on the market price and on consumer savings on public distribution 
system. Then they estimate the PPF weights and policy adjustment costs. Their results 
indicate that policy choices for both wheat and rice are weighted heavily toward urban 
consumers.
In a multi country study, Johnson et al. (1993) conducted an empirical analysis 
using the PPF. They measured the role of special interests in the US and the EU. Their 
analysis searched for mutually acceptable agreements in trade negotiations between these 
two blocs using the world trade model. They specified a PPF model for the US and the 
EU. In their model, two countries and the rest of the world produce, consume, and trade 
N commodities. Trade in the N commodities is summarized by the excess demand. After 
they estimated the PPF, they simulated various scenarios regarding the US and EU 
proposals for trade negotiations. They conclude that it is in the best interest of the US for 
the EU to liberalize while rest of the world follows their status quo policies. Kennedy et 
al. (1996) also modeled agricultural trade policy interdependence using a game theoretical 
framework and PPF. The model distinguishes between the EU, the US and a politically 
passive rest of the world. Particular emphasis was placed on the effect o f  the exchange rate 
on the equilibrium outcome o f this game. Without compensatory payments to those sectors 
with the highest political influence, the results suggest that only modest reform is possible.
7
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With compensation, liberalization occurs but free trade is not obtained. Simulations also 
indicated that the US gained incentive to reduce protection given a depreciation of the 
dollar, while incentive to liberalize trade policies decreased as the dollar appreciates.
In a case study analysis, Blandford(l987) evaluates the distributional impact of 
US farm programs. He compares the various relationships between government 
payments and average farm income with respect to farm size, sale class, and farm type. His 
analysis shows that direct payments represented a significant proportion of average farm 
income. Also, direct payments have important distributional effects despite their costs. His 
study indicates that many other developed countries supported their farmers by taxing 
consumers and through high food prices. Direct payments are superior to food taxes 
because they do not depress consumption. In addition, direct income support can be used 
to control surpluses since they are independent of the production.
There have been some studies that analyze income disparities in the agricultural 
sector, von Witzke (1979) analyzes the effect o f agricultural prices on personal income 
distribution within agriculture in West Germany. Under the assumption that changes in 
agricultural policies do not affect input or output, the effect on income distribution depends 
on the income ratio, i.e., the ratio of farmers’ income to total receipts. It was assumed 
that, because larger farms have higher incomes, an increase in prices would lead to an 
increase of income disparity in agriculture in the short run. In this theoretical analysis, it 
was assumed that only one agricultural good was produced through the use of labor, land, 
capital and two intermediate input goods, one from agriculture and one from the non- 
agricultural sector. Income is the pay-off to the factors owned by the farm family. A
8
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Cobb-Douglas production function was used. The input of production factors was 
determined using neoclassical assumptions. The analysis utilized the Gini coefficient to 
measure the concentration of income in agriculture. The Gini coefficient is specified as 
follows. If the vector of incomes for various producer groups is arranged in a non­
decreasing order, the GC is defined as
(1.1) GC=Ys- l(y * l) 'l
n
where Ys = ^  Yi
1=1
/ =
2 . / - W - 1
n - \
2 . / - M  -  1
n - 1 
2 . H - H - 1 
n - 1
y  =
’ r i
T
Yi /  = '
Yn *l
where Y represents the income of various producer groups. The * operator allows a 
multiplication of vectors or matrices of identical dimensions. In the empirical analysis, 
it was assumed that the short-run effects of changing prices take place within one year, and 
that prices change at the beginning of the year and remain constant during that year. For 
the long run analysis, however, the adjustment period is not determined explicitly. The 
speed of adjustment differs for the various production factors. The input o f  intermediate 
goods and capital can be adjusted first, whereas the adjustment of labor and land input 
generally takes more time. In this analysis, a price increase did not increase the income
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
disparity in agriculture in the short run. However, in the long run, a price increase would 
result in an increase in the concentration o f income. Likewise, a price decrease would 
result in a decrease in the concentration of income. He concludes that because of its social 
cost, the use of price policy as the main instrument for income policy should be replaced 
by other measures o f income policy.
In a 1984 study, von Witzke again analyzed a model of income distribution in 
agriculture. He used a micro-method approach of income distribution. In this method, 
the first step is to estimate the determinants of the individual income level. The second 
step is either to simulate the distribution via the endowments of the individuals with 
production factors of different kinds and qualities, or to estimate directly the effects of the 
distribution of the determinants of income on income distribution. The analysis used the 
quantity and quality o f the different production factors (land, labor, capital, cattle, and 
intermediate goods), the share of each of the production factors owned by the farm family, 
input level, and commodity prices. The analysis used the Gini coefficient o f concentration 
to measure relative income inequalities. It was found that distribution o f the economic 
farm size is the most important determinant in difference of agricultural income.
Income disparities between and within farm households and non-farm households 
was analyzed in a study by Knigma and Oskam (1987) using an individual welfare 
function o f income. They develop a concept of parity income. The basic idea for parity 
income is equal pay for equal work. The difference between actual income and parity 
income is the income disparity. In their study, income is used as the determinant of an 
individual’s utility. They call this the individual’s welfare function. This function is a
10
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reflection of the welfare perception o f an individual. Considering the welfare function as 
a static concept, the parity income o f the farming community is calculated by equating the 
average welfare level o f farmers to the average welfare level of the population. The 
income level that gives equal welfare to the farming population is the parity income. They 
conduct an empirical analysis in Germany using 126 farmers from across the country. 
They conclude that income disparities not only exist between farmers and rest o f the 
society but between farming sectors as well.
Recently, new trade theories that are based on the assertion that free trade is 
actually damaging for developing countries has received significant attention. The 
standard neoclassical theory is based on competitive models and advocates free trade. 
However, new trade theories suggest that trade intervention is welfare improving. 
Krugman (1987) analyzes international trade theory from new perspective. Krugman 
notes that formal models assume constant returns to scale and perfect competition. 
Ricardian models emphasize technological differences as the cause of trade while 
Heckscher-Ohlin models emphasize differences in factor endowments. Krugman’s 
argument for new trade theory is based on the fact that economies of scale is a significant 
factor in trade rather than comparative advantage and the international markets are 
imperfectly competitive. Krugman asserts that strategic trade policy and externalities are 
two main arguments against free trade. The strategic trade policy argument begins with the 
observation that some industries may earn higher returns than the opportunity costs o f the 
resources they employ. His strategic trade policy argument indicates that under some 
circumstances a government can raise national welfare at another country’s expense by 
supporting its firms in international competition. When there is a significant domestic
11
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market for a good, protection o f this market raises the profits of the domestic firm to 
capture the excess returns. Krugman also indicates that policies can be used to promote 
sectors yielding external economies.
Alam (1995) criticizes Krugman’s views regarding the the new trade theory and 
developing countries. He indicates that there are four main factors that are important for 
developing country and new trade theory issues. First is the market structure. He indicates 
that imperfect competition is more pervasive in the industrial sectors o f the developing 
countries than developed countries. The high concentration ratios in these developing 
countries suggest an oligopolistic market structure. Import substitution policies of 
developing countries and lack of antitrust policies lead these kinds o f non-competitive 
economic structure. Alam indicates that oligopolistic market structure can not be caused 
by economies of scale because the production level of various goods in developing 
countries is not in the range of developed countries. Another factor to consider is 
economic size. The small size of developing countries reduces their ability to use strategic 
trade policy. Alam states that small countries will not retaliate for trade distortions because 
the loss from trade restrictions would be very small for developed countries and the risk of 
retaliation against a large country could elicit a trade war. The technological character o f 
exports is another issue for the developing countries. Alam indicates that exports of 
developing countries are resource and labor intensive. Since the primary source of 
increasing return to scale is technology of production and Research and Development 
(R&D) expenditures and developing countries lack such technology, resulting economies 
o f scale from production do not affect a country’s decision for trade. He argues that in
12
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imperfectly competitive markets, trade liberalization rather than policy intervention 
promotes domestic production and leads to gains from trade.
Richardson (1990) surveys various empirical studies such as general equilibrium 
and regression methods related to the international trade and welfare under imperfect 
competition. He indicates that for a country which is a net importer of a product 
produced domestically in a setting of imperfect competition, trade liberalization can 
improve welfare in three ways. First, more open trade reduces distortionary pricing above 
marginal costs and increases the number of firms that sell products. Secondly, increased 
trade rationalizes domestic industry forcing firms who have excessive costs out of market. 
Thirdly, open trade reduces exploitative income transfers to foreign firms. If a country is 
a net exporter of a product then there exists the possibility of welfare loss in the trade 
setting. For example, in a liberalized setting, the entry of a foreign competitor could 
reduce the firms’ profits and reduce national welfare. So, it is an empirical matter whether 
liberalized trade increases national welfare. In Richardson’s empirical survey, it is 
indicated that trade liberalization has strong positive effect on welfare. The gains are two 
to three times the gains calculated under the setting of perfect competition. Calibration 
studies show moderate to heavy adjustment costs while regression methods show an 
insignificant relationship between trade penetration and entry, exit, and concentration.
Another development in trade theory is the interaction o f geography with the 
economic performance and concentration of firms in a country. Krugman (1991) searches 
the reasons for concentration o f industries in the US and EU. He compares the
13
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Northeast and Midwest regions o f the US to the South. He also compares these regions 
to France, Germany, Italy and England. This analysis utilizes employment statistics and 
constructs regional-national divergence. He finds that European nations are less specialized 
than US regions. When he compares the Midwest and South to Germany and Italy, he 
finds that the patterns of revealed comparative advantage in specific industries are similar. 
In other words, the Midwest and Germany are specialized in machinery while, the South 
and Italy are specialized in the textile industry. He also indicates that the US industries 
are more localized than those of the EU. FCrugman states that the main reason for this 
distinction is barriers to trade in the EU. Concentration takes place when transport costs fall 
and economies of scale increase. In the nineteenth century, transportation costs fell and 
economies o f scale became more important. This caused the localization o f the sectors. 
However, in Europe the fall in transportation cost was opposed by rising trade barriers 
such as tariffs, leading to less localization than in the US. Krugman indicates that the EU 
will eventually look like the US with the similar degree of specialization and localization.
New growth theory attempts to explain the process of long run growth and 
development through endogenous forces such as human capital, knowledge and 
information. This is in contrast to Neoclassical growth theory which explains steady state 
growth rate in terms of exogenous rate of technological progress. Sengupta (1998) analyzes 
the new growth theory and its empirical applications. He makes implications about the 
policy issues and decision rules about this new growth theory. In neoclassical growth 
models, the rate of growth of per capita output usually diminishes unless exogenous 
technical progress continues to sustain the investment for new technology. On the other
14
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hand, in new growth theory the process of knowledge accumulation and its spillovers 
across sectors and national boundaries serve to sustain endogenously continuous 
productivity and long run growth rate. The new growth theory allows an explicit role of 
public policy which can enhance the process of knowledge diffusion and endogenous 
process of technological change. Also, the human capital can be augmented by public 
policies through monetary and fiscal measures. Sengupta indicates that promoting 
investment in social and economic infrastructure would perform the same role in 
generation of increasing returns to scale. In the same way, public policy that promotes 
R&D through tax credits, direct subsidies or openness in trade and international diffusion 
o f knowledge would be beneficial in self sustained growth process. Sengupta also 
provides some empirical results regarding new growth theory. In one of the empirical 
surveys it is found that in the manufacturing sectors o f the US, Japan, and Korea, 
resource accumulation, not technical change, has been the key factor in output growth. 
In another empirical study he surveys the recent growth episodes of the newly 
industrializing countries (NIC) of southeast Asia. Sengupta argues that three major 
premises o f new growth theory have been put forward in this case. One is the role of 
openness in trade and export externality as a positive factor in promoting long run growth. 
The second is the persistence of increasing returns to scale in the production of technology 
intensive products. Third is the positive and negative impacts of globalization of 
international trade and stock markets on the foreign investment in NICs. On the positive 
side, competitiveness in open markets has helped increase the cost efficiency o f export 
intensive industries. On the negative side, the domestic economies of NICs are more
15
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vulnerable to international shocks. Empirical studies using time series regression analysis 
for various countries showed that openness and growth are positively related. Empirical 
studies showed that the exports have a significant impact on real national income. In terms 
of international shocks, it is found that the higher the imbalance in the foreign exchange 
market the lower the productivity growth of the economy.
Outline of Dissertation
The dissertation is structured in the following manner. Chapter One presents the 
introduction, problem statement, justification, objectives, procedures, and literature 
review. Chapter Two examines the agricultural trade policies and other relevant policies 
of Turkey and the rest of the world. Chapter Three develops the theoretical model that 
explains the impact of trade policies on producer and consumer welfare. Chapter Four 
presents the empirical model and the results of the research. Chapter Five discusses the 
results and present implications concerning the agricultural trade policies of Turkey.
16
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CHAPTER 2
AGRICULTURAL POLICY REVIEW OF TURKEY
Agriculture plays a significant role in the Turkish economy. Turkey's land area is 
approximately 76 million hectares, of this, approximately 37 percent is used for 
agricultural production. The share of agriculture in the GDP was 16.3 percent in 1994 
(Economic Report, 1994 and Trade Policy Review of Turkey, 1994). Agricultural 
production has been generally steady over the years. Cereals, industrial crops, and fruits 
are major agricultural products in Turkey. Production quantities for major Turkish 
agricultural products are presented in Table 1.
Table 1. Agricultural Production of Turkey-Major Crops, 1992-1995 (1000 tons).
Crops 1992 1993 1994 1995
Cereals
Wheat 19,300 21,016 17,514 18,015
Barley 6,900 7,500 7,500 8,000
Maize 2.225 2,500 1,850 1,900
Pulses
Lentils 600 735 610 615
Chick peas 770 740 650 730
Dry beans 200 200 180 225
Industrial crops
Sugar beet 14,840 15,620 12,944 11,171
Cotton 629 602 628 851
Tobacco 320 338 187 200
Oilseeds
Cotton seed 1,006 1,560 930 1263
Sunflower 950 815 740 900
Groundnut 67 70 70 70
Fruits and nuts
Grape and Fig 3,700 3,970 3,729 3,850
Citrus Fruits 1,674 1,737 1,889 1,782
Hazelnuts 520 305 490 455
Apple 2,100 2,080 2095 2100
Source: GATT, 1994 and FAO, 1996.
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Agricultural exports reached a value of $ 4.3 billion in 1995. Fruits, hazelnuts, 
cereals, and tobacco are major export commodities o f Turkey. The value of agricultural 
exports has increased over the years. Turkey’s agricultural exports are listed in Table 2.
Table 2. Agricultural Exports from Turkey, 1992-1995 (S million).
Product 1992 1993 1994 1995
Live animals 27.62 286.91 221.72 130.28
Cereals 591.59 270.66 374.63 440.91
Fruits and vegt. 157.01 166.96 200.33 217.91
Cotton 45.90 54.60 90.00 169.00
Tobacco 332.62 441.03 423.64 381.41
Hazelnuts 309.40 567.90 711.63 767.91
Fishery prod 60.02 29.07 70.70 87.23
Source: FAO, 1996.
Agricultural imports reached a value of $ 3.6 billion in 1992. As shown in Table 
3, oilseeds and vegetable oil play significant roles in Turkey’s agricultural imports. 
Although agricultural imports have varied over the years, there is a trend toward increased 
imports. This change arises mainly from changing consumer preferences and market 
structures.
Table 3. Agricultural Imports of Turkey, 1992-1995 (S million).
Product 1992 1993 1994 1995
Live animals 101.56 102.80 22.71 341.88
Meat 33.89 31.94 9.98 77.40
Dairy prod 27.99 27.59 19.01 34.72
Oilseeds 48.40 72.01 75.47 204.48
Veget oils 322.27 354.89 440.40 537.12
Fishery prod 30.56 18.49 38.11 50.86
Forest prod 472.05 839.43 517.25 891.09
SourcerFAO, 1996.
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Turkey has typically met its objective o f self-sufficiency in most agricultural 
products. However, Turkey is least self-sufficient in soybeans and rice. Self-sufficiency 
ratios o f major agricultural products in Turkey can be seen in Table 4.
Table 4. Self-Sufficiency Ratios of Major Agricultural Products in Turkey, 
1990-1992.
Product Percent
Wheat 114
Barley 112
Maize 95
Rice 46
Sunflower seed 83
Sugar 100
Tobacco 130
Soybean 19
Cotton 109
Milk 95
Beef 86
Sheep meat 110
Eggs 100
Chicken meat 100
Source: GATT, 1994.
Turkish agricultural policies are designed to provide adequate incomes for farmers; 
however, the average per capita income of people employed in agriculture is only 37 
percent of the national average (GATT, 1994). Currently, the main instruments of 
assistance are support prices, subsidized credit and input subsidies. The main institutions 
setting or implementing agricultural policies are; The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Affairs, The Agricultural Bank of Turkey, a number of state owned enterprises, and Unions 
of Agricultural Sales Cooperatives (ASCs). The State Planning Organization sets the 
guidelines for policy implementation. The Council of Ministers issues decisions regarding
19
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the support prices. The duties o f the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs include 
a) participation in the establishment and implementation of agricultural policies; b) 
assistance in the supply and distribution of agricultural inputs; c) supervision of 
agricultural commodity marketing in compliance with quality and standard requirements, 
and d) setting standards for the import, sale and use of pesticides, insecticides and other 
agriculture related inputs. The Agricultural Bank’s (Ziraat Bankasi) duties are: a) to 
provide financing for the institutions commissioned to implement purchases o f supported 
commodities; b) to pay input subsidies, and c) to provide agricultural credit at low interest 
rates. Soil Products Office (TMO), the State Monopoly Administration (TEKEL), 
Turkish Sugar Factories (TSFAS), the tea producer (CAYKUR), and the ASCs are the 
main institutions that provide support payments to farmers (GATT, 1994).
The state owned enterprises play a significant role in administering the support 
payments for major crops, such as wheat, coarse grains, sugar, and tobacco. Also, the 
sales cooperatives are responsible for payments with respect to other commodities, such 
as cotton, hazelnuts, and sunflowers, on which they are paid a commission. The general 
procedure is as follows: an ASC applies for permission to make payments through its 
administrative agency, the Ministry o f Industry and Trade, but its application must be 
approved by the High Planning Council. These institutions, with the exception of 
TSFAS, are not the sole purchasers; however, they are the last buyers of the agricultural 
products. The cooperatives buy approximately half the output o f cotton, hazelnuts, 
raisins, and sunflower seeds. In 1992, the private sector purchased 36 percent o f the 1991 
tobacco crop; the remainder was purchased by TEKEL for its own cigarette production
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and for support. Tea growers must obtain a production permit from CAYKUR. This 
institution, although it lost its monopsony power in 1984, sets the price for tea and 
purchases most o f Turkey's total tea output. Regarding the support payments for wheat 
and tobacco, special credit is made available through the Central Bank, and the 
Agricultural Bank finances the remaining commodities. Losses of the State Economic 
Enterprises (SEEs) are covered from the general budget. Rising support prices have 
contributed to the public deficit. In the 1980s, the number of products with price support 
was reduced from 30 to 10, and prices continued to rise slowly throughout the decade. 
In 1992, the number of crops eligible for support increased to 25. In addition, support 
prices increased by 60 to 75 percent. More than half of the payments were made for 
cotton, tobacco, sugar beet, and wheat. Supported agricultural products are: wheat, barley, 
rye, maize, oats, cotton, tobacco, sugar beets, sunflower, hazelnuts, figs, raisins, olive oil, 
mohair, pistachios, soybeans, opium seed, rape seed, livestock, paddy, green lentils, 
chick peas, peanuts, silk cocoon, red peppers, olives, rose for oil, and red lentils (GATT, 
1994).
Turkey’s Trade Policy Experience
From the beginning of the century, T urkey’s main trade policy was shaped by rapid 
industrialization, central planning, state owned enterprises and import substitution. 
However, Turkey’s trade policies were changed from time to time according to domestic 
and global conditions. There are basically two episodes of this experience (Baysan and 
Blitzer, 1991).
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The first episode was between 1970 and 1973. In this period, balance of payment 
difficulties were a major concern. The main goal o f the government was to maintain a 
high level o f growth coupled with an import substitution policy. Foreign exchange 
shortages forced the government to devalue the Turkish currency. Other incentives were 
also made to increase exports.
The second episode began in 1980. During this period, the currency was 
devaluated 50 percent, and export incentives increased. Also, public spending was limited. 
In this period, the government tried to encourage market orientation. In 1983 many 
fundamental changes were made, especially in the import sector. Much of the restricted 
tariffs were liberalized and many goods were permitted to be imported. These measures 
lowered the nominal rate of protection by approximately 16 percent. Although the trade 
policy measures could be considered successful, in terms of macroeconomics they did not 
help the economy. Because of inflationary policies and the transformation to a market 
economy, real wages and per capita consumption decreased. However, in the long run, 
because of the welfare increasing effect of trade liberalization, it is expected that 
liberalized trade will contribute to the overall economic well being of Turkey (Baysan and 
Blitzer, 1991).
Changes in the EU’s Agricultural Policies
When the EU was formed in 1951, the main objectives of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU were to raise productivity, ensure a fair standard of 
living for the agricultural community, stabilize markets, and provide food security and 
reasonable prices for the consumers (Pearce, 1981). In 1962, the EU specified three main
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principles on which the market and price policies of the CAP are based. These are the 
principle o f the unity of the market which has been implemented through the gradual 
harmonization of producer prices in member countries; the principle o f community 
preferences which are implemented by a system of variable levies and the common customs 
tariff; and the principle of financial solidarity, which is supported by the European 
Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (Harris, 1983).
The main instruments used for the implementation of the CAP are listed as follows. 
An intervention price, which establishes a minimum guaranteed price for producers, is 
used for cereals, sugar, dairy, beef, fruits, and vegetables. Storage aid is used to reduce the 
pressure on intervention for dairy, beef, and veal. Direct aid was provided for cereals, 
dairy, beef, veal, fruits, and vegetables. Import levies and export refunds are used for 
cereals, sugar, dairy, beef, veal, and processed fruit. Production quotas also are used for 
sugar and dairy (Rosenblatt etal., 1988).
As the EU implemented its agricultural policies, production expanded faster than 
consumption and the EU became a net exporter of various commodities. The CAP also 
became an increasing burden for the EU. On the other hand, international pressures 
through multilateral trade negotiations forced the EU to reform its agricultural policies 
(Ingersent et al., 1998). The EU has reduced cereal support prices by 29 per cent by 
providing compensation to farmers over the years. For oilseeds, a similar procedure has 
been followed. In the beef and sheep sectors, limits are placed on the number of animals, 
accompanied by a penalty system for exceeding the quota. The dairy and sugar sectors 
were not affected significantly by the reform.
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The EU started an Agenda 2000 movement in 1998, aiming to maintain the policy 
o f economic and social cohesion, pursue reform of the CAP, strengthen the growth and 
living conditions in the EU, and allow the accession of new members in a stable way 
(European Commission, 1999). The agricultural reforms were designed to increase the 
competitiveness of agricultural products, ensure adequate incomes for farmers, improve 
food safety, and strengthen the EU’s position in the WTO negotiations. Gradual 
reductions in intervention prices will be made in crops and the milk sector. In the sectors 
o f beef and veal, the basic price will be reduced (European Commission, 1999).
Turkey-EU  Relations
Turkey applied to the EU on July 13, 1959. After a lengthy negotiation process 
the Ankara Agreement was signed on September 12, 1963 and entered into force on 
December 1,1964. This agreement created an association between Turkey and theEU. 
The Ankara Agreement established the way for full membership and provided 
institutional and structural relationships between Turkey and the EU. The goal o f the 
agreement is to promote continuous and balanced commercial and economic relations, 
accelerate the development o f the Turkish economy, and improve the level o f living 
conditions for the Turkish people (GATT, 1994).
To attain these objectives, the agreement seeks the gradual establishment o f a 
customs union through three consecutive stages: I) the prepatory stage; 2) the transitional 
stage; and 3) the final stage. The first stage began in 1964 and ended in 1969. In this stage, 
Turkey was given concessions to adapt its economy to the conditions o f the Community. 
The second stage began in 1970 and covered a 12- year transitional period. In this stage,
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reciprocal concessions were made. The final stage was to start in 1995. However, this does 
not mean that Turkey will become a full member o f the Community. The full membership 
may be possible after the some negotiations. Turkey applied for full membership to the 
EU on April 14, 1987 and joined EU custom union in 1996. The customs union excludes 
agricultural products; however, the articles of the customs union agreement ensures an 
increase in agricultural imports from the EU (GATT, 1994). Recently, the EU accepted 
Turkey as a candidate member for full membership on December 10, 1999.
The commodity composition of Turkish exports has changed significantly in favor 
o f industrial goods, since the 1980s. The share of agricultural products exported to the 
Community declined from 51 percent to 11.3 percent while exports of industrial goods 
increased from 4 1 percent to 87.1 percent, as can be seen in Table 5. Turkey and the EU’s 
agricultural policies toward specific agricultural products for the analysis are presented
in Table 6.
TableS. Commodity Composition of Turkey's Trade with the EU, 1980-1992 
(percent).
1980 1990 1991 1992
Exports to the EU
Industrial products 41.4 82.7 82.8 87.1
Agricultural products 51.1 15.2 15.2 11.3
Mining 7.5 2.1 1.9 1.6
Imports from the EU
Industrial products 60.5 76.1 81.9 81.5
Agricultural products 1.5 6.1 3.8 5.2
Mining 38.0 17.8 13.7 13.3
Source:GATT, 1994.
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Table 6. Agricultural Policies of Turkey and the EU, 1995.
Product Policies
Turkey
Lamb Direct payment, credit subsidy, import tariff
Dairy Milk Specific subsidies, import tariff
Com Price support, credit subsidy, import tariff
Wheat Price support, credit subsidy, import tariff
Rice Price support, credit subsidy, import tariff
Oilseeds Credit subsidy, import tariff
Cotton Credit subsidy, import tariff
Sugar Price support, import tariff
Tobacco Price support, direct payment, import tariff
Poultry Direct payment, credit subsidy, import tariff
EU
Lamb Basic price, deficiency payments, import tariff
Dairy Milk Target price, intervention price, production quota, export subsidy
import tariff
Com Target price, intervention price, compensatory payments, import
tariff
Wheat Target price, intervention price, compensatory payments, import
tariff
Rice Target price, import tariff
Oilseeds Reference price, import tariff
Cotton Intervention price
Sugar Basic price, production quota, export subsidy, import tariff
Tobacco Premium
Poultry Basic price
Source: WTO, 1999 and European Commission, 1995.
Note: Italics indicate the main policy instruments for that product.
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In Turkey, a direct payment program for lamb and poultry production is used to 
compensate for the slaughter o f animals for sanitary reasons. Specific subsidies are 
temporary and provide a kind of secondary income for low income milk farmers. TMO 
purchases com, wheat, and rice, TSFAS purchases sugar, and TEKEL purchases tobacco 
using their own resources and then charge the Treasury ofTurkey with the amount of the 
purchase plus a 10% margin. A credit subsidy is provided for crops and livestock. 
Introduced in 1995, the Support Price and Stabilization Fund extends the concessional 
credits at 40-90 percent points below commercial rates. These loans are provided by the 
Turkish Agricultural Bank. For tobacco, a direct payment program provides deficiency 
payments for the difference between the market price and administrated price.
In the EU, basic prices for lamb, sugar, and poultry are used. If the reported market 
price or the reference price falls below this level, intervention may be undertaken. 
Deficiency payments are used to support lamb production when market prices rise. In the 
dairy and sugar sectors, administered prices and production quotas are used in conjunction 
with import protection. For cereals, the spending under the EAGGF fund has payments 
which increase over the years. However, due to high world cereal prices, export refunds 
have declined. For cotton, like livestock, dairy and cereals, an intervention price that sets 
a minimum price is used. For tobacco, premiums are paid depending on the quality of the 
product.
Trade Liberalization and the WTO
The movement toward agricultural trade liberalization has been made under the 
GATT rules. Because o f the high level of protection in agricultural commodities,
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agriculture played an important role in the negotiations (Ingersent and Rayner, 1994). 
Unlike the other areas of trade policy, it is very difficult to separate agricultural trade 
policies from domestic policies. The origins of the Uruguay Round go back to the 1980s. 
In this time period, protectionist policies were widespread in the world. Before the 
Uruguay Round, there were other negotiations regarding trade liberalization but agriculture 
benefitted little from this process. In 1982, a GATT committee was appointed to make 
changes in protectionism. In 1986, world prices for agricultural commodities decreased 
noticeably. US agricultural exports fell and support costs for agriculture increased. Export 
subsidy programs were introduced to promote exports in the US and EU. These 
developments led to trade disputes and negotiations were started.
The trade negotiations in agriculture were carried out in three phases. In the first 
phase, various countries attempted to make improvements in trade liberalization. In 1987, 
the US proposed the elimination of all trade distorting farm policies over a ten- year 
period. The PSEs were suggested to use as criteria for the domestic subsidies. However, 
the EU and other countries objected to this proposal. In 1989, countries agreed to freeze 
support prices.
The second phase intended to form a common document on which all countries 
would agree. The US proposed to convert non tariff import barriers into tariff equivalents. 
The EU agreed to form tariffication. The third stage developed the details of the agreement 
and summarized them in the Final Draft of December 1991 by the director general of 
GATT, Arthur Dunkel and was called as Dunkel Draft. The Dunkel Draft established the 
guidelines for trade liberalization. In 1992 the main provisions on agriculture were made
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in terms o f market access, reducing domestic support, and improving export competition 
(Ingersent and Rayner, 1994). These provisions are given in Table 7.
Table 7. Key Elements of Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture.
Market Access: Reduce existing and new tariffs by 36% on average 6 years (developing 
countries 24% over 10 years). Reduce tariffs for each item by 15% (developing countries 
5%)
Export Competition: Reduce expenditure by 36% over 6 years (developing countries 24% 
over 10 years). Reduce volume by 21% over 6 years (developing countries 14% over 10 
years).
Domestic Subsidies: Aggregate level of trade distorting support reduced by 20 percent over 
6 years (developing countries 14% over 10 years).
Source: International Agricultural Research Consortium, 1994.
Turkey continued the trade liberalization process on the multilateral scale through
the Uruguay Round negotiations. Turkey made certain concessions in agriculture and
other sectors. International treaties, such as GATT, are signed by the Ministry of Foreign
affairs. Although the treaties require legislative approval by the Grand National Assembly,
they may be implemented without legislative approval. Turkey’s accession to the GATT
began with the 1951 Torquay Protocol and since then it has participated in all negotiations.
Globalization and the Agricultural Sector
The economic environment of international agricultural trade changes as
globalization emerges as a determining power in the world. Increased international
competition, decreasing number of farmers, and complex government policies and
interventions are critical issues of the new trade agenda. Consequently, agriculture has
become increasingly dependent on foreign markets, capital flow, exchange rates, trading
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blocs, and trade policy (Lueschen, 1993). Agricultural protectionism has been the main 
policy in the agriculture of the developed countries. The agricultural policies in developed 
countries have been designed to protect their farmers from world market fluctuations as 
well as domestic demand and supply changes. Developed countries share common 
objectives, such as supporting farm income, providing adequate amounts of food for 
consumers, and protecting the rural environment and the landscape. Despite similar 
objectives, many countries, such as United States and the EU, have employed different 
policy instruments to achieve their objectives.
In developing countries, government intervention in agriculture has also played an 
important role in the structure of the sector. The agricultural trade regimes in developing 
countries have some distinct features. Developing countries often tax their farmers. As 
a result, agricultural products in developing countries are underpriced. Marketing boards 
in developing countries have been a monopoly to trade in major agricultural export 
commodities. This situation resulted in lower prices received by farmers. Quantitative 
restrictions, such as quotas and import tariffs, were used widely. However, some 
developing countries are restructuring their economies towards more liberal policies and 
freer trade (Lueschen, 1993).
WTO provisions, policy reforms in developed countries, and globalization of the 
world economy causes agricultural protection to lessen and become more liberalized. 
However, the globalization of agricultural policies is a difficult process given that the main 
policies utilized by developed countries are distinct from those of developing countries. 
Current policies o f developed countries, such as the US and EU, have introduced 
distortions in the world market. As a result, consumers and tax payers pay the burden of
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agricultural support. In addition, the relative power of farmer organizations in the 
developed countries is the obstacle in freer trade. Success o f trade liberalization and 
globalization depends heavily on the commitments of the developed countries’ on 
multilateral trade concessions (Lueschen, 1993).
Developing countries gain from trade liberalization through enlarged market 
access for their agricultural exports. They have considerable interest in WTO negotiations 
and achieving of trade liberalization. Many of these countries depend heavily on food 
imports and may experience higher import costs due to the rising world prices o f cereals 
and livestock prices. Their loss can be decreased by increases in other agricultural 
products and manufacturing exports. Providing reciprocal concessions to developing 
countries helps their bargaining power and encourages their participation in the negotiations 
(Islam, 1988).
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORETICAL MODEL
Gains From Trade
International trade provides benefits when it allows buyers access to commodities 
that would either be unavailable or more expensive without a trade. Mutually beneficial 
trade can arise among countries because production conditions and preferences differ from 
country to country. Through the exchange o f commodities, countries are able to consume 
different bundles o f goods than they actually produce. This kind of exchange can increase 
the well-being of each trading country. Gains from international trade can be extended 
through specialization in production of specific commodities as determined by 
comparative advantage. Since resources and factors are not fully mobile, international 
trade causes some groups to lose while others to gain although a society as a whole 
benefits from these transactions (Houck, 1986).
In order to understand the welfare gains from trade, we can use a three sector 
diagram. Let us assume there are two countries, one exporter (X) and one importer (M). 
These countries trade a commodity in a competitive market. Supply and demand curves 
represent the aggregate supply and demand, respectively. In Figure 1(b) ES and ED 
represent excess supply and excess demand curves for X and M respectively. The excess 
supply curve shows the amount that X will sell (export) at each price, while the excess 
demand curve shows the amount M is willing to buy (import) at each price. In autarky, 
when their economies are closed, they produce OE, and OG, amounts o f goods at the 
domestic equilibrium prices P, and P2, respectively. Since the price is higher in M than
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in X, M has an incentive to buy from X. When they open their economies and implement 
free trade, the price in X rises and the price in M falls. The welfare effects o f liberalized 
trade can be shown by evaluating the change in producer and consumer surplus resulting 
from the price change in each country. Producers in X have a surplus gain represented by 
the area E+F+G+H, while consumers have a surplus loss represented by the area E+F+G. 
Therefore, the gain for X is represented by the area H. This area equals the area M in 
Figure 1(b). Producers in M have a producer surplus loss represented by the area R+N, 
while the consumers have a surplus gain represented by the area N+Q+R+T and the 
triangular area on each side of the T. Thus, M gains an area represented by Q+T and the 
triangular areas at each side of the T. This area equals the area K.+L in Figure 1(b). So, 
both countries gain from trade (Haley and Dixit, 1995).
This diagram can also be used to show the various agricultural trade policy 
scenarios on the welfare of various groups. Let us assume that the government introduces 
a price support program (Pp) in X. Consumption in X falls from OA, to OM,, while 
production increases from OB, to ON,. Consumers in X have a surplus loss represented 
by the are A+B, while producers gain area A+B+C. The government in X is forced to 
purchase N,M, of the commodity and taxpayers pay an amount equal to the area 
B+C+D+F+G+H+J+Y. The net welfare cost o f this program is the area 
B+D+F+G+H+J+Y. The area C represents the income transfer from foreign buyers to 
producers in X and is not a cost to X. Consumers in M face higher prices. Their welfare 
loss is represented by the area R+T and the triangular deadweight loss areas at each side 
o f T. Producers in M gain the area R. So the net welfare loss for M is T and the triangular
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areas at each side of it. The global welfare loss is the area Z in Figure 1 (b). This shows 
that government can never increase the global welfare in the sense of a Pareto superior 
concept by changing price or quantity from either direction (Haly and Dixit, 1995). 
However, in some cases, as described by the new trade theory, trade barriers may 
facilitate rapid development in developing countries.
Economic Integration
Economic integration may take various forms ranging from free trade areas to 
complete political integration. The varieties of integration can be summarized as follows 
(El-Agraa, 1994):
1. Free Trade Areas: The member nations remove all trade barriers among themselves but 
retain their freedom regarding the determination of their trade policies rest of the world.
2. Customs Unions: This way of integration is similar to free trade areas except that the 
members must conduct and pursue common external trade relations. For instance, they 
must adopt common external tariffs on imports from nonparticipants.
3. Common Markets: This kind of integration allows for free factor mobility across 
national members, such as capital, labor, enterprise, and technology as well as the custom 
union.
4. Economic Unions: Economic unions requires complete unification of monetary and 
fiscal policies so that a central authority is introduced to exercise control over the policies.
5. Political Integration: In this type of integration, members become a single nation with 
one political authority.
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International trading bloc arrangements can be encouraged by various means, such 
as sense of community, strategic alliances, norms, and rules. The purpose of a trading bloc 
is to make up for some shortcomings o f multinational trading. The motivation for 
forming multinational trading blocs varies from region to region. The main factors that 
play a role in forming these kinds of trading blocs are as follows (Delener, 1999):
1. Members may see economic benefits from achieving a more efficient production 
structure from foreign investment inside.
2. Members may attach importance on non-economic objectives, such as political ties, 
stabilization, etc.
3. Members may want to improve their bargaining power in multilateral trade negotiations.
4. Smaller countries may want to have security of market access by forming trade alliances
Economic integration could result in trade creation and/or trade diversion. Trade 
creation occurs because of the replacement of expensive domestic production by cheaper 
imports from a partner while trade diversion occurs because of the replacement of cheaper 
initial imports from the rest of the world by more expensive imports from a partner.
The welfare implications of economic integration can be described as follows. 
Assuming perfect competition in both commodity and factor markets, full employment of 
resources, perfect factor mobility nationally but imperfect mobility across borders, three 
countries, H(home), P (the potential partner) and W (rest of the world) are presented in 
Figure 2.
In Figure 2, Sw is W’s perfectly elastic tariff free supply curve for a commodity. 
SH, is H’s supply curve while SH+P is the joint H and P tariff free supply curve. When a
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nondiscriminatory tariff o f AD (th) is imposed by H, the effective supply curve facing H 
is BREFQT, which is its own supply curve up to E and W’s, subject to the tariff [Sw(l+ tH)]. 
The domestic price is OD, which gives domestic production o f Oq3 and imports o f q2q3. 
H pays q2LMq3 for these imports while the domestic consumer pays q2EFq3 with the 
difference (LEFM) being tariff revenue that accrues to the government in country H. This 
revenue can be considered as a transfer from the consumers to the government. If H and 
W form a customs union, the free trade situation will be restored so that Oq5 will be 
consumed in H and this amount will be imported from W. In this situation, free trade is an 
ideal situation. However, if H and P form a customs union, the tariff will still apply to W 
while it is removed from P. In this case, the effective supply curve is BR.GQT. Price falls 
to OC causing in a decrease in domestic production to Oql and increase in consumption 
to Oq4. Increase on imports is the distance in the amount o f qlq4. These imports now 
come from P.
The welfare implications of these changes can be analyzed using the concept of 
consumer and producer surplus. Consumer surplus increases by an amount represented 
by CDFG as a result of increased consumption. CDEJ is a fall in producer surplus due to 
the decline in domestic production and IEFH is a portion of the tariff revenue transferred 
back to the consumer. In this case, triangles JEI and HFG are gains from the customs 
union. The fall in domestic production from Oq2 to Oql leads to increased imports of 
qlq2. The cost of import from P is ql JIq2 while it originally costs q l JEq2 to produce 
domestically. Therefore, the saving is the area represented by JEI. The increase in 
consumption from Oq3 to Oq4 results in a new import o f q3q4 that costs q3HGq4 to import
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from P. The welfare gain for consumers is represented by the amount HFG. Since the 
initial imports o f q2q3 originally cost the country q2LMq3, and now these imports come 
from P costing q2IHq3, these imports lead to a loss equal to the government revenue which 
is LIHM. Therefore, triangle gains (JEI+HFG) should be compared to the loss of tariff 
revenue represented by the area (LIHM) before a definite conclusion can be made regarding 
net gain or loss of a customs union (El- Agraa, 1994).
Given the previous discussion, there are several factors which will likely cause an 
economic integration to progress (Salvatore, 1995). First if the preunion trade barriers 
among member countries are higher, the welfare is likely to increase. In this case, there 
is a greater probability that formation of the customs union will create trade among union 
members rather than divert trade from monmembers to members. Second, if the customs 
union’s barriers on trade with the rest of the world are lower, the welfare is likely to 
increase. This makes it less likely that formation of the customs union will cause costly 
trade diversion. Third, if the number o f countries forming an economic union are high and 
their sizes are large, the welfare increases. In this case, the probability that low cost 
consumers join the union increases. Fourth, if the economies of member countries are 
competitive rather than complementary, the welfare is likely to increase. In this case, there 
are greater opportunities for specialization in production and trade creation with the 
formation o f economic union. Fifth, if the member states are geographically closer, the 
welfare increases because of the low transportation costs. Finally, if the preunion trade 
relationships are well developed, the welfare increases because of the fact that this creates 
significant opportunities for significant welfare gains as a  result o f formation of a 
economic union.
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Figure 2. Welfare Implication of Economic Integration
Source :E1-Agraa, 1994.
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There are other static and dynamic welfare effects of an economic integration 
(Salvatore, 1995). The static arise from administration, terms of trade, and 
negotiation power. Administration savings arise from elimination o f customs officers, 
and border patrols among member countries. Also, a trade diverting customs union is 
likely to increase the terms of trade of a member country. In this case, demand for imports 
and supply of exports to the rest of the world decreases. However, for a trade creating 
customs union, the opposite is true. In this case, part o f the increase in real income 
resulting from the union increases the demand for imports from rest of the world. Another 
factor resulting from economic integration is that by acting as a single unit in international 
trade negotiations an economic union increases its bargaining power.
Formation of an economic union also has dynamic effects. These dynamic effects 
stem from increased competition, economies of scale, investment stimulation, and better 
utilization of economic resources. In the absence of a economic integration among 
member countries, producers may be less likely to take advantage of international markets 
because of protective trade barriers. When a customs union is formed, and the trade 
barriers among member states are eliminated, the producers in each country must be more 
efficient in order to compete with other producers. This kind of progress also benefits 
consumers because of the low prices. Economies of scale are likely to emerge from an 
enlarged market. After the formation of an economic union, the range of differentiated 
products manufactured in each country can be decreased, resulting in increase of 
production and productivity. Formation of an economic union encourages foreign investors 
to invest within the union to avoid trade barriers set by the union (Salvatore, 1995).
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Agricultural Policies and Income Effects
There are primarily four economic factors that affect income equity. These are: 
economic growth, personal assets, capital intensity of technology, and product market 
demand (Stevens and Jabara, 1988). Neoclassical theory indicates that with free markets, 
wage and income differentials should decrease as the economy develops because of the 
market forces. However, economic theory indicates that the primary determinants of 
income are the assets controlled by individuals in the form of physical and human capital. 
Therefore, income is affected by the amount of land, business equipment, and financial 
assets, and by human capital that includes knowledge or skills. The capital intensity of 
technological change also affects the share of income received by the various factors of 
production. The distribution of income between the factors of production will be 
determined by the rate of growth in the supply of a factor relative to the rate o f growth in 
demand of that factor. The demand for a factor will be influenced by the amounts and 
kinds o f technological change occurring in that sector. For example, if a new technology 
has been developed that requires proportionately less labor, labor use will decrease 
compared to the amount used in with the original technology. When a labor-saving 
technology is used the share of labor in the income produced tends to decline unless wage 
rates rise rapidly. The policy implication of this model is that government policies that 
reduce the cost of capital below market rates, such as subsidies for capital intensive 
agricultural technologies will tend to encourage the adoption of labor displacing 
technologies and slow the growth of the demand for labor, thus worsening the distribution 
o f income.
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Product market demand conditions are other factors that affect the distribution of 
income. For example, an increase in the supply o f agricultural products due to 
technological change would result in the reduction of price received by producers. 
Whether producers or consumers would gain is determined by the price elasticity o f 
demand. With an inelastic demand curve, the price farmers receive would decrease with 
little increase in quantity sold. Given an elastic demand curve, a small decrease in the 
price farmers receive would result in a proportionally large increase in the quantity sold. 
So, with an inelastic demand for their products, farmers are likely to lose income relative 
to consumers, but with an elastic demand for their products, farmers are likely to gain 
income relative to consumers (Stevens and Jabara, 1988).
Government Policies to Reduce Income Disparities
Policy makers typically chose among three tools to reduce income disparities. 
These are: structural and institutional changes, income transfer, and investment programs 
that improve the employment opportunities and human capital of low income groups 
(Stevens and Jabara, 1988). Structural and institutional change aim to shift income flows 
from higher to lower income groups (e.g., agricultural land reforms that transfer land assets 
and land income from large landholders to small farmers). However, attempts to carry out 
these changes often face significant political and social obstacles. The income transfer 
strategy using taxation is common in developed nations. In this case, lower income 
groups are given financial and other aid from resources obtained by taxing higher income 
groups. Also, programs providing minimum income for the poor and aged and free health 
care for the poor are used for low income people. However, since many developing
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countries lack strong tax system, government transfer usually decreases only a small 
amount o f poverty. Investment strategy focuses on increasing the physical and human 
capital o f lower income groups. For instance, irrigation programs in poorer agricultural 
areas, and technical training of lower income groups about new techniques can be used 
for this purpose. Agricultural price policies also have substantial distributional effects. 
Change in support prices and input subsidies affect producer and consumer prices. 
However, experiences have shown that such price interventions are relatively ineffective 
instruments for transferring income to the poor. While benefitting some low-income 
groups, they have limited effect and can have various adverse effects on other low- 
income groups (FAO, 1987). An increase in the real producer price support level for 
agricultural products will initially change the distribution of income in favor of agriculture 
and cause a loss of real income for consumers. A rise in producer prices will mostly 
benefit larger producers because the increase in their sales is likely to be more than the 
additional cost of their food purchases. Small farmers may gain or lose depending on the 
size of their food sales in relation to food purchases. I f  income is reduced, the farmer may 
be forced to decrease farm investment or current input expenditures. This causes a decrease 
in future production and income. On the other hand, if income rises as a consequence of 
the higher price of output, they may invest more. Employed landless labors will reduce 
their food consumption because of the decrease in their real income. This situation may 
be avoided if farm wage increases.
Policies that affect input prices may cause the displacement o f labor and worsen 
income distribution in agriculture. For example, if a cheap credit is given for purchase of
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machinery, there will be a decrease in agricultural labor. Displacement o f labor can 
influence concentration of big land ownership and, consequently distort the income 
distribution. Displacement of labor from agriculture may be compensated by jobs in the 
manufacturing or services sectors depending on the economic performance o f the 
economy.
Agrarian structure also affects the price-equity issues. If the agricultural sector 
consists of small farmers, required labor is provided by the small farmers. In this case, an 
increase in product prices will be spread evenly among most farmers. Output and absolute 
level o f income rise without distorting the distribution of the income (FAO, 1987).
Since agricultural price policy has substantial effects on income distribution, when 
constructing such policies, income distribution effects should be considered. To avoid 
worsening income distribution in rural and urban populations some measures should be 
considered. These are: 1- Price policy needs to be associated with structural and other non­
price measures that considers equity problem more directly, 2- Measures to carry out price 
policy must be designed and administered to ensure that small farmers participate and 
benefit full, and 3- Producer price intensives should be accompanied by targeted food 
subsidies that considers both rural and urban poor (FAO, 1987).
One instrument for reducing the inter-farm inequality arising from market surplus 
is the redistribution of the assets. However, if changes in land ownership is not feasible, 
the government can alter tenancy agreements to improve the access of small farmers and 
landless labors to bigger land assets. Providing various input subsidies, extension in favor 
of small farmers, and unionization of farm workers can benefit small farmers (FAO, 1987).
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Price measures need to be designed and applied so that not only the large 
farmers but also small farmers can benefit. Price supports could be directed at those crops 
grown mostly by small farmers. Food subsidies are needed to protect the real income of 
the poor. For rural food purchasers, a rural work program and partial payment in food 
purchase can be very effective.
Food Prices and Consumers
There are a number of policy options available for correcting the undesirable 
effects o f increased food prices on low income consumers. These measures can be listed 
as explicit general subsidies, targeted food subsidies, and alternative measures (Andersen, 
1987).
Explicit General Subsidies: Some countries protect consumers from increasing food prices 
by constructing wedges in the form of publicly financed subsidies. The fiscal cost of these 
subsidies depends on the size o f wedge protection, marketing cost, and the amount of food 
to which the subsidy applied. The size of the wedge may change over time either to 
insulate domestic consumers from price fluctuations in the international markets or to 
narrow the gap between the domestic and international price trends. The subsidized price 
wedge leads to high budgetary costs.
Targeted Food Subsidies: Because o f the high budgetary costs o f general food subsidies, 
governments often target food subsidies to low income consumers or specific foods. If the 
main goal o f the food subsidies is to increase or sustain the ability of the low income 
consumers to purchase enough food to meet nutritional requirements, targeting can cost 
less. However, it should be noted that increasing administrative costs can jeopardize cost 
efficiency.
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Alternative Measures: There are other alternative measures that aim to improve low- 
income consumers’ purchasing power, such as cash payments and food transfers programs. 
Cash payment programs require costly control measures to avoid abuses. The advantage 
o f cash payment programs is that the actual distribution of food need not be undertaken 
by the public sector. Regarding food transfers, some countries prefer direct feeding of 
individuals deficient in calories and nutrition. In this case, leakage to nontargeted 
households is small but administrative cost is high.
Design and Implementation of Agricultural Policies in Developing Economies
The objective of an agricultural policy should be to establish a price system which 
integrates producer prices, consumer prices, access by low income rural and urban people 
to basic foods at below retail levels, responsiveness such as supply and demand conditions, 
and input prices (FAO, 1987).
The level and stability of producer prices is a main point in developing a producer 
price policy. Some countries design policies such that minimum target prices do not 
match the satisfactory level. Developing countries tax exports to keep consumer food 
prices low and to receive revenue. On the other hand, many developed countries favor 
producers (FAO, 1987). In determining producer prices a number of economic criteria 
should be considered, such as demand prospects, the prices necessary to achieve the 
desired level of output, international price trends, and projected changes in production cost. 
Policy makers should weigh the relative importance of these various criteria.
Agricultural price policies must reconcile the need for low price and adequate 
amounts o f foods for low income consumers and providing adequate levels o f producer
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prices. To suppress producer prices is not a desirable action since it decreases production 
and producer income and slows a country’s growth in the long run. General food or input 
subsidies also cause excessive budgetary burden. The optimal choice involves determining 
the best combination of food pricing, and allocation of public funds to food subsidies for 
targeted rural and urban poor. The commodity coverage of producer support prices 
depends on public funds and administrative capacity. If these resources are not enough, 
coverage can be limited to storable foods and to leading exporting commodities. In 
implementing the price policies for producer and consumer welfare, a number of measures 
need to be employed. The main policy for producer income is to determine a level of 
guaranteed minimum support prices. Some form of government purchase must be 
available in case the market prices fall below the target level. Purchased supplies may be 
resold domestically to keep domestic prices down, used for food distribution, or exported.
An FAO study (1987) showed that 15-20 percent purchase of grains will usually be 
sufficient. Another method is to provide government backed loans to be made of the 
security of the crop. In this case the producer has the option of redeeming the loan. If a 
country regularly imports a commodity, it can maintain its target price by controlling the 
inflow of imports and the timing and price of their release. The purchasing and 
distribution agency can involve a governmental organization such as the ministry of 
agriculture, quasi-commercial institutions, or the contractual use of private or cooperative 
marketing organizations. In purchasing the agricultural commodities, the government 
should be ready to export the excessive purchases to prevent unwanted stocking. For 
export commodities, if the commodity is covered by an international agreement, a national
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marketing organization will be needed to link domestic and international price levels. If 
there is no such international agreement, a national commodity stabilization program can 
be used. In this case, a commodity institution can set an annual producer price and 
purchase the commodity, or it may pay the difference between the domestic and 
international export price. However, if the government keeps the average price paid to 
producers well below the export price, and treats the surpluses as government revenue, this 
policy distorts relative prices of agricultural exports. The availability o f a comprehensive 
tax base which reduces the commodity taxes for these specific products can reduce the 
distortion (FAO, 1987).
Key Policy Issues Confronting Developing Countries
Changes in agricultural policies have direct and indirect macro effects in an 
economy. Price bias against agriculture caused by long-term development strategies must 
be removed gradually if a sector contributes to the economy extensively. In countries at 
early stages of the development, subsidies such as input and credit can be effective. The 
effectiveness o f input pricing depends on good measure and adequate infrastructure (FAO, 
1987).
Producer price policy affects the distribution of income both between agriculture 
and other sectors o f the economy and within the agricultural sector. Higher producer 
prices favor big farmers because they have great market quantities over small farmers and 
landless labor. Also, input subsidies have similar effects. In order to limit unintended 
effects within agriculture, price policy must be accompanied by other measures targeting 
small farmers. These measures include, credit to small farmers, public investment, and
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improved access to subsidized food. If the agricultural sector consists of evenly distributed 
lands and small farmers have equal access to inputs and credit, price support policy can be 
used more freely.
Theoretical Framework
This section will develop a theoretical framework to analyze the effects o f various 
international agricultural trade policies of Turkey on the PPF accompanied with the trade 
liberalization.
An important assumption of studies utilizing a political preference function is that 
policy-making process is formulated such that the government maximizes a function of the 
welfare o f various interest groups and the observed policy outcomes are Pareto efficient 
(Bullock, 1994). Many interest groups influence policy. Likewise, there are many policy 
instruments available to the government. In order to describe this concept o f the PPF, we 
can use Figure 3. Consider the case of two interest groups. A surplus transformation 
curve (STC) can be generated in (u,, u2) space by changing one instrument, x, while, 
continuously holding all other instruments constant. Assume that instruments are price 
subsidy s and government research r, where r is assumed to lead technological advance by 
lowering producer marginal costs and market prices. Also assume that there are two interest 
groups consisting o f consumer-taxpayers and producers. The welfare of consumers and 
producers, CS and PS, respectively, are function o f the government’s policy choice (s, r). 
The welfare outcome of policy (sn, r0) is [CS(s0, r„), PS(s0, r0)] at point a. At least two 
STCs; STC, and STC3, pass through a. The government can move the economy along 
STC3 by changing the level o f research and keeping subsidy constant. At point a, STC,
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and STC3 are not tangent to a common hyperplane. Thus, because the necessary 
conditions of vector maximization problem are not met, the policy (s0, r0) is not efficient, 
so [CS(s0, r0), PS(s0, r0)]at point a is not on the Pareto frontier. On the other hand, (r,, s0) 
and (r0, s,) are efficient policies since slopes of STC, and STC4 are equal at b (Bullock, 
1994).
The framework underlying this analysis is based on Johnson et al. (1993) and 
Kennedy etal. (1996). In this model, countries produce, consume and trade N number 
of commodities. The aggregate level of production, consumption, and trade in country i 
is provided by vectors o f supply, demand, and excess demand. Fanners in country i 
produce the subset of the N traded commodities in order to maximize profit, given prices, 
technology, and endowments. Aggregate supply is given by
(3.1) Y{Pr Zr \. . .YH{Pn Zf ),
where Pr„(P„, ...P,N) is the vector of the producer prices of the N traded commodities, and 
Zf is a vector of exogenous factors, such as prices of inputs and factor endowments. 
Demand for agricultural commodities is summarized by the vector of demand functions
(3.2) X(Pc,Zc) = ( X l(Pc;Zc) , . . .XN(Pc;Zc)),
the corresponding indirect utility function is given by
(3.3) U(PC;ZC),
where Pc=(Pci> PC2 » PC3 » Pcn) is the vector of consumer prices for the N commodities, Zc 
is a vector of exogenous variables. Trade in N commodities is summarized by excess 
demand
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Figure 3. Relationship between Surplus Transformation Curves and Pareto Frontier.
Source: Bullock, 1994.
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(3.4) E(Pf ,Pc,Zf ,Zc) = X{Pc,Zc) -Y (<Pf -,Zf ).
Governments intervene in the domestic markets through price instruments and 
demand/supply shift instruments. Price instruments, denoted by Apfn for producers (f) and 
Apcn for consumers (c) of commodity N affect the farm and consumer prices directly or 
indirectly. Let us assume that is the world price of commodity N. Then the following
domestic price functions are defined
(3.5a) Pfn = Pfn( A p/„,Pwn), and
(3.5b) Pcn = Pc„ ( A pc„,Pwn), V« = 1,... AL
Suppose that world prices are functions of the actions of the two governments, then
(3.6) Pw = Pw(A p/ i , A pci,As/ i , A sci ,A p/ 2 , A pc2. A s/ 2 .A s^ Z l.Z2,Z3).
where Asfn and Ascn are shift instruments that shift supply and demand functions, such as 
input subsidies, acreage reduction, etc.
When governments choose agricultural policies, they consider the effects of their 
policies on the welfare of various groups, such as producers, consumers, and taxpayers. 
Since agricultural policies, like any other policies, can make some groups better off at 
others expense, governments must weigh the welfare gains of one group against the welfare 
losses of others. These trade-offs are represented by a political payoff function (PPF) 
which is a weighted additive function of producer quasi-rents, indirect utility o f consumers, 
and the cost of agricultural policies of the two governments. Let -i represent other country, 
let At= (Afi, Aci)= (Apfi, Asfi, Apci, Asci), and suppress Z,, Z2, Z3. Producers are aggregated
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by commodity group. The welfare of each producer group is the profit obtained from the 
production and sale o f the commodity. Thus, assuming differentiability, the welfare 
associated with the production of the n* commodity is the line integral
pn
<3-7> n .(/>.)= Jp/,o>)dp,
0
as commodity N is a net output or net input respectively. Let
(3.8a) n(/>/ ;Z/ ) = ( n I( / ,/ ;Z/ ),...,n :v (/>/^ / ) T
be the vector of quasi-rents as a function of the policies of the government, then substitute 
for Pr by using equation (3.5a) and (3.5b), suppressing Zf and substitute for Pw by using 
equation (3.6) to obtain
(3.8b) n , ( ^ , ^ . , )  = n , ( 4 , P w( / f , , / i . , ) ) ,^ ) .
In the same way, substituting the domestic price function into equation (3.3) we can obtain 
indirect utility,
(3.9) U, ( 4 ,  A_, ) = £/,( Pct (APct, Pw (At , A_,)), A SCI).
In order to define the government budget in the N agricultural commodities, let t 
denote a transpose. Then, aggregate consumer expenditures are Pc X', producers receive 
PrY‘, and excess demand is purchased in world markets at prices Pw for PWE‘. Therefore, 
using equations (3.1) and (3.2) and substituting for E with equation (3.4), the budget is
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(3.10a) B(Pf ,Pc,Pw;Z) = (Pc - P w ) * X l(Pc;Zc) - ( P f - P w)* Y ‘(Pf ;Zf ).
After making the proper substitutions for Pf, Pc, Pw, and Z as before, the budget of 
government i becomes a function of both governments agricultural policies;
(3.10b) 5 , ( 4 - , ^ )  = B t i P ^ A P  ji ,Pw),Pci( A pd ,P w),Pw( A s f l ,Aci).
Finally, normalizing on the budget and using equations (3.8a), (3.9) and (3.10a), the PPF 
is shown as
(3.11) F;.(^,_,.) = n i(Ai^ )* A .Ji+Ui(Ai'_i)*Aci + Bt(A , ^ )
where k fi is an N by one strictly positive vector and ka is a positive scalar. The {kfi, kct)
are the political weights of the respective commodity groups and the aggregate consumer 
in country i.
Equation (3.10a) explicitly links the policies of two governments with their 
objectives. However, the way either government chooses its agricultural policies also must 
be determined. An equilibrium point can be constructed such that in formulation of the 
polices, a government chooses policies to maximize its PPF given the policies o f the other. 
In this case, a best response correspondence is defined for each government. Then, the 
equilibrium is defined using the best response correspondence. For a given A.j, 
government i chooses A,* which is a best response to A.j, such that
(3.12) V,(A ,\A_,)>  V , ( 4 ,A . , ) V A , s  A,.
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where Af is the set of actions or policies available to government i. Therefore, every Af 
A., has a set of actions in A ; that satisfy equation (3.12). This set defines the best response 
correspondence of A.j. A  pair of actions (A ,*, A2*) is an equilibrium if A ,* is a best 
response to A2* and vice verse. Thus, (A ,*, A2*) satisfies equation 3.12 for all i. Now 
consider the differentiable case of the model. In this case, differentiating equation (3.11) 
with respect to A fi and A cj, the first order necessary conditions for a maximum are
r d V i  i
d  n , 8  Uai ] r  SB ., -1
3  v fi d  A ji d  A jj d A fi "o
= * + =
d  v t d  r i i a  Uai *ci SB ., 0
3  v « . J  A ci 1 1
tji
For a given A.(, if Vj is concave in Ai} then any A t* that solves equation (3.13) maximizes 
Vj, so it is a best response to A.j. Thus, equation (3.13) implicitly defines the best response 
correspondence as Aj* (A.j). The Af* (A.j) is a function ifand only if V; is strictly concave 
in Aj for all values of A.j. (A j*, A2*) is a Nash equilibrium (Johnson et al., 1993) if
\ 3 V {  }
p
0
d  A x
(3.14) d  V2 
d  A 2 | (/»!*.Az*)
0
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Suppose the governments of two countries or trading blocs negotiate to improve their 
positions relative to the one period equilibrium that they currently pursue. If both 
governments are rational then no treaty will be signed or complied with that does not make 
both governments at least as well off as prior to the agreement. Also, if governments can 
delay agreement, a necessary condition for a treaty to be signed and complied with would 
be existence of actions (A,', A2' ) such that
(3.15) V, (A,*, A,’) *V,(A,*, A2*) and V2 (A2\  A,') a V2(A2*, A,*).
The set of actions that satisfy equation 3.15 are called the treaty action space and the 
elements of this space treaty actions.
Estimation of PPF Weights
In order to estimate the PPF weights it is assumed that the observed policies are a 
single period Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative game (Kennedy, 1996). Turkey and 
the EU choose their policies such that they maximize their PPF given the action of other. 
Given differentiable indirect profit and utility functions, inference of dtr/dA, and dU/dAj 
can be calculated from observable demand and supply functions (Johnson et al., 1993). Let 
Atur and AEU be the instruments set by Turkey and the EU in 1995. The weights kWR, and 
A.eu are estimated using approximations of partial differentials o f profits o f producers and 
utility of consumers with respect to producer and consumer protection instruments. The 
approximation of the differentials is obtained by taking small changes in An and A,.; in the 
MISS model. Considering the discrete approximation of equation (3.13), the weights can 
be calculated rearranging equation (3.13), such that
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(3.16)
^fi
ACl
[ATI,.
\<1 —i r*n
AAj; *
ATI; AB{ ABt
_AAci M e/ _ M ci_
The weights calculated according to the formula above represent the political 
influence of various producer groups and consumers as an aggregate in the agricultural 
policy formulation of Turkey and the EU.
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CHAPTER 4 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
In order to examine the effects of agricultural trade liberalization for Turkey and 
various trade policy strategies, the previously developed theoretical model will be used. 
Analysis of the effects of various scenarios is implemented using Modele International 
Simplifie de Simulation (MISS). MISS is a partial equilibrium trade model that simulates, 
in a comparative static framework, the effects of various policy decisions.
The model operates on the principle of Walrasian equilibrium. The model takes a 
change of policy by a country and identifies the corresponding changes in world prices, 
production, and consumption. Quantity supplied will equal quantity demanded plus initial 
stocks in the world markets. The initial equilibrium is given by
(4-1) I *  Sik = I *  Dik +S* Oik Jr'Lk Iik
for all i= l, N, where i represents commodity and, k represents the country. Sik, Dik> Qik
represent production, derived demand, and total demand, respectively, for commodity i 
in country k for the base year, Iik represents initial stock of commodity i in country k. 
Change in supply is given by
(4.2) SSit = + Ep.PjL)***.
for all i=l,...N, where E*jjk, (E’*jjk) represent the matrix of supply elasticities with respect 
to output (input) prices, Psjk and PDjk represent the domestic price for production and 
derived demand i in country k, and <rtk represents a quantity shifter for production.
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Change in derived demand is given by
(4.3) 40„ = Zy(J&.fJ
while change in final demand is given by
(4.4) 4
for all i= l, ...N, where Gijk represents the matrix of final demand elasticities with respect 
to consumer prices, P°jk represents the domestic price for final demand for commodity i in 
country k, £lk represents a quantity shifter for final demand for commodity i in country k.
The domestic /world price linkage is shown by the equation
or in logarithmic terms Wk is fixed so it disappears,
(4.6) p »  = p f  + C, + /*  for N=(S, D, Q ) ,
where PWj represents world price o f commodity i, ck represents the currency exchange rate, 
and Wk are the margin coefficients representing transportation costs, freight, insurance, 
or other costs.
The final equilibrium for the model, using the previous equations is given by
(4.7) Z k Slk .ASlk = Z* Dlk. ADlk + Z* Qlk AQlk
for al i=l, ...N.
Net budget costs for country k are shown as
(4.8) BCt = z {Pi -  P i) .S li - Z , ( ^ 8 )A i - 2 , ( ^ S -  p£)-Q* 
where P B ik represents the border price o f commodity i in country k.
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For the empirical analysis, 10 agricultural commodities, which are important in 
Turkish agriculture in terms of production, consumption, and trade, were chosen. These 
commodities are: lamb, dairy milk, com, wheat, rice, oilseeds, cotton, sugar, tobacco, and 
poultry. Given that the customs union with the EU started in 1996, the base year for the 
empirical study was chosen as 1995. Initialization of the model begins with the calculation 
of the protection ratios for concerned producers and consumers for Turkey in 1995. 
Protection ratios for producers and consumers are calculated as percentage PSEs and CSEs 
respectively. The necessary data for the empirical study are: I production amounts, 
2)consumption amounts, 3) prices for commodities, 4) protection levels, and 5) supply and 
demand elasticities for agricultural products. These data were obtained from major 
International statistical publications. Production and consumption amounts and prices are 
obtained from FAO (1999), protection levels are obtained from OECD (1999), and supply 
and demand elasticities are obtained from USDA (1989).
Methods of Measurement for Non-Tariff Barriers
Various methods have been used to calculate non-tariff barriers (NTB) such as 
frequency type measures, price comparison measures, and output subsidy equivalents 
(Deardorff and Stem, 1998). In frequency type measures, commodity, country and sector 
specific trade control measures are collected. Then it is possible to construct a frequency 
of occurrence of NTBs. The frequencies are calculated for applicable commodity 
categories that are subject to some degree of protection. The number of product categories 
subject to NTBs is then expressed as a percentage of total number o f product categories in 
each commodity group. This is called the frequency ratio. In this way, the degree of
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change in structure of protectionism over the years can be estimated. However, the 
frequency measures are border measures and do not include the range of internal 
government policies.
Price comparison measures are used to calculate tariff equivalents of various non­
tariff policies. Let Pd denote the price of domestic goods, and Pm denote the price of 
imported goods, which includes the transportation costs but excludes the tariffs. Then the 
tariff equivalent is calculated as
(4.9) TE = m * ( P d - P m) l  Pm.
This measure assumes that domestic and import goods are perfect substitutes.
Import quotas also can be measured in terms of tariff equivalents. If a quota is 
auctioned, tariff equivalent can be shown as
(4.10) TE = A / Pc
where A represent the auction price per unit o f quota and Pc represents the import price 
in terms of cost, insurance, and freight (c.i.f).
Government intervention in agriculture can take many forms, such as price support, 
credit subsidies, input subsidies, etc. These kinds o f subsidies can be aggregated into a 
Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE) or Consumer Subsidy Equivalent (CSE) (Deardorff 
and Stem, 1998). PSEs and CSEs quantify various protection levels. They are the 
aggregate measures of support that denote the effects of various government programs. 
The percentage PSE is defined as total transfers from government programs over 
commodity’s value to producers. PSE can be shown as
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(4.11) Percentage PSE = 0W^ n  to f rod^ rs = Q ' ( P j X )  + D + f
value to producers Q* Pd + D
where Q represents quantity produced, Pd represents producer price, Pw represents world 
price, X represents exchange rate conversion factor, D represents direct government 
payments, and I represents indirect transfers through policies such as input subsidies, 
marketing assistance or exchange rate distortions. The calculation procedure for CSE is 
similar to the PSE. The policy categories for the calculation of the PSE’s can be listed as 
follows (USDA, 1994):
t- Income support: This category include direct or indirect money transfers from the 
government to the producers. The goal o f this kind of programs is to increase farmers 
income levels. This category includes deficiency payments, disaster relief payments, and 
producer levies (negative income support).
2- Price intervention: This kind of policy alters prices o f products in the marketing chain. 
In this type of program, domestic commodities are purchased by the government at high 
prices. This domestic policy is typically accompanied by a border policy such as quota 
or tariff. This category includes export taxes, tariffs, quotas and other non-tariff barriers, 
marketing boards, and domestic price controls.
3- Input Assistance: These policies subsidize the use of inputs in agriculture. This 
category includes fertilizer subsidy, feed subsidy, pesticide subsidy, agricultural credit 
subsidy, agricultural insurance subsidy, and irrigation water subsidy.
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4- Marketing Assistance: This category of policies changes marketing and processing 
costs. It includes market development programs, storage subsidies, grading and inspection, 
and transportation subsidy.
5- Infrastructure Support: This category includes policies that effect farm structure, 
producer knowledge and productivity, and other kinds of agricultural infrastructure. These 
kinds o f programs are not commodity specific and are directed at the general agricultural 
sector. They include research and extension, land improvement, farm building subsidies, 
and assistance to farm consolidation.
6- Regional Support: This program includes state or provincial policies that effect 
producer and consumer groups.
7- Economy-wide Policies: These policies are not specific to agriculture but effects the 
agricultural sector. Examples include exchange rate policies, general transportation 
subsidies, and general tax policies.
In this study, in order to capture the total protection in agriculture both PSE and 
CSE values are used. The PSE’s are percentage values while CSE values are aggregated 
using the weighted average. In this way, various trade policy scenarios, such as a 
reduction in domestic protection and tariff reductions can be modeled. Turkey will adjust 
its tariff equivalents and domestic protections, when it joins the EU. Thus, economic 
integration in addition to a customs union in agriculture can be modeled.
Several studies estimated PPF weights for game theoretic analysis o f this type (e.g., 
Rausser and Freebaim ( 1974), Johnson et al. (1993), and Kennedy et al. (1996)). However, 
for this game to be well defined in extensive form, a number o f conditions must hold
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(Bullock, 1994 and von Cramon-Taudabel, 1992). These conditions include knowledge of 
the welfare functions which map instruments to well being, that the observed policies are 
Pareto optimal for the given weights, and that the set of feasible welfare outcomes be 
compact and convex over the domain o f policy instruments. In order to minimize these 
problems mentioned, this study uses PPF weights based on the producer and consumer 
subsidy equivalents observed in the base period 1995. Interest group weights for producers 
and consumers are calculated as percentage PSEs and an aggregate weighted CSE, 
respectively. Weights for Turkey and the EU calculated according to the method 
mentioned above are presented in Tables 8 and 9.
Table 8. Subsidy Equivalent Weights and Their Rankings by Interest Groups for 
Turkey and the EU, 1995.
Product Turkey 
Rank Weight Rank
EU
Weight
Lamb 7 1.28 1 1.77
Dairy Milk I 1.46 3 1.53
Com 8 1.18 8 1.46
Wheat 10 1.04 5 1.49
Rice 6 1.30 7 1.47
Oilseeds 5 1.33 2 1.54
Cotton 9 1.08 6 1.48
Sugar 4 1.34 4 1.50
Tobacco 2 1.39 10 1.20
Poultry J 1.36 9 1.29
Consumers 11 0.98 11 0.71
Source: OECD, 1999 and calculations.
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Table 9. Estimated Political Preference Function Weights for Turkey and the EU, 
1995.
Product Turkey EU
Rank Weight Rank Weight
Lamb 3 1.10 1 1.42
Dairy Milk 1 1.18 3 1.19
Com 11 0.83 3 1.19
Wheat 8 0.95 10 0.84
Rice 7 1.00 5 1.13
Oilseeds 10 0.90 9 0.87
Cotton 6 1.01 4 1.18
Sugar 5 1.02 2 1.21
Tobacco 4 1.03 6 0.97
Poultry 2 1.12 8 0.88
Consumers 9 0.91 7 0.93
Source: Calculated.
According to these values, with regard to the subsidy equivalent weights calculation, 
in Turkey, dairy milk, tobacco, poultry, and sugar have high level o f weights. On the other 
hand, in the EU, lamb, oilseeds, milk, and sugar have relatively high level of protection 
weights. The EU’s protection ratios are higher in all products except tobacco and poultry. 
Consumers have the lowest weight in both Turkey and the EU, although consumers in 
Turkey have a higher level of protection (0.98) than that of the EU (0.71). When the 
weights are estimated, in Turkey dairy milk, poultry, and lamb have relatively high level 
of weights, while in the EU lamb, sugar, dairy milk, and com have high level of weights. 
Comparing the two methods of weight calculation, the estimation method yields lower 
weights. Also, the rankings vary from product to product. For example, in Turkey only
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dairy milk keeps its ranking (1) while the others change although not significantly. In the 
EU, Iamb and dairy milk keep their rankings while the ranking of other commodities 
change.
Inequality Index and Gini Coefficient
A popular method of presenting data regarding income distribution is through the 
Lorenz curve. In the Lorenz curve, the x axis represents the percentage of income units 
while y axis represents the percentage of total income. The Lorenz curve shows the degree 
of dispersion of income. If all incomes are equal, so that every percentage of income units 
receives exactly the same percentage of income, the Lorenz curve is a straight diagonal 
line. If the income units receive unequal incomes, the Lorenz curve lies below the 
diagonal line. The general description of the Lorenz curve is presented in Figure 4. The 
Gini coefficient (GC) is used to measure the inequality of income in the form of a 
concentration ratio. GC is described as
/ 1 i ->\ Area between Lorenz curve and diagonal(4.12) GC = --------------------------------------------------
Total area under diagonal
The coefficient varies in the range from 0 when incomes are equal to 1 when incomes are 
extremely nonequal (Atkinson, 1983).
In order to determine the effects of various trade policy scenarios on the distribution 
o f income among the agricultural sectors, a different gini coefficient estimation will be 
used. Milanovic(1997) provides a formula to calculate the gini coefficient as
(4.13) G = 2covar(y,rv) / N y ,
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Figure 4. Lorenz Curve
Source: Atkinson, 1983.
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where covar (y, ry) is the covariance between income (y) and ranks of individuals according 
to their income. The lowest income gets the rank 1 and highest income gets the rank=N.
N represents the total number of individuals, andy represents the mean income. Another
formula that depends on the correlation coefficient can also be derived. From (1)
(4.14) covar(y,ry ) = c ya ryp(y,ry),
where cry represents the standard deviation of income, cr^ represents standard deviation 
of individual’s ranks, and p(y,ry ) represents correlation coefficient between y and ry. 
Standard deviation of ranks can be shown as
after further disaggregeting the term after the sum notation and substituting the result in 
equation (3), we can obtain
(4.16) crry= ^ N 2 - 1/12,
Substituting (4) into (1) we can get a useful formula for the Gini coefficient
(4.17) G — J L ^ O m v ) .  
V 3 y
68
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
The data necessary to compute the GCs is obtained as an output of the simulations 
conducted using the MISS model. Once the producer surplus values are obtained for 
various producer groups in various scenarios, they will be listed according to their 
producer surplus values beginning from the lowest. For each producer surplus values a 
rank will be assigned according to their incomes. Namely, lowest ranking to lowest income 
and highest ranking to highest income. This way the GCs for various producer groups for 
Turkey and the EU will be estimated by the formula given above.
Determination of the Scenarios
The normai-form representation of a game specifies players, actions, and the 
payoffs (Kennedy, 1995). Players are the units who make decisions. Each player’s goal 
is to maximize utility through the selection of actions. An action by a player is a choice 
he can make. By player’s payoff it is meant either a) the utility player i receives after all 
players have picked their actions and the game has been played out; or b) the expected 
utility player i receives as a function of the actions chosen by himself and other players 
(Rasmusen, 1989).
In this study, there are two players in the game: Turkey (TUR) and the EU. Let Ak 
denote the set of actions available to player k, for k= TUR, EU and let Ak denote an 
arbitrary member of this action set. Let ( A ^ ,  AEU) denote a combination of actions, and 
let Pk denote player k’s payoff function where Pk(ATUR, AEU) is player k’s payoff resulting 
from actions (Atur, Aeu). In other words, the normal-form representation of a two-player 
game specifies the player’s action spaces A„ A2 and their payoff functions P„ P2. This 
game is denoted by G={A„ A2; P„ P2}. In the normal-form game G={ A„ A2; P„ P2} let
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Alk and A2k are members o f Ak. Action A,k is strictly dominated by A2k for all actions 
available to the other player, k’s payoff from playing Alk is strictly less than k’s payoff 
from playing A2k, such that: Pk (Alk, A J  < Pk(A2k, A.J for all A.k e A.k, where -k represents 
the other player. If a unique solution to a two-player normal-form noncooperative game, 
in which the players can not make binding commitments (Rasmusen, 1989), is to be found, 
it must be self-enforcing (Kennedy, 1995). Each players’s predicted action must be that 
player’s best response to the predicted action of the other player. This concept is known as 
Nash equilibrium (Johnson, 1993).
The main scenarios for this study will be Turkey’s status quo option (SQ ™ ), WTO 
concessions as a developing country (WTOtur) , and integration with the EU (INTnJR). In 
the status quo scenario, Turkey’s current protection levels and agricultural policies towards 
the specified agricultural products will be used. That way, the estimated PPF values will 
be the base for the other scenarios. In the WTO scenario, Turkey’s commitments as a 
developing country for trade measures and domestic protection reductions will be modeled. 
This scenario will show whether the trade liberalization of Turkish agriculture benefits the 
economy compared with the status quo option. The Integration scenario with the EU will 
consider that Turkey is a member of the EU and adjusts its protection levels and trade 
policy measures accordingly. In the integration scenario, Turkey’s WTO commitments 
will be adjusted such that Turkey adopts the EU’s commitments for trade liberalization.
Similarly, the EU has three actions: Agenda 2000 provisions (A2KEU), WTO 
concessions (WTOeu), and free trade (FTEU). In the free trade scenario, all trade measures 
will be adjusted such that there will be no tariffs on imports.
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Considering a two-player, normal-form, noncooperative game, defined by G={ATUR, 
Aeu; Pjur, Peu}> each country k chooses some action Ake Ak in order to maximize its PPF 
given the action choices of the other country, where Ak represents the set o f actions 
available to player k and Pk represents player k’s payoff function resulting from its actions. 
The policy strategies analyzed here are several different degrees of trade liberalization. The 
action space is defined by A ™  ^ {SCW , WTO™, INT-™} for Turkey and AEU={ A2KEU, 
WTOeu, FTeu} for the EU.
Results
Welfare changes for various producer groups coupled with changes in consumer 
surplus for various scenarios in Turkey are presented in Tables 10, 11, and 12. When 
Turkey chooses its status quo scenario given A2K. as the action of the EU, the change in 
producer surplus is a positive 32.12. The highest increase in producer surplus is 27.18 for 
dairy milk. When Turkey chooses its status quo option given WTO as the action of the EU, 
the change in producer surplus is a positive 115.38 with the highest change in dairy milk 
o f 50.14 followed by lamb with 33.41. When Turkey chooses its status quo option, 
given free trade as the EU action, change in producer surplus is a positive 535.12, again 
with the highest increase felt in dairy milk with 259.08, and followed by lamb with 
172.24. The reason for high level change of producer welfare in dairy milk and lamb is due 
to the higher protection of these commodities in the EU. Change in consumer surplus is 
zero for all scenarios because, in status quo, Turkey keeps its consumer prices constant 
while producer prices are affected by domestic- world price linkage. Budget savings
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decrease in Turkey as EU chooses freer trade because, as Turkey keeps its status quo 
protection level while the EU liberalizes, budgetary cost of protection increase in Turkey.
Table 10. Welfare Change for Turkey in Status Quo Scenario, Million US Dollars.
Producer groups SQtUR ’ ^2Kpjr
Scenarios
SQtur> WTOeu SQrrR < FTEll
Lamb 1.79 33.41 172.24
Dairy Milk 27.18 50.14 259.08
Com 0.00 0.00 0.00
Wheat 0.00 0.00 0.00
Rice 0.00 0.00 0.00
Oilseeds 2.58 2.23 11.78
Cotton 0.44 12.86 52.41
Sugar 0.00 0.00 0.00
Tobacco 0.00 0.00 0.00
Poultry 0.13 16.73 39.61
Change in producer surplus 32.12 115.38 535.12
Change in consumer surplus 0.00 0.00 0.00
Budget saving -36.81 -125.13 -577.21
Source: MISS model results.
When Turkey chooses its WTO scenario given, that the EU chooses its A2K. action, 
change in producer surplus is -263.35. The highest decrease occurs in dairy milk by 
-58.39, while the lowest decrease occurs on rice by -3.66. When Turkey chooses its WTO 
action, given the EU takes the WTO action, change in producer surplus is -184.19. In this 
case, the highest decrease occurs in dairy milk by -37.16 and in tobacco by -36.58 while 
an increase occurs in cotton by 1.52. When Turkey takes its WTO action, given the EU 
takes its FT action, change in producer surplus is 211.55. The highest increase occurs in 
milk by 157.47 and in lamb by 126.96. Also, poultry welfare increases by 8.77. Other
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products present negative change in producer surplus. Consumer surplus increases by 
334.46 in all actions. Budget savings are negative and decreasing as the EU moves toward 
free trade.
Table 11. Welfare Change for Turkey in WTO Scenario, Million US Dollars.
Producer groups WTO rim; A2kK
Scenarios
„■ WTOnm; WTOeu WTOnm; FTfv
Lamb -35.05 -4.67 26.96
Dairy Milk -58.39 -37.16 157.47
Com -5.07 -5.07 -5.07
Wheat -27.09 -27.88 -27.86
Rice -3.66 -3.66 -3.66
Oilseeds -30.07 -30.33 -21.26
Cotton -10.75 1.52 40.48
Sugar -27.69 -27.69 -27.69
Tobacco -36.58 -36.58 -36.58
Poultry -28.20 -12.67 8.77
Change in producer surplus -263.35 -184.19 211.55
Change in consumer surplus 334.46 334.46 334.46
Budget saving -16.20 -101.09 -539.15
Source: MISS model results.
When Turkey chooses its Integration scenario, given that the EU chooses its A2K 
action, change in producer surplus is 235.18. The highest increase occurs in wheat with 
1169.03 and in lamb with 569.18. All other products show gains in producer surplus 
except tobacco with -114.28 and in poultry with -33.88. The reason for increases in 
producer surplus is that under the integration, Turkey will adopt the EU’s protection levels. 
Since these protection levels are relatively higher in all products, with the exception of 
tobacco and poultry, the welfare o f producer groups increases with the exception of 
tobacco and poultry. With integration, given the EU takes its WTO action, change in
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producer surplus is 1772.26 with the highest increase in wheat with 1039.42 and in lamb 
by 422.39. Again all other products show gains except for a change in tobacco with - 
129.38 and in poultry with -47.14. With integration, given the EU takes its FT action, 
change in producer surplus is -1289.22 with the highest decrease in milk with -385.11 and 
in tobacco with -216.75. All other products show a loss in producer surplus except an 
increase in wheat with 36.39. Budget savings decrease with liberalization because EU 
protections are higher than that of Turkey, but increase when the EU adopts free trade. 
Change in consumer surplus is increasing as the EU moves toward free trade because of 
the gains from trade.
Table 12. Welfare Change for Turkey in Integration Scenario, Million US Dollars.
Producer groups INTnm; A2Kkv
Scenarios
INTrm; WTO,:v INTii,^  FTeu
Lamb 569.18 422.39 -148.79
Dairy Milk 10.44 0.74 -385.11
Com 65.91 49.30 -36.96
Wheat 1169.03 1039.42 36.39
Rice 12.76 5.33 -21.25
Oilseeds 68.03 67.70 -199.72
Cotton 399.00 316.51 -28.08
Sugar 88.99 47.39 -151.99
Tobacco -114.28 -129.38 -216.75
Poultry -33.88 -47.14 -136.97
Change in producer surplus 235.18 1772.26 -1289.22
Change in consumer surplus -1097.27 -264.61 554.67
Budget savings -1297.29 -1531.98 819.78
Source: MISS model results.
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Table 13. Political Preference Function Values for Turkey and the EU, Using
Weights Equal to One.
Turkey's Actions
EU ’s Action SQtur WTO™ INT™
A2Keu 386;-5; 398;55 332;-159
w t o eu 1066;-10; 1075; 49 1036;-24
f t eu 1182;-42 1171;7 1149; 85*
Source: Calculated. Numbers show the PPF values for the EU and Turkey in S Million US, respectively. 
* Unique Nash equilibrium occurs at ( FTEU; INTtur).
Table 14. Political Preference Function Values for Turkey and the EU, Using 
Weights Based on Subsidy Equivalents.
Turkey 's Actions
E U ’s Action SQtur WTO™ INT™
A2Keu 972;9 -958;-36 -1049;117*
w t o eu -3741 ;30 -3750;-! 7 -3782; 148
FTeu -16108;148 -16091; 81 -15951 ;-410
Source:Calculated. Numbers show the PPF values for the EU and Turkey in $ Million US, respectively. 
* Unique Nash equilibrium occurs at (A2KEU; rNTTOR).
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Table. 15. Political Preference Function Values for Turkey and the EU, Using
Estimated Weights.
Turkey's Actions 
S Q t u r  W T O x u r  i n t tur
E U ’s Actions
A2Keu 311;0.15 324;ll* 247;-80
WTOeu 251;5 260; 14 214;-31
FTeu -1287;6 -1284;22 -1254;-51
Source: Calculated. Numbers show the PPF values for the EU and Turkey in $ Million US, respectively.
* Unique Nash equilibrium occurs at (A2KEU; WTOtur).
The base solution using PPF weights equal to one can be seen in Table 13. In this
instance, the EU’s action choice results in their choosing the row, while Turkey chooses
the column through its actions. In determining the equilibrium solution to this game the
concept of iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies is utilized. An iterated
dominance equilibrium can be obtained by deleting a weakly dominated strategy, which
is a strategy for a player that yields lower payoff than other strategies, from the strategy
set o f one of the players (Rasmusen, 1989). Regardless of the action chosen by Turkey,
through choosing the FTEU strategy the EU receives payoffs that are strictly greater than
what it could acquire by choosing an alternative strategy. Thus, the dominated strategies,
A2Keu and WTOEU can be eliminated from consideration. This simplifies the selection
process for Turkey. It now maximizes its payoff given the remaining alternatives and will
choose INTjur. Thus, the unique Nash equilibrium solution to this game is found at the
point (FTeu; INTtur).
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The second game simulation is similar to the first with the exception that the PPF 
weights are no longer equal to one but they are based on producer and consumer subsidy 
equivalents. As can be seen in Table 14, in this case, the EU again has a strictly dominant 
strategy of choosing A2KEU. Based on this, Turkey evaluates the payoffs 9, -36, and 117 
and chooses 117 which corresponds with the integrationCINT-njR) scenario. Thus, in this 
case the unique Nash equilibrium solution is found at the point (A2KEU; INTXUR).
The third game simulation, as can be seen in Table 15, considered the estimated 
weights. In this game, the unique Nash equilibrium occurs at (A2KEU; WTOjur). Turkey 
has strictly dominant strategies by choosing the WTO action all the time regardless of the 
action chosen by the EU. In this case, Turkey evaluates its payoffs and chooses the WTO 
action since the payoffs o f WTO action (11, 14,22) are highest than the payoffs of other 
actions. In the same manner, the EU has a strictly dominant strategy of choosing A2K. 
Thus, the Nash equilibrium occurs at (A2KEU; WTOXUR).
The trend of Turkey’s PPF values for various EU actions can be seen in Figures 5, 
6, and 7. When all the weights are equal to one, SQ™  and WTO™ PPF values show a 
similar pattern. They do not change significantly with EU’s trade liberalization actions but 
decrease with free trade. On the other hand, INT™ payoff shows an increasing pattern 
starting from a negative value for all the actions of the EU. When subsidy equivalent 
weights are used, an opposite pattern is observed. SQ™  and WTO™ PPF values show 
a similar increasing pattern after given the actions o f the EU, while the INT™ PPF values 
show a decreasing pattern reaching a negative value. When estimated weights are used, 
PPF values for all actions o f Turkey present a similar pattern to that of the game one that 
considers all the weights as one.
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Figure 5. Turkey's PPF Values Given the EU’s Actions with Weights Equal to One.
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Figure 6. Turkey’s PPF Values Given the EU’s Actions with 1995 Weights.
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Income Distribution Effects
The Gini coefficient o f the selected producer groups in various scenarios is
calculated for Turkey and the EU. The Gini coefficient value changes between 0 and 1.
As the value approaches zero it indicates a more equitable income distribution. The
calculated Gini coefficients for various producer groups can be seen in Table 16.
Table 16. Gini Coefficients for Various Producer Groups in Turkey and theEU, 
1995.
Gini Coefficient
Scenarios
Turkey EU
(0  SQnm f A2Keu 0.36 0.48
(2) SQtvr; WTOeu 0.35 0.49
(3) SQtur < FTeu 0.37 0.51
(4) WTOnm; A2Keu 0.37 0.48
(5) WTOwr; WTOEa 0.36 0.49
(6) WTOtur; FTE(f 0.39 0.51
(7) INTn:R; A2KE[/ 0.45 0.48
(8) INTtur; WTOeu 0.44 0.50
(9) INTtur; FTeu 0.45 0.50
Source:Calculated.
As can be seen from these Gini coefficients, income distribution among the Turkish 
producer groups does not significantly change as a result of EU actions. However, the 
Gini coefficient for Turkey decreases from 0.36 to 0.35 as the EU adopts WTO action. If
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the EU chooses the free trade scenario, the Gini coefficient increases. As Turkey moves 
from status quo to WTO to and to integration, Gini coefficients show an increasing trend. 
These results imply that integration deteriorates the distribution of income among the 
producer groups. The trend of Gini coefficient for various Turkish actions can be seen in 
Figure 8.
Calculated Gini coefficients for Turkey and the EU are analyzed in a game 
theoretical framework and presented Table 17. Suppose that Turkish policy makers base 
their decisions on income distribution. In this case, the status quo action is Turkey’s 
dominant strategy. Turkey’s Gini coefficient payoffs are lowest and represent better 
income distribution in status quo option (0.36, 0.35, 0.37) regardless o f the EU action. 
In the same manner, the EU also has a strictly dominant strategy by choosing A2K because, 
in this case, the Gini coefficient values are smallest ones (i.e., more equitable income 
distribution) regardless of the strategy chosen by Turkey. Therefore, the Nash equilibrium 
occurs at (A2KEU; SQ™).
Table 17. Gini Coefficients for Turkey and the EU, 1995.
Turkey's Actions 
EU's Actions SQ™ WTO™ INT™
A2Keu 0.48;0.36‘ 0.48;0.37 0.48;0.45
WTOeu 0.49;0.35 0.49;0.36 0.50;0.44
FTeu 0.51;0.37 0.51;0.39 0.50;0.45
SourcerCalculated. Numbers show the Gini Coefficients for Turkey and the EU, respectively. 
* Unique Nash equilibrium occurs at (A2KEU; SQtur).
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The relationship between PPF values for various scenarios can also be presented in 
isoquant forum as can be seen in Figures 9, 10,11, and 12. In constructing the isoquants 
it is assumed that these isoquants are well behaved, such as they are continuous, 
everywhere dense, and nonintersecting (Kamerschen and Valentine, 1977). Figure 9 
shows the Gini coefficients (G) of various scenarios in an isoquant representation. 
Similarly, Figure 10 shows PPF values or welfare (W) of Turkey in isoquant space 
corresponding to various scenarios.
Figure 11 shows the combination of these isoquants from Figure 9 and 10. The 
cross hatched area represents the possible improvements for welfare and Gini coefficient 
from the point (A2KEU; SQtur). The simple version of this representation can be seen in 
Figure 12. In this figure, potential Pareto improvement points are the cross section of 
Pareto superior Gini and Pareto superior Welfare isoquants which is represented by the 
cross hatched area. In this case, a Pareto optimal solution can be found at (WTOEU; 
WTOjur ), a different solution than the Nash Equilibrium point of (FTEU; INTtur) for 
unweighted PPF payoffs or the Nash equilibrium of (A2KEU; SQtur) f°r Gini coefficient 
weights. This result highlights the fact that the Pareto optimal solution does not imply an 
equitable solution for the parties involved.
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Figure 9. Unweighted Political Preference Function Isoquants.
Source: MISS model results.
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Figure 10. Gini Coefficient Isoquants
Source: MISS model results.
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Source: MISS model results.
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Figure 12. Potential Pareto Improvement from (A2KEU;SQTtR).
Source: MISS model results.
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CHAPTERS 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study has analyzed the agricultural impacts of various international agricultural 
trade policies of Turkey, including multilateral trade negotiations and trade liberalization. 
In addition, it has analyzed the income distribution effects of various policies within 
agriculture and welfare effects among agricultural producers and consumer groups. Since 
Turkey will potentially join the EU, the economic integration of Turkey into the EU is 
also modeled to measure the agricultural welfare change.
Agricultural trade policies o f Turkey and the EU were first reviewed. Turkish 
agricultural policies aim to provide adequate levels of income for farmers. Support prices, 
subsidized credit, and input subsidies have been the main instruments of Turkish 
agricultural policy. After the 1980s, Turkish trade policy changed considerably, allowing 
market forces to shape the economy. Also, much of the restricted trade was liberalized. 
Turkey’s long journey to EU membership resulted in a Customs Union with the EU in 
1995. Continuing negotiations aim to make Turkey a full member of the EU in the near 
future. In the beginning, the EU’s main instruments for the CAP have been the 
intervention price, storage aid, direct aid, production quotas, and import levies. Financial 
burdens of agricultural supports and international pressures due to the multilateral trade 
negotiations forced the EU to reform its agricultural policies in the 1990s. The EU has 
reduced cereal and oilseeds support prices. In the beef and lamb sectors total payments 
were reduced. The EU started the Agenda 2000 reform process in 1998 to increase the 
competitiveness of its agricultural products and to strengthen its position in WTO
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negotiations. Trade liberalization commitments within the WTO require that members, 
including Turkey and the EU, make various concessions in agricultural trade protection 
levels as well as decreases in domestic support policies.
The analysis conducted in this dissertation considers ten agricultural products that 
are significant in terms of production, consumption and trade in T urkey. F or the empirical 
analysis a Political Preference Function is used. A PPF is a weighted, additive function 
o f producer quasi-rents, indirect utility of consumers, and the cost of agricultural policies 
of government which is budgetary expenses. The empirical analysis considered three 
concepts important to the Turkish agriculture: change in producer and consumer welfare; 
optimal strategies; and distributional impacts of trade policies. The first addressed the 
change in welfare composed of change in producer and consumer surplus, and change in 
budget expenditures. When Turkey takes the status quo action given the EU has A2K, 
WTO and FT actions, change in producer surplus is positive and increases as the EU 
chooses freer trade while there is no change in consumer surplus. Budgetary savings due 
to producer protection also decrease. When Turkey takes the WTO action given that the 
EU retains its previous actions, change in producer surplus is negative but decreases with 
freer trade and is positive as the EU chooses free trade. Change in consumer surplus in this 
case is positive. Budgetary savings also decrease with freer trade. When Turkey integrates 
with the EU, change in producer surplus is positive and increases with freer trade but is 
negative when the EU chooses free trade. Change in consumer surplus is negative except 
for the free trade. Budgetary savings also gets smaller as the EU liberalizes its protection 
but increases with free trade.
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The second aspect o f this study determined the optimal strategies for Turkey using 
a non cooperative game framework. Game simulations show that Turkey’s integration into 
the EU is independent of the weights. The unique Nash equilibrium solution is found at 
the point where Turkey chooses integration while the EU chooses free trade when all 
weights are equal to one. When weights based on 1995 subsidy equivalents are used, a 
unique solution has occurred at the point where Turkey chooses integration while the EU 
chooses Agenda 2000 scenario. When the estimated weights are used, the unique Nash 
equilibrium has occurred at the point where Turkey chooses its WTO action while the EU 
chooses its A2K action. The pattern o f the Turkish PPF values indicate that the PPF values 
of game one which uses equal weights and game three which uses estimated weights 
present similar patterns, while the PPF values of game two that considers subsidy 
equivalent weights presents an opposite pattern of game one and game three.
The third aspect o f this study analyzed the income distribution effects o f  the various 
policies and scenarios in agriculture using the Gini coefficient. Results showed that 
although distribution of income deteriorates slightly with freer trade, it deteriorates 
noticeably with integration. Thus, Turkish policy makers might consider various types 
of income adjusting policies or compensation to those sectors which suffer losses. When 
Turkey chooses its status quo option while the EU liberalizes, lamb, dairy milk, cotton, 
and poultry sectors’ income increase while other sectors show no change in their income. 
When Turkey chooses its WTO action, all sectors lose except lamb, dairy milk, cotton and 
consumers. With integration, wheat, lamb, cotton and oilseed sectors show a significant
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gain. Consumers lose in this action. However, as the EU chooses free trade producers lose 
and consumers gain as can be expected through gains from trade.
With liberalization, producer groups will lose from their base income. Thus, 
policy makers should consider policies that help producer groups that are harmed as the 
result o f the policy change. Such policies can include input subsidies in these sectors or 
low cost loans for investment. With integration the real income of consumers will 
decrease. Since the share of food as a component of total expenses constitute a significant 
share of the Turkish consumer budget, consumer subsidies may be necessary.
When gini coefficients are used as payoffs resulting from Turkish and EU actions, 
the unique Nash equilibrium occurred at (A2KEU; SQtur) which is quite different than the 
equilibrium solution for the PPF values. It shows that when policy makers o f Turkey base 
their decisions on income equality, the choice is to retain the status quo. When the 
isoquants o f Gini coefficients and PPF values for Turkey are compared, a Pareto superior 
solution can be found at (WTOEU; WTOtur), a different solution than the Nash Equilibrium 
point of (FTeu; INTjur) for unweighted PPF payoffs or the Nash equilibrium of (A2KEU; 
SQtur) f°r the Gini coefficient weights. This result highlights the fact that the Pareto 
optimal solution does not imply an equitable solution for the parties involved.
The results have several welfare implications for Turkish producers, consumers, 
budget, and Turkey-EU relations. It is clear that the WTO and further trade liberalization 
will harm the of several producer groups in Turkey. However, producer welfare 
increases when Turkey joins the EU. The reason for this increase is most likely the high 
level o f producer protection in the EU. However, with integration, if the EU chooses free
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trade, Turkish producer welfare decreases due to lower protection. Also, the income of 
various producers in the agricultural sector changes in different directions such that the 
distribution of income is affected. With liberalization, income distribution deteriorates 
slightly. With integration, this deterioration worsens. This deterioration can cause a 
decrease in the production of the sectors that are negatively affected by agricultural and 
trade policies and a decrease in self sufficiency in those products. With integration, 
however, the welfare of several producers, such as wheat, increases significantly. This 
increase may have dual impacts on Turkish producers and consumers. Since Turkish 
consumers depend heavily on this product in food consumption, an increase in the 
welfare of this producer group assures an adequate level of supply of this strategic 
commodity. However, if the increase in protection in the wheat sector is reflected on 
consumers, it decreases real income of consumers. Also, a noticeable welfare increase in 
a traditional crop of cotton may increase production of that product and assure an adequate 
level of supply for the textile industry, which is a significant part of the economy and 
export market of Turkey. On the other hand, Turkey’s other traditional product, tobacco, 
loses with integration because the protection of this product in the EU is lower than that of 
Turkey. This change in protection will negatively impact the welfare of producers, distort 
export markets, and decrease export earnings. Consumers gain with trade liberalization 
but can lose because of the decrease in the domestic support of agricultural products 
because a decrease in agricultural protection causes less production and higher food prices. 
With trade liberalization, Turkish consumers gain. Since most of the Turkish consumers 
spend a great deal o f their income on food, trade liberalization helps them by increasing
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their real income. However, with integration consumers experience a loss in their welfare 
due to the high level of agricultural protections in the EU. This loss is eliminated only if 
the EU implements free trade. The optimal agricultural policy should account for the 
needs o f low-income consumers as well as influential producer groups. As a developing 
country Turkish consumers have less weight in the policy process relative to producer 
groups; thus they are vulnerable to negative change in consumer prices due to the 
agricultural policies. In order to compensate for the harm of the price increase in food 
products and other income distorting policies, a welfare system should be introduced in 
Turkey that targets the low income class of consumers and subsidizes their food 
expenditures. Targeting low income consumers will both decrease the level o f budgetary 
expenses and assure equitable distribution.
Budgetary cost noticeably increases when Turkey joins the EU due to the high level 
of budget expenses for producers but decreases with EU’s free trade action. Turkey’s high 
level o f budget expenditures can push further inflation. However, if these expenses are 
compensated by the EU’s fund for agriculture, this pressure can be lightened.
In designing agricultural policies the welfare o f both producer and consumer must 
be considered. Policies can be designed so that they do not detoriate the base level o f 
income distribution. Considering that agricultural policies often have multiple goals, they 
need multiple measures. The overall consistency of various measures must be monitored 
to ensure they work as intended. In determining the domestic support levels, international 
markets need to be considered. Changing world trade conditions and liberalization due to 
globalization put downward pressure on support prices and trade barriers. In determining
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income policies, producer and consumer interests are important. Subsidized food could 
be provided to low income consumers. The targeting of food subsidies is essential for 
both budgetary and equity considerations.
Turkey’s various policy decisions will affect manufacturing and services sectors 
as well as agriculture in both multilateral trade agreements and integration with the EU. 
Future studies can consider other sectors, in order to evaluate Turkey’s various policy 
actions towards globalization and regional trading blocs. Also, income distributional 
effects should be evaluated in these types of analyses given that trade policies also affect 
the distribution of welfare within an economy as it affects the welfare of various interest 
groups.
Limitations and Further Study
This study utilized a static partial equilibrium trade model to research the impacts 
of various agricultural trade policy actions of Turkey on producer and consumer welfare. 
However, this study has limitations that must be considered in interpreting the results. 
The first limitation of this study is that it is a partial equilibrium model. Partial 
equilibrium studies consider the effects of various policy actions only in a specific sector. 
The interaction between sectors, such as agriculture, manufacturing, and services is not 
included in partial equilibrium models. On the other hand, general equilibrium studies 
consider the interaction between the sectors of an economy, such as factor mobilization, 
multi-sectoral input and output use and the overall welfare o f an economy. Future studies 
can consider general equilibrium studies to search the overall welfare. The second 
limitation o f this study is that it is a static model meaning that it uses a base year rather than
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time series data. Given the dynamic nature of the policies, dynamic models can show the 
factors that affect various interest group welfares over the years. In this way, future 
predictions can also be made. The third limitation of this study is the use of elasticities. 
Elasticities play a significant role because they are used in the calculation of producer and 
consumer surpluses. This study utilized elasticities calculated by the USDA ( 1989). Since 
these elasticities are point elasticities and include some level o f error in calculation, it may 
affect the results o f the study. For this reason, a sensitivity analysis can be performed in 
future studies. The fourth limitation of this study involves the theory of the model. This 
study used a neoclassical approach in modeling. However, recent studies utilizing new 
trade, new growth, and economic geography theories raise some of the issues regarding 
the Neoclassical view of modeling, such as the benefit of free trade for developing 
countries, and the role of trade restrictions on development. One o f the most striking 
implications of new trade theory is that free trade can actually be damaging for 
developing countries because of the noncompetitive nature o f the international trade. The 
implication of new trade theory shows itself in the calculation of producer and consumer 
surpluses and choice of optimal trade policies in a game theoretical framework. Based on 
this, we can expect that as Turkey chooses freer trade, Political Preference Function (PPF) 
values decrease because new trade theory’s suggestion of welfare improvement resulting 
from trade intervention.
Krugman’s (1987) new economic geography theory also has interesting 
implications for Turkish agriculture. According to Krugman’s assertions we can expect 
that in Turkey, traditional crops which require specific geographical and climactical
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requirements, such as cotton, tobacco, and fruits will have higher production when Turkey 
joins the EU because producers o f these products in other European countries will give up 
production and producers in T urkey will supply most of the needs for the EU. On the other 
hand, it can be expected that in animal products, such as beef, lamb, and dairy milk other 
EU countries which are efficient in production of these products will replace producers in 
Turkey. Therefore, in a geographical perspective, it can be implied that cotton, tobacco, 
and fruits may concentrated in Turkey, but Turkey’s animal production will decrease with 
integration. Since the textile industry is based on cotton production, it also implies that 
Turkey will be a significant producer of the textiles in the new EU. The incomes of 
traditional crops, therefore, will increase relative to animal production. This will shift 
income distribution among producer groups in Turkish agriculture. These new trade and 
development theories also promise new perspectives for future studies.
When making political decisions, economic studies can help policy makers to 
review and choose various policy actions. However, it must be kept in mind that 
empirical analyses are not the only criterion that should be considered in the policy 
making process. Empirical studies can provide input for policy makers facing various 
decision making. Policy makers should use the results of these studies to influence and 
justify their decisions. Also, empirical studies provide the necessary data for comparison 
of the opportunity cost. Namely, if the study suggests that a policy action causes changes 
that may be acceptable, alternative policies can be used in more confidential way. In the 
time where precision and measurement play vital role in decision making, it is imperative 
that economists provide as accurate results as possible. The policy making process is
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increasingly more complex and includes various interest group demands. In making 
decisions, political, social, and environmental factors need to be considered as well as 
economic factors. Future studies can address these issues and provide various 
perspectives that can be used in the policy making process.
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APPENDIXES
APPENDIX 1. DATA TABLES
Appendix Table 1. Production and Consumption Amounts for Turkey and EU,
1995 (1000 Metric Ton).
Production Consumption
Products Turkey EU Turkey EU
Lamb 366 1120 368 1433
Dairy Milk 7512 121788 7500 116040
Com 1900 28990 2327 32290
(1700) (19340)
Wheat 18015 86065 15500 74215
(600) (23050)
Rice 250 2021 365 1813
Oilseeds 1001 13495 1322 11181
(601) (117)
Cotton 851 1699 893 1217
Sugar 2050 17008 1960 13997
Tobacco 200 348 109 730
Poultry 340 7463 340 7060
Source:FAO, 1996 and USDA, 1996.
Appendix Table 2. World and ROW Production and Consumption, 1995 (1000 
M. ton).
Products
Production 
World ROW
Consumption 
World ROW
Lamb 7099 5613 6436 4753
Dairy Milk 379929 250629 375170 251630
Com 514710 483820 533319 456777
Wheat 544315 440235 516000 414435
Rice 550869 548598 363604 361426
Oilseeds 253980 239484 253000 240497
Cotton 20038 17488 18473 16363
Sugar 112596 93538 113843 97886
Tobacco 6364 5816 6882 6039
Poultry 41215 33412 40690 33290
SourcerFAO, 1996 and USDA, 1996.
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Appendix Table 3. Export and Import Amounts for Turkey, 1995 (1000 M. ton).
Products
Export Import
Lamb 2.673 0.177
Dairy Milk 2.488 0.196
Com 2.300 624.00
Wheat 1764.500 1253.400
Rice 0.95 300.110
Oilseeds 62.031 383.811
Cotton 96.000 182.561
Sugar 4.45 443.850
Tobacco 143.175 26.524
Poultry 4.907 0.038
Source.FAO, 1996.
Appendix Table 4. Export and Import Amounts for the EU, 1995 (1000 M. ton).
Products
Export Import
Lamb 4.55 210.29
Dairy Milk 232.43 33.25
Com 229 3838
Wheat 10630 2614
Rice 6.63 123
Oilseeds 328 1935
Cotton 153.95 898.30
Sugar 15.59 1881.35
Tobacco 200.74 508.55
Poultry 1008.20 110.46
Source:FAO,1996.
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Appendix Table 4. Producer and Consumer Prices for Turkey and EU, 1995 
(S Metric ton).
Producer Price Consumer price
Product Turkey EU Turkey EU
Lamb 4932 3171 6035 9807
Dairy Milk 268 723 692 1067
Com 142 162 168 279
Wheat 146 170 536 691
Rice 373 442 975 1968
Oilseeds 654 1116 1498 1537
Cotton 1248 1680 1248 -
Sugar 611 567 871 1187
Tobacco 4191 3529 4191 -
Poultry 1529 1620 2367 3543
Source: FAO, 1999 and ILO, 1996.
Appendix Table 5. World Prices, 1995 ($ M. ton).
Product
Price
Lamb 2910
Dairy Milk 183
Com 127
Wheat 142
Rice 283
Oilseeds 615
Cotton 1128
Sugar 260
Tobacco 2921
Poultry 1427
Source: USDA, 1996.
Notes: Lamb is carcas equivalent, wheat is common, rice is rough equivalent o f medium grained. Oilseed 
price is a average o f sunflower, olive and sesame seed oils. Cotton is a index o f various cotton producing 
countries l-3/32".Sugar is raw equivalent. Tobacco is unmanufactured. Polutry is liveweight.
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Appendix Table 6. Tariff Equivalents for Turkey and EU (percent), 1995.
Tariff Equivalents
Products Turkey EU
Lamb 130 112
Dairy Milk 80 217
Com 35 153
Wheat 35 160
Rice 35 289
Oilseeds 20 192
Cotton - -
Sugar 38 241
Tobacco 30 -
Poultry 130 -
Source: WTO, 1998 and The Int. Agr. Trade Res. Cons., 1994.
Appendix Table 7. Turkey’s and EU’s Producer and Consumer Subsidy
Equivalents (percentage).
PSE CSE
Products Turkey EU Turkey EU
Lamb 11 59 33 35
Dairy Milk 52 63 12 9
Com 42 62 14 36
Wheat 31 57 10 37
Rice 26 62 15 20
Oilseeds 21 57 5 57
Cotton 10 48 10 48
Sugar 32 59 24 32
Tobacco 43 20 43 20
Poultry 7 23 4 22
Source: Calculated from WTO, 1998 and Ingersent et al., 1998 and USDA, 1994.
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Appendix Table 8. Agenda 2000 Commitments of the EU
Products
Policy
Dairy Milk % 15 decrease in intervention price
Com Same as dairy milk
Wheat Same as dairy milk
Oilseeds Same as dairy milk
Source: Agenda 2000. vvww. europa.int., 1999.
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Appendix Table 8. Direct and Cross Supply Elasticities for Turkey.
LM DM CN WH RI OS CO SU TO PO
LM 0.50 -0.02 -0.02
DM 0.60 -0.08 -0.06
CN 0.40
WH 0.30 -0.04
RI 0.15 -0.01
OS 0.15 -0.01
CO -0.14 0.45
s u 0.10
TO 0.10
PO -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 0.50
Source:USDA, 1989.
Appendix Table 9. Direct and Cross Demand Elasticities for Turkey.
LM DM CN WH RI OS CO SU TO PO
LM -0.50 0.08 0.15
DM -0.90
CN -0.4 0.05
WH 0.02 -0.11
RI -0.70
OS 0.13 -0.65
CO -0.30
SU -0.10
TO -0.10
PO -0.40
Source:!JSDA, 1989.
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Appendix Table 10. Direct and Cross Supply Elasticities or the EU.
LM DM CN WH RI OS CO SU TO PO
LM 0.82 -0.10 -0.08
DM -0.01 0.60 -0.01 -0.01
CN 0.65 -0.21
WH -0.06 0.70 -0.07 -0.04
RI 0.43
OS -0.37 0.90
CO 0.38
SU -0.04 -0.02 0.90 -0.04
TO 0.20
PO -0.04 -0.04 0.70
SourcerUSDA, 1996.
Appendix Table 11. Direct and Cross Demand Elasticities for the EU.
LM DM CN WH RI OS CO SU TO PO
LM -0.86 0.10
DM -0.14 0.01
CN -0.41 0.19 0.02
WH 0.02 0.06 -0.35 0.01 0.02
RI 0.27 -0.41
OS
CO -0.49
SU 0.01 0.01 -0.36
TO -0.40
PO 0.08 -0.60
SourcerUSDA, 989.
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Appendix Table 12. Direct and Cross Supply Elasticities for the ROW.
LM DM CN WH RI OS CO SU TO PO
LM 0.25 -0.15
DM 0.48 -0.06
CN 0.34 -0.06 -0.01
WH -0.25 0.60 -0.05
RI 0.24 -0.02
OS -0.05 0.46
CO -0.08 0.40
SU -0.06 -0.05 0.49
TO 0.16
PO 0.23 -0.02 0.65
Source:USDA, 989.
Appendix Table 13. Direct and Cross Demand Elasticities for the ROW.
LM DM CN WH RI OS CO SU TO PO
LM -0.60 0.17
DM -0.29
CN -0.18 0.03
WH 0.15 -0.30
RI 0.06 -0.26
OS -0.61
CO -0.14
SU -0.58
TO -0.20
PO 0.08 -0.54
Source:!USDA, 1989.
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APPENDIX 2. MISS MODEL OUTPUT
05/11/1999 A 13:2S " TURKEY-EU:1995
SCENARIO : Turkey - European Union: 1995 
ZONE : Turkey
SQ/A2 * Fichier scenario n
VARIATIONS (en *> relatil A la base)
Supply Deriv Dem.
VP VL VQ VP VL VQ VP VL
Lamb 0.13 -> 0.00 0.06 0.13 -> 0.00 0.00 -> 0.00 -0.13
Milk 1.42 -> 0.00 0.BS 1.42 -> 0.00 0.00 -> 0.00 -1.40
Corn -> 0.00 -0.17 0.00 -> 0.00 -0.17 0.00 -> 0.00 -0.17
Wheat -> 0.00 -0.35 0.00 -> 0.00 -0.35 0.00 -> (1.00 -0. 35
Rice -> 0.00 -0.05 0.00 - i 0.00 -0.05 0.00 -> 0.00 -0.05
Oilseeds 0.30 -> 0.00 0.04 0.30 - > 0.00 0.00 -> Q.Q0 -0.30
Cotton 0.04 -> 0.00 0.02 0.04 -> 0.00 0.00 -> 0.00 -0.04
Suqar -> 0.00 0.01 0.00 -> 0.00 0.01 0.00 -> 0.00 0.01
Tobacco -> 0.00 0.00 0.00 «> 0.00 0.00 0.00 -> 0.00 0.00
Poultry 0.02 -> 0.00 0.00 0.02 -> 0.00 0.00 -> 0.00 -0.02
VEAUX (Q : Millions de Tonnes - L: Ecus/Tonne - P: Ecus/Tonne)
Supply | Deriv Gem. 1 Fin. Dem.
Q I P 1 Q L p I Q L
Lamb 0.37 1.28 3724.64 0.00 1.00 2913.78 0.37 1.22
Milk 7.57 1.46 257.43 0.00 1.46 257.43 7.50 1.37
Corn 1.90 1.18 157.35 1.70 1.18 157.35 0.63 1.00
Wheat 18.01 1.04 155.06 0.60 1.04 155.06 14.90 0.80
Rice 0.25 1.30 386.29 0.00 1.00 297.15 0.37 1.15
Oilseeds I.00 1.33 861.42 0. 12 1.28 829.04 1.32 1.28
Cotton 0.85 1.08 1279.66 0.00 1.00 1184.87 0.89 1.10
Suqar 2.05 1.34 365.82 0.00 1.00 273.00 1.96 1.27
Tobacco 0.20 1.39 4263.20 0.00 1.00 3067.05 0.11 1.43
Poultry 0.34 1.36 1941.11 0.00 1.00 1427.29 0.34 1.29
(Millions de tonnes - TAA: M
Bilan Initial I Bilan Final
Oflre Demand# Exp.Net TAuto-A 1 Offre Demand# Exp.Net
Lamb 0.37 0.37 0.00 1.000 0.37 0.37 0.00
Milk 7.51 7.50 0.01 1.0GL 7.57 7.50 0.07
Corn 1.90 2.33 -0.43 0.815 1.90 2.33 -0.43
Wheat 18.01 15.50 2.51 1.162 18.01 15.50 2.51
Rice 0.25 0.37 -0.12 0.676 0.25 0.37 -0.12
Oilseeds 1.00 1.44 -0.44 0.694 1.00 1.44 -0.44
Cotton 0.85 0.89 -0.04 0.955 0.85 0.89 -0.04
Suqar 2.05 1.96 0.09 1.046 2.05 1.96 0.09
Tobacco 0.20 0.11 0.09 1.818 0.20 0.11 0.09
Poultry 0.34 0.34 0.00 I.000 0.34 0.34 0.00
INDICATEURS (Millions d*Ecus>
Coflt Budqitaire
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Wheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
Initial
DBpenses
47.27
24.87
Final
Dtpenses
66.57
124.29
4.90
546.83
5.81
45.81
94.16
34.09
44 .06 
24.40
Economic Budqfttaire
-1.97
-32.22-O.IO
1.32
-Q.02
-0.00 -0 .00 
♦0.13
-36.81
114
Turkey95
VQ
0.00
0.00
0 . 0 0
0.00
0 . 0 0
0.00
0 . 0 0
0 .0 0
0.00
0.00
p
3550.20
241.65
133.35
119.28
341.72
426.56
1302.84
346.71
4385.88
1840.83
TAutO-A 
L.001 
1 . 01 0  
0.815 
1.162 
Q.676 
0.695 
0.955 
1.046 
1.818 
1.000
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Lamb
Milk
Corn
Wheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
Balance Commerciale 
Initial Final
0.00 
1.74 
-57.34 
374.24 
-35.66 
-284.13
-47.38
24.57
276.030.00
375.56
-35.68
-284.72
-47.19
24.57
276.030.00
264.80
Surplus commercial
1.32 -0.02 
-0.59 
0.18 -0.00 0.00 0.00
12.72
Valeur ajouete : 
(Milliards d’Ecus)
Surplus du consommateur r
Surplus du producteur :
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Wheat
Si!;™*
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
Objeetif Couvrt :
Revenus animaux :
Lamb
Milk
Poultry
Revenus veqbtaux :
Corn
Wheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Gain social :
Effet Terme Echanqe :
1.53 (Initial)
0.00
32.12
2.58
0.440.000.00
0.13
9.25
0.00
0.000.000.00
0.30
0.00 0.00 0 .00 
0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00
-4.69
0.52
1.58 (Pinal) 0.05 (Variation)
05/11/1999 1 13:28 * TURKET-EU:1995 Base : Turkey95
Turkey - European Union: 1995 (Norn : SQ/A2 - Fiehier scenario n*
VARIATIONS <en * relatlf i la base)
Supply 1 Deriv Dem. 1 Fin. Dem.
vp VL VQ I VP VL VQ 1 VP VL VQ
Lamb -> Q.00 -0.13 0.55 • > 0.00 -0.13 0.00 -> 0.00 -0.13 0.00
Milk - > -3.80 -5.15 -2.28 -> -3.80 -5.15 0.00 -> 0.00 -1.40 0.00
Corn -> -2.00 -2.17 -0.88 -> -2.00 -2.17 0.00 -> 0.00 -0.17 0.00
Wheat *> •2.00 -2.34 -1.17 - > -2.00 -2.34 0.00 -> 0.00 -0.35 0.00
Rice -> 0.00 -0.05 0.00 -> 0.00 -0.05 0.00 - > 0.00 -0.05 0.00
Oilseeds -6.82 -> -7.10 -5.46 0.30 -> 0.00 0.00 0.30 -> 0.00 -0.17
Cotton 0.04 -> 0.00 0.02 0.04 -> 0.00 0.00 0.04 -> 0.00 -0.02
Suqar »> 0.00 0.01 0.20 -> 0.00 0.01 0.00 -> 0.00 0.01 0.00
Tobacco 0.00 -> 0.00 0.00 0.00 -> 0.00 0.00 0.00 -> 0.00 0.00
Poultry -> 0.00 -0.02 0.16 -> 0.00 -0.02 0.00 -> 0.00 -0.02 0.00
VEAUX (0 ': Millions de Tonnes - L: Ecus/Tonne - P: Ecus/Tonne I
Supply | Oenv Dem. Fin. Dem.
Q L P 1 Q L P Q L p
Lamb 1.13 1.77 5150.70 0.00 1.00 2910.00 0.31 1.36 3957.60
Milk 119.01 1.45 255.88 0.00 1.45 255.88 116.04 1.49 262.51
Corn 28.73 1.43 190.80 19.34 1.43 190.80 12.95 1.05 140.02
Wheat 85.06 1.46 217.72 23.05 1.46 217.72 51.16 1.05 156.55
Rice 2.02 1.47 436.81 0.00 1.C0 297.15 1.81 1.47 436.81
Oilseeds 12.75 1.43 926.63 3.40 1.00 647.69 7.72 I.00 647.69
Cotton 1.70 1.48 1753.61 0.00 1.00 1184.87 1.22 1.48 1753.61
Suqar 17.04 1.50 409.50 0.00 1.00 273.00 14.00 1.58 431.34
Tobacco 0.35 1.20 3680.46 0.00 1.00 3067.05 0.73 1.20 3680.46
Poultry 7.47 1.29 1840.83 0.00 1.00 1427.00 7.06 1.35 1926.45
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BILAN (Millions de tonnes - TAA: *)
Bilan initial I Bilan Pinal
Of fze Demande Exp.Net TAuto-A | Offre Demande Exp.Net TAuto-A
Lamb 1.12 0.31 0.81 3.613 1.13 0.31 0.82 3.633
Milk 121.79 116.04 5.75 1.050 119.01 116.04 2.97 1.026
Corn 28.99 32.29 -3.30 0.898 28.73 32.29 -3.56 0.890
Wheat 86.07 74.21 11.86 1.160 85.06 74.21 10.85 1.146
Rice 2.02 1.81 0.21 1.116 2.02 1.81 0.21 1.116
Oilseeds 13.49 11.13 2.36 1.212 12.75 11.12 1.64 1.147
Cotton 1.70 1.22 0.48 1.393 1.70 1.22 0.48 1.394
Suqar 17.01 14.00 3.01 1.215 17.04 14.00 3.04 1.217
Tobacco 0.35 0.73 -0.38 0.479 0.35 0.73 -0.38 0.479
Poultry 7.46 7.06 0.40 1.057 7.47 7.06 0.41 1.058
INDICATEU&S (Millions d’Ecus)
Cotit Budgdtaire
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Wheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
Mpenses
2184.83 
933.28 
505.60 
4222.78 
29.33 
4704.03 
272.89 
105.10
12957.83
12285.79
Final
expenses
2195.49
454.17
3867.97
29.30
35J7.54
273.34
109.84
233.10
434.11
Economic Budqitaire
- 1 0 . 6 6
1466.16
51.43
” i:Sl
1146.49
-0.45
-4.730.00
-4.84
2998.23
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Wheat
5
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
Balance Commerciale 
Initial Final
2357.10
999.64
-440.06
1768.33
568.51
821.73
^S:iS-474.87
lo23.88
iosl'.la
569.42
830.93
"*5996764
Surplus commercial
-475.39
-34.82
-144.44
0.03
-463.99
0.91
9.200.00
17.13
Valeur ajoutie : 30.43 (Initial) 26.19 (Final) -4.24 (Variation)
(Milliards d’Ecus)
Surplus du consommateur : -15.82
Surplus du producteur : -2596.58
Lamb 0.51
Milk -1216.45
Corn -112.38
Wheat -380.19
Rice 0.00
Oilseeds -889.94
Cotton 1.19
Sugar 0.00
Tobacco 0.00
Poultry 0.66
Objectif Couvrt : -971.70
Revenus animaux : 0.00
Lamb 0.00
Milk 0.00
Poultry 0.00
Revenus v6q6taux : -171.13
Corn -75.31
Wheat -102.42
Rice 0.0O
Oilseeds 6.59
Cotton 0.00
Sugar 0.00
Tobacco 0.00
Gam social : 385.83
Effet Terme Echanqe : 18.81
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05/11/1999 A 13:28 - TURKEY-EU:1995 * Base : Turkey95
SCENARIO : Turkey->dEur°pean Union: 1995 (Nom : SQ/A2 - Fichier scenario n* :
VARIATIONS (en *> relatif A la base)
Lamb
Milk
Corn
NheaC
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
0.05
0.30
0.04-0.01-0.000.02
(QuantitAs)
Milk
Corn
Wheat
Rice
OLlseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
Supply Deriv Dem. fin. Dem.
-0.06
-oio5 
-0.05 -0.01
0.01 0. €0 
0.05
8:ii
8:H0.000.000.01
0.000.000.000.000.000.000.000.000.000.00
0.010.00-0.01
NIVEAUX (Ecus/Tonnes - Millions de Tonnes}
Pru Mondial
Lamb
MilkCorn
Wheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
2913.94
185.61
127.21
283.15
616.83
1129.43
259.97
2921.00
1427.24
(QuantitAsI
Lamb
Milk
corn
Wheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
Supply Deriv Dem. fin. Dem.
5.61 0.00 4.75
252.13 0.00 250.60
484.06 0.00 456.64440.71 0.00 414.22
548.65 0.00 361.39
239.77 0.00 240.07
17.49 0.00 16.36
93.54 0.00 97.90
5.82 0.00 6.04
35.41 0.00 33.29
(Millions de tonnes - TAA: M
Bilan Initial I Bilan Final
Offre Qemande Exp.Net TAuto-A I Offre Demande Exp.Net TAuto-A
Lamb 5.61 4.75 0.86 1.181 5.61 4.75 0.86 1.182
Milk 250.63 251.63 -I. oo 0.996 252.13 250.60 1.54 1.006
Corn 483.82 456.78 27.04 1.059 484.06 456.64 27.42 1.060
Wheat 440.23 414.43 25.80 1.062 440.71 414.22 26.49 1.064
Rice 548.60 361.43 187.17 1.518 548.65 361.39 187.26 1.518
Oilseeds 239.48 240.50 -1.02 0.996 239.77 240.07 -0.30 0. 999
Cotton 17.49 16.36 1.13 1.069 17.49 16.36 1.13 1.069
Sugar 33.54 97.89 -4.35 0.956 93.54 97.90 -4.36 0.955
Tobacco 5.82 6.04 -0.22 0.964 5.82 6.04 -0.22 0.964
Poultry 33.41 33.29 0.12 1.004 33.41 33.29 0.13 1.004
05/11/1999 a 13:27 * TURKEY'-EU:1995 * Base : Turkey95
SCENARIO ; Turkey - European Union: 1995 (Nom : SQ/NTO - Ftchier scenario n* : 1}
ZONE : Turkey
(en * relatif a la base) 
Supply Deriv Dem.
VP VL VQ v p VL VQ VP VL VQ
Lamb 2 . 4 1 -> 0 . 0 0 1 . 2 0 2 . 4 1 - > 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 -> 0 . 0 0 - 2 . 3 6 0 . 0 0
Milk 2 . 6 1 - > 0 . 0 0 1 . 5 6 2 . 6 1 —> 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 -> 0 . 0 0 - 2 . 5 4 Q . 0 0
Corn - > 0 . 0 0 - 0 . 5 9 0 . 0 0 - > G.OQ - 0 . 5 9 0 . 0 0 - > 0 . 0 0 - 0 . 5 9 0 . 0 0
Wheat -> 0 . 0 0 - 1 . 0 6 - 0 . 0 5 - > 0 . 0 0 - I . 06 9 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 - 1 . 0 6 0 . 0 0
Rice - > 0 . 0 0 - o . i e 0 . 0 0 - > 0 . 0 0 -0.18 0 . 0 0 - > 0 . 0 0 -0.18 Q.OO
Oilseeds 0 . 2 6 - > 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 4 0 . 2 6 - > 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 - > 0 . 0 0 - 0 . 2 6 0 . 0 0
Cotton 1.18 - > 0 . 0 0 0 . 5 3 1.18 - > 0 . 0 0 G .0 0 - > 0 . 0 0 - 1 . 1 7 0 . 0 0
sugar - > 0 . 0 0 - 1 . 7 4 0 . 0 0 - > 0 . 0 0 - 1 . 7 4 0 . 0 0 - > 0 . 0 0 - 1 . 7 4 0 . 0 0
Tobacco -> 0 . 0 0 - 0 . 9 1 0 . 0 0 - > 0 . 0 0 - 0 . 9 1 0 . 0 0 - > 0 . 0 0 - 0 . 9 1 0 . 0 0
Poultry 2 . 5 2 - > 0 . 0 0 1 . 2 4 2 . 5 2 - > 0 . 0 0 0 . 0 0 - > 0 . 0 0 - 2 . 4 6 0 . 0 0
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VEAUX (0 : Millions de Tonnes - L: Ecus/Tonne - P: Ecus/Tonne)
Supply I Deriv Dem. | Fin. Dem.
Q L P 1 Q L P 1 Q L
Lamb 0.37 1.28 3814.57 0.00 1.00 2980.13 0.37 1.19
Milk 7.63 1.46 260.45 0.00 1.46 260.45 7.50 1.35
Corn 1.90 1.17 157.35 1.70 1.17 157.35 0.63 0.99
Nheat 18.00 1.03 155.06 0.60 1.03 155.06 14.90 0.79
Rice 0.25 1.30 386.29 0 . 0 0 1.00 297.15 0.37 1.15
Oilseeds 1.00 1.33 861.08 0.12 1.28 828.71 1.32 1.28
Cotton 0.85 1.08 1294.25 0.00 1.00 1198.38 0.89 1.09
Sugar 2.05 1.32 365.82 0 . 0 0 0.98 273.00 1.96 1.25
Tobacco 0.20 1.38 4263.20 0.00 0.99 3067.05 O.lt 1.42
Poultry 0.34 1.36 1989.63 0.00 1.00 1462.96 0.34 1.26
(Millions de tonnes - TAA: M
Bilan Initial I Bilan Final
Offre Demande EXp.Net TAuto-A [ Offre Demande Exp.Net
Lamb 0.37 0.37 0.00 I. 000 0.37 0.37 0.00
Milk 7.51 7.50 0.01 I.OOl 7.63 7.50 0.13
Corn 1.90 2.33 -0.43 0.815 1.90 2.33 -0.43
Nheat 18.Qi 15.50 2.51 1.162 16.00 15.50 2.50
Rice 0.25 0.37 -0.12 0.676 0.25 0.37 -0.12
Oilseeds 1.00 1.44 -0.44 0.694 1.00 1.44 -0.44
Cotton 0.85 0.89 -0.04 0.955 0.85 0.89 -0.04
Suqar 2.05 1.96 0.09 1.046 2.05 1.96 0.09
Tobacco 0.20 0. 11 0.09 1.818 0.20 0.11 0.09
poultry 0.34 0.34 0. 00 I. 000 0.34 0.34 0.00
INDICATEURS (Millions d’Ecus)
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Wheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
3ugar
Tooaceo
Poultry
Initial
06penses
45.81
94.16
31.96
889.35
817.21
CoOt BudgStaire
i Pinal
ctes I OSpenses
101.52
15H
45.38
91.63
52.81
997.85
942.33
Economic Budqetaire
-36.92
-59.32
-0.34
4.03
-0.06
-2.81
-13.82
0.43■•53
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
Balance Ccmmerciale 
Initial Final
13.23
-ii:I9
0.00
.^ 8
.57
.0300
376.88
-35.72
-284.62
-42.54
I:17
”3 0 1 . 9 7
Surplus commercial
13.23
20.94
-0.34
2.63
-0.06
-0.49
4.84
HI
6.17
49.89
Valeur aloutie r 
(Milliards o'Ecus)
Surplus du conscrenateur
Surplus du producteur :
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
Objectif Gouvrt :
Revenus animaux :
Lamb
Milk
Poultry
Revenus vtgttaux :
Corn
Nheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
sugar
Tobacco
Cain social :
Effet Terme Echange :
1.53 (Initial)
0.000.00
2.23
1 2 . 8 60.000.00
16.73
1.70 (Final) 0.18 (Variation)
30.46
0.000.000.00
0.26
0.000.000.00
0.260.000.000.00
-9.75
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3550.20 
241.65 
133.35 
119.28 
341.72 
826.56 
1302.84 
346.71 
4385.89 
1840.83
TAuto-A 
1.012 
1.017 
0.815 
1.161 
0.676 
0. 695 
0.960 
1.046 
1.818 
1.012
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05/11/1999 A 13:27 * TURKEY-EU:1995 * Base : Turkey95
SCENARIO : Turkey - European Union: 1995 (Nom : SQ/NTO - Fichier scenario n* : L)
ZONE : EU
VARIATIONS (en * relatif A la base)
Supply Deriv Dem. j Fin.. Dem.
VP VL VQ VP VL VQ 1 VP VL
Lamb -> -6.40 -8.61 -4.36 2.41 -> 0.00 a.Qo -> -7.40 -9.58 4
Milk -> -4.80 -7.22 -2.80 -> -4.80 -7.22 0.00 -> -9.60 -11.90 1
Corn -> -6.30 -6.86 -2.95 -> -6.30 -6.86 0.00 -> -3.90 -4.47 0
Nheat -> -5.70 -6.70 -3.30 -> -5.70 -6.70 0.00 -> -3.90 -4.91 0
Rice -> -6.60 -6.76 -2.89 0.18 -> ooo 0.00 -> -11.40 -11.56 3
Oilseeds -6.86 -> -7.10 -4.14 0.26 -> Q.00 0.00 0.26 -> 0.00 -0
Cotton -5.70 -> -6.80 -2.21 1.18 -> 0.00 0.00 -11.16 -> -12.20 5
Suqar -> -5.10 -6.75 -4.21 1.77 -> a.QO a. qq -> -17.90 -19.23 ■»
Tobacco -2.41 -> -3.30 -0.49 0.92 -> 0.00 0.00 -5.85 -> -6.70 2
Poultry -> -2.30 -4.70 -i. 13 2.52 -> 0.00 0.00 -> -17.10 -19.14 11
NIVEAUX (Q ;: Millions de Tonnes - L: Ecus/Tonne - P: Ecus/Tonne)
Supply 1 Deriv Qem. 1 Fin. Dem.
Q L P 1 Q L P 1 Q L
Lamb 1.07 1.62 4821.05 0.00 1.00 2980.13 0.33 1.23
Milk 118.38 1.42 253.22 0.00 1.42 253.22 117.64 1.33
Corn 28.13 1.36 182.43 19.34 1.36 182.43 13.01 1.00
Nheat 83.23 1.39 209.50 23.05 1.39 209.50 51.35 1.00
Rice 1. 36 1.37 407.98 0.00 1.00 297.68 1.88 1.30
Oilseeds 12.93 1.43 926.24 3.40 1.00 647.43 7 .72 1.00
Cotton 1.66 1.38 1653.00 0.00 1.00 1198.38 1.29 1.30
Sugar 16.29 1.40 388.62 0.00 1.00 277.83 15.01 1.28
Tobacco 0.35 1.16 3591.76 0.00 1.00 3095.27 0.75 1.12
Poultry 7.38 1.23 1798.49 0.00 1.00 1462.96 7.85 1.09
3664.74
237.31
134.56 
150.45 
387.01 
647.43
1557.29
354.56 
3465.15 
1597.03
BILAN (Millions de tonnes - TAA: *>
Bilan Initial
O tire Demande Exp.Net
Lamb 1.12 0.31 3.81
Milk 121.79 116.04 5.75
Corn 28.99 32.29 -3.30
Nheat 86.07 74.21 11.86
Rice 2.02 1.81 0.21
Oilseeds 13.49 11.13 2.36
Cotton 1.70 1.22 0.48
Sugar 17.01 14.00 3.01
Tobacco 0.35 0.73 -0.3B
Poultry 7.46 7.06 0.40
Bilan Final
TAutc-A 1 Offre Demande Exp.Net TAuto-A
3.613 1.07 0.33 0.75 3.296
1.050 118.38 117.64 0.74 1.006
0.898 28. 13 32.35 -4.22 0.870
1. 160 63.23 74.40 8.83 1.119
1.116 1.96 1.88 0.08 1.042
1.212 12.93 11.12 1.81 1.163
1.393 1.66 1.29 0.37 1.286
1.215 16.29 15.01 CDP« 1.085
0.479 0.35 0.75 -0.40 0.466
1.057 7.38 7.85 -0.4B 0.939
INDICATEURS (Millions d’Ecus)
CoOt Budqttaire
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
Initial
Dftpenses
2164.83
933.28
505.60
4222.78
29.33
4704.03
272.89
105.10 233.10 
438.95
Final
04penses
1749.32
1927.03
419.26
3551.28
48.26
13667.53
13563.80
Econcmxe Budqbtaire
435.51
-993.75
86.34
671.50
-18.93
1098.67
LB.86
-1861.00
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
Balance Comnerciale 
Initial Final
1768.33
821.73
1165.46
570.80
2223.
-566.09
1329.88
44^.93
35o.
- L 2 3 6 . 6 0
Surplus commercial
-133.43
-867.89
-126.03
-438.44
-38.66
-350.08
-125.58
-465.65
119
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Valeur ajoutie :
(Milliards d’Ecus)
Surplus du consommateur :
Surplus du producceur :
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheac
Rice
Orlseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
Objectif Gouvrt :
Revenus anisiaux :
Lamb
SUlk
Poultry
Revenus v6q6taux :
Cotton
sugar
Tobacco
Gam social :
Effet Terme Echanqe :
30.43 (Initial)
7475.16
-5130.78
27.30 (Pinal) -3.13 (Variation)
-350.33
-1071.93
-57.39
-347.77
-30.97
-311.94
0.00Q.OO0.00
-523.39
-237.22
-291.as 0.00 
5.71 0.00 0.00 0.00
1066.38
05/11/1999 a 13:27 TURKEY-EU:1995 Base : Turkey9S
SCENARIO : Turkey - European Union: 1995 (Nom : SQ/NTO - fichier scenario n* : 
ZONE : R.du Monde
VARIATIONS (en * relatif a la base)
PMondial
Lamb 2.41
Milk 2.61
corn 0 . 6 0
Nheat 1.07
Rice 0.18
Oilseeds 0.2b
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
(Quantittsi Supply Deriv Dem. Tin. Dem.
Lamb 0.24 0.00 -1.02
Milk 1.09 0.00 -0.74
Corn 0.16 0.00 -0.09
Nheat 0.32 0.00 " *'
Rice 0.04 0.00
Oilseeds 0.11 0.00 “0.16
Cotton O.JB 0.00 -0.16
Suqar 0.67 0.00 * '**
Tobacco 0.15 0.00
-o! 16 
-0.04
 ____ :i:il
Poultry I.00 0.00 -1.14
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
(Ecus/Tonnes - Millions de Tonnes) 
Prix Mondial
187.77
127.76 
143.51 
293.50 
616.61 
1141.36 
264.60
2947.76 
1462.94
Lamb 5.62
Milk 253.36
Corn 484.59
Nheac 441.64
Rice 548.82
Oilseeds 239.74
Cotton 17.56
Sugar 94.17
Tobacco 5.83
Poultry 33.74
Supply Deriv Dem. Pin. Dem.
0.00 4.70
0.00 249.77
0.00 456.37
0.00 413.77
0.00 361.29
0.00 240.12
0.00 16.33
0.00 96.90
0.00 6.03
0.00 32.91
BILAN (Millions de tonnes - TAA: *)
Bilan Initial
offre Oemande Exp.Net
Lamb 5.61 4.75 0.86
Milk 250.63 251.63 -1.00
Corn 483.82 456.78 27.04
Nheat 440.23 414.43 25.80
Rice 548.60 361.43 187.17
Oilseeds 239.48 240.50 -1.02
Cotton 17.49 16.36 1.13
Sugar 93.54 97.89 -4.35
Tobacco 5.82 6.04 -0.22
Poultry 33.41 33.29 0.12
Bilan Pinal
TAutO-A 1 Offre Demande Exp.Net TAuto-A
1.181 5.62 4.70 0.92 1.196
0.996 253.36 249.77 3.59 1.014
1.059 484.59 456.37 28.23 1.062
1.062 441.64 413.77 27.87 1.067
1.518 548.82 361.29 187.53 1.519
0.996 239.74 240.12 -0.37 0.998
1.069 17.56 16.33 1.22 1.075
0.956 94.17 96.90 -2.73 0.972
0.964 5.83 6.03 -0.20 0.967
1.004 33.74 32.91 0.83 1.025
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05/11/1999 A 13:27 ’ TURKEY-EU:1995 Base : Turkey95
SCENARIO : Turkey - European Union: 1995 (Nom : SQ/WTO - Fichier scenario n* * 1)
ZONE : Turkey
VARIATIONS relatif 4 la base)
Supply 1 Deriv Dem. r Fin. Dem.
VP VL VQ 1 VP VL VQ 1 VP VL
Lamb 2.41 -> 0.00 1.20 2.41 -> 0.00 0.00 -> Q.Q0 -2.36
Milk 2.61 -> 0.00 1.56 2.61 -> 0.00 0.00 -> 0.00 -2.54
Corn -> 0.00 -0.59 0.00 -> 0.00 -0.59 0.00 0.00 -0.59
Nheac -> 0.00 -1.06 -0.05 -> 0.00 -t.Q6 0.00 -> 0.00 -1.06
Rice -> 0.00 -0.18 0.00 -> 0.00 -0.18 0.00 -> 0.00 -0.18
Oilseeds 0.26 -> 0.00 0.04 0.26 -> 0.00 0.00 -> 0.00 -0.26
Cotton 1.18 -> 0.00 0.53 1.18 -> 0.00 0.00 -> 0.00 -1.17
Suqar - > G.00 -I. 74 0.00 -> 0.00 -1.74 0.00 -> 0.00 -1.74
Tobacco -> 0.00 -0.91 0.00 -> 0.00 -0.91 0.00 -> 0.00 -0.91
Poultry 2.52 -> 0.00 1.24 2.52 -> 0.00 0.00 -> 0.00 -2.46
N1VEAUX (Q Millions de Tonnes - L: Ecus/Tonne - P: Ecus/Tonne)
Supply 1 Deriv Dem. Fin. Dem.
Q L P 1 Q L p Q L
Lamb 0.37 1.28 3814.57 0.00 1.00 2980.13 0.37 1.19
Milk 7.63 1.46 260.45 0.00 1.46 260.45 7.50 1.35
Corn 1.90 I. 17 157.35 1.70 1. 17 157.35 0.63 0.99
Nheat 18.00 1.03 155.06 0.60 1.03 155.06 14.90 0.79
Rice 0.25 1.30 386.29 0.00 1.00 297.15 0.37 1. 15
Oilseeds 1.00 1.33 861.08 0.12 1.28 828.71 1.32 1.28
Cotton 0.85 1.08 1294.25 0.00 1.00 1198.38 0.89 1.09
Suqar 2.05 1.32 365.82 0.00 0.98 273.00 1.96 1.25
Tobacco 0.20 1.38 4263.20 0.00 0. 99 3067.05 0. 11 1.42
Poultry 0.34 1.36 1989.63 0.00 1.00 1462.96 0. 34 1.26
VQ
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
3550.20 
241.65 
133.35 
119.28 
341.72 
826.56 
1302.84 
346.71 
4385.88 
1840.83
(Millions de tonnes - TAA: M
Bilan Initial . Bilan Final
Offre Demande Exp.Net TAuto-A 1 Offre Oemande Exp.Net TAutO-A
Lamb 0.37 0.37 0.00 1.000 0.37 0.37 0.00 1.012
Milk 7.51 7.50 0.01 1.001 7.63 7.50 0.13 1.017
Corn 1.90 2.33 -0.43 0.815 1.90 2.33 -0.43 0.815
Nheat 18.01 15.50 2.51 1.162 18.00 15.50 2.50 1.161
Rice 0.25 0.37 -0.12 0.676 0.25 0.37 -0.12 0.676
Oilseeds 1.00 1.44 -0.44 0.694 1.00 1.44 -0.44 0.695
Cotton 0.85 0.89 -0.04 0.955 0.85 0.89 -0.04 0.960
Suqar 2.05 1.96 0.09 1.046 2.05 1.96 0.09 1.046
Tobacco 0.20 0. 11 0.09 1.818 0.20 0. 11 0.09 1.818
Poultry 0.34 0.34 0.00 1.000 0.34 0.34 0.00 1.012
INDICATEURS (Millions d'Ecus)
CoOt BudqAtaire
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheat
Rice
Oilseeds
cotton
sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
Initial
DApenses
64 .60 
92.07 
4.80
45.81
94.16~31:96
889.35
817.21
I
Final
OApenses
101.52
151.39
5.14
544.12
5.86
45.38
91.63
52.81
Economie BudqNtaire
-36.92
-59.32
-0.34
4.03
-0.06
-2.81
-13.82
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheat
Rice
Oilseeds
cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
Balance Comaereiale
Initial Final
0.00 13.23
1.74 22.68
-57.34 -57.68
374.24 376.88
-35.66 -35.72
-284.13 -284.62
-47.38 -42.54
24.57 25.00
276.03 278.56
0.00 6.17
Surplus commercial
13.23 
20.94 
-0.34 
2.63 
-0.06 
-0.49 
4.84 
0.43 
2.53 
 6.17
49.?9
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Valeur aioutie : 
(Milliards d’Ecus)
Surplus du consonsnateur
Surplus du producteur :
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheat
R4.ce
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
Objeccif Gouvrt :
Revenus animaux :
Lamb
Milk
Poultry
Revenus v6q6taux :
Corn
Nheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Gain social :
Efffet Terae Echanqe :
1.53 (Initial)
0 .0 0
115.38
33.41
58:iS
0 . 0 00.002.3312.36
0 . 0 00.00
16.73
30.46
0.00
0.000.000.00
0 . 0 00.000.00
0.26
1.70 (Final) 0.18 (Variation)
-9.75
6.33
05/11/1999 A 13:27 TURKEY-EU:1995 Base : Turkey95
SCENARIO
ZONE
Turkey - European Union: 1995 (Nom : SQ/NTO - Fichier scenario n*
VARIATIONS (en 1 relatif a la base)
Supply 1 Deriv Dem. I Fin. Oem.
VP VL VQ 1 VP VL VQ 1 VP VL
Lamb -> -6.40 -8.61 -4.36 2.41 -> 0.00 0.00 -> -7.40 -9. 58
Milk -> -4.80 •7.22 -2.80 -> -4.80 -7.22 0.00 -> -9.60 -11.90
Corn -> •6.30 -6.86 -2.95 -> -6.30 -6.96 0.00 - > -3.90 -4.47
Nheat - > -5.70 •6.70 -3.30 -> -5.70 -6.70 0.00 - > -3.90 -4 . 91
Rice -> •6.60 -6.76 -2.89 0.18 -> 0.00 0.00 - > -11.40 -11.56
Oilseeds -6.86 -> -7.10 -4.14 0.26 -> 0.00 0.00 0.26 -> 0.00
Cotton -5.70 -> -6.80 -2.21 1.18 -> 0.00 0 . 0 0 -11.16 -> -12.20
Suqar -> •5. 10 -6.75 -4.21 1.77 -> 0.00 0.00 -» -17.80 -19.23
Tobacco -2.41 -> -3.30 -0.49 0.92 0.00 0.00 -5.95 -■» -6.70
Poultry - > -2. JO -4.70 -1.13 2.52 -> 0.00 0.00 - > -17.10 -19.14
NIVEAUX (Q Millions de Tonnes - L: Ecus/Tonne - P: Ecus/Tonne)
Supply | Deriv Dem. I Fin. Dem.
Q L P 1 Q L p I g L
L-afwta 1.07 1.62 4821.05 0.00 1.00 2980.13 0 . 3 3 1.23
Milk 118.38 1.42 253.22 0.00 1.42 253.22 117.64 1.33
Corn 28.13 1.36 182.43 19.34 1.36 182.43 13.01 1.00
Nheat 83.23 1.39 209.50 23.05 1.39 209.50 51.35 1.00
Rice 1.96 1.37 407.98 0.00 I. 00 297.68 1.88 1.30
Oilseeds 12.93 1.43 926.24 3.40 1.00 647.43 7.72 1.00
Cotton 1.66 1.38 1653.00 0.00 1.00 1198.38 1.29 1.30
Suqar 16.29 1.40 3B8.62 0.00 1.00 277.83 15.01 1.28
Tobacco Q .35 1.16 3591.76 0.00 1.00 3095.27 0.75 1.12
Poultry 7.38 1.23 1798.49 0.00 1.00 1462.96 7.85 1.09
VQ 
4.85 
1.38 
0.50 
0.38
3.97 
-0.15
5.97 
7.23 
2.44
1 1 . 2 2
P
3664.74
237.31
134.56 
150.45 
387.01 
647.43
1557.29
354.56 
3465.15 
1597.03
BILAN (Millions de tonnes - TAA: o
Bilan Initial
Offre Demande Exp.Net
Lamb 1.12 0.31 0.81
Milk 121.79 116.04 5.75
Corn 28.99 32.29 -3.30
Nheac 86.07 74.21 11.86
Rice 2.02 1.81 0.21
Oilseeds 13.49 11.13 2.36
Cotton 1.70 1.22 0.48
Suqar 17.01 14.00 3.01
Tobacco 0.35 0.73 -0.38
Poultry 7.46 7.06 0.40
Bilan Final
TAuto-A 1 Offre Demande Exp.Net TAuto-A
3.613 1.07 0.33 0.75 3.296
1.050 118.38 117.64 0.74 1.006
0.898 28.13 32.35 -4.22 0.870
1.160 83.23 74.40 8.83 1.119
1.116 1.96 1.88 0.08 1.042
1.212 12.93 11.12 1.81 1.163
1.393 1.66 1.29 0.37 1.286
1.215 16.29 15.01 1.28 1.085
0.479 0.35 0.75 -0.40 0.466
1.057 7.38 7.85 -0.48 0.939
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INDICATEURS (Millions d'Ecus}
CcOt Budgetaire
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheac
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
D4penses
2184.83
933.28
505.60
4222.78
29.33
4704.03
272.89
105.10
D6penses
1749.32
1927.03
419.26
3551.28
48.26
3605.36
291.74
653.22
1422.05
Eeonomie Budgetaire
435.51
-993.75
86.34
671.50
-18.93
1098.67
-18.86
Lamb
Milk
Corn
NheacRice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
ToBacco
Poultry
Balance Commerciale 
Initial Pinal
999.64 
-440.06 
1768.33 
62.40 
1523.97 
568.51 
821.73
-1165.48
570.80
*7066794
2223.67
131.74
-566.09
1329.88
Surplus commercial
-133.43
-867.89
-126.03
-438.44
-38.66
-350.08
-lit: __ 
-i2 Vi'.n
Valour aioutee : 
(Milliards d'Ecus)
Surplus du consommateur
Surplus du producteur :
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
Objectif Gouvrt :
Revenus animaux :
Lamb
Milk
Poultry
Revenus vdqAtaux :
Corn
Nheat
Rice
Oilseeds
cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Cam social :
Effet Terme Echanqe :
30.43 (Initial)
-359.63
-1531.61
-350.33
-1071.93
-57.39
-901.23
- 1 6 7 . 9 8
-347.77
-30.97
-311.94
-3741.29
0 . 0 0
0 . 0 00.00
-523.39
-237.22
-291.880.00
l:li0.000.00
1066.38
52.58
27.30 (Final) -3.13 (Variation)
05/11/1999 4 13:27 TURKEY-EU:1995 Base : TurkeySS
(Nom : SQ/NTO - Fichier scenario n*
VARIATIONS (en relatif 4 la base)
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheac
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
2.41 
2.61 
0.60 
1.07 
0.18 
0.26 1. IB 
1.77 
0.92 
2.52
(Quantites) Supply Oenv Cem. Fin. Dem.
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheat
Sift..*,
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
0.04 0.11 
0.38 
0.67 
0.15 1.00
0.000.000.000.000.000.000.000.000.000.00
-1.02
-0.74
-0.09
-0.16
-0.04
-0.16
-0.16-1.01
-0.18
-1.14
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheac
olS nd i
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
(Ecus/Tonnes - Millions de Tonnes) 
Prix Mondial
187.77
127.76 
143.51 
283.50 
616.61 
1141.36 
264.60
2947.76 
1462.94
123
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
(Quantitis)
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheac
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
Supply Deriv Dem. Pin. Dem
S.62 
2S3.36 
484.59 
441.64 
548.82
33.74
0.00 4.70
0.00 249.77
0.00 456.37
0.00 413.77
0.00 361.29
0.00 240.12
0.00 16.33
0.00 96.90
0.00 6.03
0.00 32.91
(Millions de tonnes - TAA: A)
Bilan Initial Bilan Final
Offre Demande Exp.Net TAutO-A Offre Demande Exp.Net TAuto-A
Lamb 5.61 4.75 0.86 l.IBl 5.62 4.70 0.92 1.196
Milk 250.63 251.63 -1.00 0.996 253.36 249.77 3.59 1.014
Corn 483.82 456.78 27.04 1.059 484.59 456.37 28.23 1.062
Nheac 440.23 414.43 25.80 1.062 441.64 413.77 27.87 1.067
Rice 548.60 361.43 187.17 1.518 54B.82 361.29 187.53 1.519
Oilseeds 239.48 240.50 -1.02 0.996 239.74 240. 12 -0.37 0.998
Cotton 17.49 16.36 1.13 1.069 17.56 16.33 1.22 1.075
Suqar 93.54 97.89 -4.35 0.956 94 17 96.90 -2.73 0.972
Tobacco 5.82 6.04 -0.22 0.964 5.83 6.03 -0.20 0.967
Poultry 33.41 33.29 0. 12 1.004 33.74 32.91 0.83 1.025
05/11/1999 4 13:27 - TURKEY-EU:1995 " Base : Turkey95
SCENARIO Turkey - 
ZONE Turkey
European Union: 1995 (Nom : SQ/NTO - Fichler scenario n* : 1)
VARIATIONS fen *■ relatif 4 la base)
Supply | □eriv Dem. Fin. Dem.
VP VL VQ | VP VL VQ VP VL VQ
Lamb 2.41 -> 0.00 1.20 2.41 -> 0.00 0.00 -> 0.00 -2.36 0.00
Milk 2.61 -> 0.00 1.56 2.61 -> 0.00 0.00 -> 0.00 -2.54 0.00
Corn • > 0.00 -0.59 0.00 - 0.00 -0.59 0.00 -> 0.00 -0.59 0. 00
Nheac -> 0.00 -1.06 -0.05 - 0.00 -1.06 0.00 -> 0.00 -1.06 0.00
Rice «> 0.00 -0.18 0.00 -> 0.00 -0.18 0. 00 -> 0.00 -0.18 0.00
Oilseeds 0.26 -> 0.00 0.04 0.26 -> 0.00 0.00 -> 0.00 -0.26 0.00
Cotton 1.18 -> 0.00 0.53 1.18 -> 0.00 0.00 -> 0.00 -1.17 0.00
Suqar •> 0.00 -1.74 0.00 -> 0.00 -1.74 0.00 -> 0.00 -1.74 0.00
Tobacco -> 0.00 -0.91 0.00 - 0.00 -0.91 0.00 -> 0.00 -C.91 0.00
Poultry 2.52 -> 0.00 1.24 2.52 -> 0.00 0.00 -> 0.00 -2.46 0.00
<Q : Millions de Tonnes - L: Ecus/Tonne - P: Ecus/Tonne)
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
Supply
Q
0.37 
7.63 
1.90 
18.00 
0.25 
1.00 
0.85 
2.05 
0.20 
0.34
Oenv Dem.
L
1.28
1.46
1.17
1.03
1.30
1.33
1.09
1.32
1.38
1.36
P
3814.57
260.45
157.35
155.06
386.29
861.08
1294.25
365.82
4263.20
1989.63
Q
0 . 0 0
0.00
1.70
0.60
0.00
0.12
0.00
0.00
0.00
0 . 0 0
L 
1.00 
1.46 
1.17 
1.03 
1.00 
1.28 
1 . 0 0  
0.98 
0.99 
1.00
p
2980.13
260.45
157.35
155.06
297.15
828.71
1198.38
273.00
3067.05
1462.96
Q
0.37
7.50
0.63
14.90
0.37
1.32
0.89
1.96
0.11
0.34
L 
1. 19 
1.35 
0. 39 
0.79 
1.15 
1.28 
1.09
1.25 
1.42
1.26
3550.20
241.65
133.35
119.28
341.72
826.56
1302.84
346.71
4385.88
1840.83
(Millions de tonnes - TAA: M
Bilan Initial 1 Bilan Final
Offre Demande Exp.Net TAuto-A 1 Offre Demande 5xp.Net TAuto-A
Lamb 0.37 0.37 0.00 1.000 0.37 0.37 0.00 1.012
Milk 7.51 7.50 0.01 1.001 7.63 7.50 0.13 1.017
Corn 1.90 2.33 -0.43 0.815 1.90 2.33 -0.43 0.815
Nheac 18.01 15.50 2.51 1.162 18.00 15.50 2.50 1.161
Rice 0.25 0.37 -0.12 0.676 0.25 0.37 -0.12 0.676
Oilseeds 1.00 1.44 -0.44 0.694 1.00 1.44 -0.44 0.695
Cotton 0.85 0.89 -0.04 0.955 0.85 0.89 -0.04 0.960
Suqar 2.05 1.96 0.09 1.046 2.05 1.96 0.09 1.046
Tobacco 0.20 0.11 0.09 1.818 0.20 0.11 0.09 1.818
Poultry 0.34 0.34 0.00 1.000 0.34 0.34 0.00 1.012
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INDICATEURS (Millions d’Ecus}
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheac
Rice
Oilseeds
Coccon
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
Inicial
expenses
64. SO 
92.07 
4 .60
45.81 
94 .16 
33.96
CoOt Budgetaire
I Final
cces I D4penses
101.52 
151.39 
5.14 
544.12 
5.86
45.38
91.63
52.81
997.85
942.33
Rececces
44.46
11.05
Economic Budq6caire
-36.92
-59.32
-0.34
4.03
-0.06
-2.81
-13.82
55.51
Balance Commercials
Lamb
Milk
Corn
NheacRise
Oilseeds
Cottcn
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
Inicial
0.00
1.74
-57.34
374.24
-35.66
-284.13
-47.38
24.57
276.030.00
” 252?oI
Final
13.23 
2 2 . 6 8  
-57.68 
376.88 
-35.72 
-284.62 
-42.5 4 
25.00 
278.56 
6.17
”~30lT97
Surplus commercial
13.23
20.94
-0.34
2.63
-0.06
-0.49
1.S4
0.43
2.53
6.17
49.89
Valeur aloutie : 
(Milliards d'Ecus)
Surplus du consommaeeur
Surplus du producteur :
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheac
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
Ob^eccif Couvrt :
Revenus animaux :
Lamb
Milk
Poultry
Revenus v6g6caux :
Corn
Nheac
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Cain social :
Effet Terme Echanqe :
1.53 (Inicial)
0 . 0 0
115.38
56.14 
0 . 0 0  
0 . 0 0  0.00 
2.23 
1 2 . 8 6  0.00 0.00 
16.73
30.46
0.00
0.000.000.00
0.26
0.000.000.000.26
3.000.000.00
-9.75
4.33
1.70 (Final) 0.18 (Variation)
05/11/1999 A 13:27 • TURKEY-EU:1995 Base : Turkey95
3CENAAIO : Turkey - European Union: 1995 (Nom : SQ/NTO - Fichier scenario n*
VARIATIONS relatif 4 la base) 
Supply Oenv Dem.
VP VL VQ 1 VP VL VQ 1 VP VL VQ
Lamb -> -6.40 -8.61 -4.36 2.41 -> 0.00 0.00 -> -7.40 -9.58 4.85
Milk -> -4.80 -7.22 -2.80 -> -4.80 -7.22 0.00 -> -9.60 -11.90 1.38
Corn -> -6.30 -6.86 -2.95 -> -6.30 -6.86 0.00 -> -3.90 -4.47 0.50
Nheac -> -5.70 -6.70 -3.30 -> -5.70 -6.70 0.00 -> -3.90 -4.91 0.38
Rice -> -6.60 -6.76 -2.39 0.18 -> 0.Q0 0.00 -> -11.40 -11.56 3.97
Oilseeds -6.86 -> -7.10 -4.14 0.26 -> 0.00 0.00 0.26 -> 0.00 -0.15
Cocton -5.70 -> -6.80 -2.21 1.18 -> 0.00 0.00 -11.16 -> -12.20 5.97
Suqar -> -5.10 -6.75 -4.21 1.77 -> 0.00 0.00 -> -17.80 -19.23 7.23
Tobacco -2.41 -> -3.30 -0.49 0.92 -> 0.00 a . o o -5.85 -> -6.70 2.44
Poultry -> -2.30 -4.70 -1.13 2.52 -> 0.00 o . a o -> -17.10 -19.14 11.22
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IVEAUX (Q : Millions de Tonnes - L: Ecus/Tonne - P: Ecus/Tonne)
Supply j Oeriv Dem. I Fin. Dem.
Q L P 1 Q L P 1 Q L
1.07 1.62 4821.05 O.CO 1.00 2980.13 0.33 1.23
Milk 118.38 1.42 253.22 0.00 1.42 253.22 117.64 1.33
Corn 28.13 1.36 182.43 19.34 1.36 182.43 13.01 1.00
Nheac 83.23 1.39 209.50 23.05 1.39 209.50 51.35 1.00
Rice 1.96 1.37 407.98 0.00 1.00 297.68 1.88 1.30
Oilseeds 12.93 1.43 926.24 3.40 1.00 647.43 7.72 1.00
Cotton 1.66 1.38 1653.00 0.00 1.00 1198.38 1.29 1.30
Suqar 16.29 1.40 388.62 0.00 1.00 277.83 15.01 1.28
Tobacco 0.35 1.16 3591.76 0.00 1.00 3095.27 0.75 1.12
Poulcry 7.38 1.23 1798.49 0.00 1.00 1462.96 7.85 1.09
BILAN (Million* de tonnes - TAA: *)
Bilan Inicial
Offre Demande Exp.Net
Lamb 1.12 0.31 0.81
Milk 121.79 116.04 5.75
Corn 28.99 32.29 -3.30
Nheac 86.07 74.21 11.06
Rice 2.02 1.81 0.21
Oilseeds 13.49 11.13 2.36
Cocton 1.70 1.22 0.48
Suqar 17.01 14.00 3.01
Tobacco 0.35 0.73 -0. 30
Poulcry 7.46 7.06 0.40
I Bilan Final
TAutO-A I Offre Demande Exp.Net
3.613 1.07 0.33 0.75
1.050 118.38 117.64 0.74
0.898 28.13 32.35 -4.22
1.160 83.23 74.40 8.33
1.116 1.96 1.88 0.08
1.212 12.93 11.12 1.81
1.393 1.66 1.29 0.37
1.215 16.29 15.01 1.28
0.479 0.35 0.75 -0.40
1.057 7.38 7.85 -Q.48
INDICATEURS (Million* d'Ecus)
Code Budqbeaire
Lamb
Milk
Coen
Nheac
Rice
Otlaeed*
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
D6penses
2184.83 
933.20 
80S Jo 
4222.78 
29.33 
4704.03 273.89 
105.IQ
233.10 
430.95
Oepenaea
1749.32
1927.03
419.26
3551.28
48.26
3605.36
291.74
653.22
1422.05
Economic eudgbtaire
435.51 
-993.75 
86.34 
671. 50 
-18.93 
1090.67 -L0.86
-1861.00
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheac
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
Balance Commereiale 
Initial Final
2lliM
-566.09
1329.88
-440.06
1748.33
62.40
1523.97
568.51
821.73
1165.48
570.80
*7066?i4
356.08
-1236.60
-696.99
Surplus commercial
-126.03 
-438.44 
-38 .66 
-350.00
HIM-uiyM
Valeur aioutbe : 
(Milliards d'Ecus)
Surplus du consoamateur :
Surplus du producteur :
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheac
Rice
Oilseed*
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poulcry
Objectif Couvrt :
Revenus animaux :
Lamb
Milk
Poultry
Revenus vSgbtaux :
corn
Nheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Coccon
Sugar
Tobacco
Cain social :
Effet Terma Echanqe :
30.43 (Initial)
-57.39
-901.23
-167.98
-347.77
-30.97
-311.94
-3741.29
0.00
0.00
0 . 0 00.00
-523.39
-237.22
-291.880.C0
5.710.000.000.00
1066.38
52.56
27.30 (Final) -3.13 (Variation)
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3664.74
237.31
134.56 
150.45 
387.01 
647.43
1557.29
354.56 
3465.15 
1597.03
TAuto-A
3.296
1.006
0.870
1.119
1.042
1.163
1.286
1.085
0.466
0.939
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05/11/1999 i  13:27 - TURKEY-EU:1995 * Base Turkey95
(Nom : SQ/NTO - fichier scenario n* : I)
VARIATIONS
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheac
Rice
Oilseeds
CoCCon
Sugar
Tobacco
Poulcry
(en *> relatif 1 la base)
PMondial
2.41
2.61
0.60
1.07o .ia
0.26
1.18
1.77
(Quaneitis) Supply Deriv Dem. Fin. Dem.
Milk
Corn
Nheac
Rice
Oilseeds
CoCCon
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
0.24 
1.09 
0.16 
0.32 
0.04 0. 11 0. ?8 
0.67
0.151. 00
0.000.000.000.000.000.000.000.000.000.00
- 1 . 0 2  
-0.74 
-0.09 
-0.16 
-0.04 
-0.16 
-0.16 
- 1 . 0 1  
-0.18 
-1.14
NIVEAUX (Ecus/Tonnes - Millions de Tonnes)
Prix Mondial
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheac
Rice
Oilseeds
CoCCon
sugar
Tobacco
Poulery
127.76
HUi
1462.94
(Quancicfts)
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheac
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
484.59
441.64
548.82
239.74
17.56
94.17
5.83
33.74
i v  Oem. Fin. Dem.
0 . 0 0 4 . 7 0a.ao 2 4 9 . 7 7
0 . 0 0 4 5 6 . 3 7
0 . 00 4 1 3 . 7 7
0 . 0 0 3 6 1 . 2 9
0 . 0 0 2 4 0 . 1 2
0.00 1 6 . 3 3
0 . 0 0 9 6 . 9 0
0 . 0 0 6 . 0 3
0 . 0 0 3 2 . 9 1
(Millions de tonnes - TAA: *)
Bilan Initial 1 Bilan Final
Offre Demande Exp.Net TAuco-A 1 Offre Demande Exp.Net TAuto-A
Lamb 5.61 4.75 0.86 1.181 5.62 4.70 0.92 1.196
Milk 250.63 251.63 -I.00 0.996 253.36 249.77 3.59 1.014
Corn 483.82 456.78 27.04 1.059 484.59 456.37 28.23 1.062
Nheac 440.23 414.43 25.80 1.062 441.64 413.77 27.87 1.067
Rice 548.60 361.43 187.17 I.SIS 548.82 361.29 187.53 1.519
Oilseeds 239.48 240.50 -1.02 0.996 239.^4 240.12 -0.37 0.998
CoCCon 17.49 16.36 1.13 1.069 17.56 16.33 1.22 1.075
Sugar 93.54 97.89 -4.35 0.956 94. 17 96.90 -2.73 0.972
Tobacco 5.92 6.04 -0.22 0.964 5.83 6.03 -0.20 0.967
Poultry 33.41 33.29 0.12 1.004 33.74 32.91 0.83 1.025
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05/11/1999 A 13:28 " TURKEY-EU:1995 * Base : Turkey95
SCENARIO : Turkey 
ZONE : Turkey
European Union: 1995 (Non : SQ/FT - Fichier scenario n*
(en * relacif A la base}
Supply | Deriv Dem. 1 Fin. Oem.
VP VL VQ 1 VP VL VQ | VP VL VQ
Lamb 12.14 -> 0.00 5.90 12.14 V o o o 0.00 -> 0.00 -10.82 0.00
Milk 13.09 -> 0.00 7.66 13.09 -> 0.00 0.00 -> 0.00 -11.57 0.00
corn -> 0.00 -2.64 0.00 -> 0.00 -2.64 0.00 -> 0 .00 -2.64 0.00
Nheac -> 0.00 -4.85 -0.19 -> 0.00 -4.85 0.00 -> 0.00 -4.85 0.00
Rice -> 0.00 -0.81 0.00 -> 0.00 -0.81 0.00 -> Q.00 -0.81 0.00
Oilseeds 1.37 -> 0.00 0.20 1.37
ooo 0.00 -> 0.00 -1.35 0.00
CoCCon 4.77 -> 0.00 2.12 4.77 -> 0.00 0.00 -> 0.00 -4.55 0.00
Suqar -> 0.00 -6.30 0.00 -> 0.00 -6.30 0.00 0.00 -6. 30 0.00
Tobacco -> 0.00 -2.66 0.00 -> 0.00 -2.66 0.00 -> 0.00 -2.66 0.00
Poultry 5.92 -> 0.00 2.86 5.92 -> 0.00 0.00 0.00 -5.59 0.00
VEAUX (Q Millions de Tonnes - L: Ecus/Tonne - P: Ecus/Tonne)
Supply I Deriv Oem. 1 Fin. Dem.
g L P I o L p ! 0 L p
Lamb 0.39 1.28 4176.99 0.00 1.00 3263.27 0.37 1.09 3550.20
Milk 8.09 1.46 287.05 0.00 1.46 287.05 7.50 1.23 241.65
Corn 1.90 1.15 157.35 I. 70 1.15 157.35 0.63 0.97 133.35
Nheac 17.96 0.99 155.06 0.60 0.99 155.06 14.90 0.76 119.28
Rice 0.25 1.29 386.29 0.00 0.99 297.15 0.37 1.14 341.72
Oilseeds 1.00 1.33 870.61 0.12 1.28 837.88 1.32 1.26 826.56
Coceon 0.87 1.06 1340.17 0.00 1.00 1240.90 0.89 1.05 1302.84
Suqar 2.05 1.26 365.82 0.00 0.94 273.00 1.96 1. 19 346.71
Tobacco 0.20 1.35 4263.20 0.00 0.97 3067.05 0.11 1.39 4385.88
Poulcry 0.35 1.36 2055.61 0.00 1.00 1511.48 0.34 1.22 1840.83
(Millions de tonnes • TAA: M
Bilan Initial j Bilan Final
offre Demande Exp.Net TAUCO-A 1 Offre Demande Exp.Net TAuto-A
Lamb 0.37 0.37 0.00 1.000 0.39 0.37 0.02 1.059
Milk 7.51 7.50 0.01 1.001 8.09 7.50 0.59 1.078
Corn 1.90 2.33 -0.43 0.815 1.90 2.33 -0.4 3 0.815
Nheac 16.01 15.50 2.51 1.162 17.98 15.50 2.4B 1.160
Rice 0.25 0.37 -0.12 0. 676 0.25 0.37 -0.12 0.676
Oilseeds 1.00 1.44 -0.44 0.694 1.00 1.44 -0.44 0.696
Coeeon 0.85 0.89 -0.04 0.955 Q. 87 0.89 -0.02 0.975
Suqar 2.05 1.96 0.09 1.046 2.05 1.96 0.09 1.046
Tobacco 0.20 0.11 0.Q9 1.818 0.20 0.11 0.09 1.818
Poultry 0.34 C.34 0.00 1.000 0.35 0.34 0.01 1.029
INDICATEURS (Millions d'Ecus)
Code BudqAtaire
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheac
Rice
Oilseeds
Cocton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poulcry
Initial
DApenses
4 5 . 8 1
94.16
33.96
Final
DApenses
251.66 
393.40 
6.36 
529.13 
6.09
31.04
ti:ii
70.32
Econonie BudqAtaire
-167.26
-301.32
-1.56
19.02
-0.29
-itll
HI
 -44.35
-577.21
Lamb
Milk
Coen
Wheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Coceon
Sugar
Tobacco
Poulcry
Balance Commercials 
Inicial Final
0 . 0 0
1 .7 4
-57.34
374.24
-35.66
-284.13
-47.38
24.57
2 7 6 . 0 3
0 . 0 0
*252.08
115.06
-58.90
387.96
-35.95
-266.72
-27.27
26.22
283.58
14.70
469.92
Surplus commercial
13.71
-0.29
-2.59
2 0 . 1 0
1.65
7.55
14.70
237.84
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Valeur aioutie :
(Milliards d'Ecus)
1.53 (Initial) 2.35 (final) 0.B2 (Variation)
Surplus du consoramateur : 0.00
Surplus du producteur : 535.12
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
172.24
259.08
0.00
0.00
0.00
11.78
52.41
0.00
0.00
39.61
Objectif Gouvrt : 147.65
Revenus animaux : 0.00
Milk
Poultry
0.00
0.00
0.00
Revenus vdqbtaux : 1.36
Corn
Wheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.36
0.00
0.00
0.00
Gain social : -42.09
Effet Terme Echanqe : 42.89
5/11/1999 A 13:26 TURKEY-EU:1995 Base : Turkey95
ten • relatif A la base)
SQ/FT - Fichier scenario n*
Supply J Oetiv Dem. ] Fin.. Dem.
VP VL VQ I VP VL VQ 1 VP VL
Lamb *> -36.70 -43.55 -27.16 12. 14 -> 0.00 0.00 -> -17.60 -26.52
Milk -> -26.00 -34.56 -15 95 -> -26.00 -34.56 0. 00 -> -25.10 -33.77
Corn -> -29.60 -31.46 -14.34 -> -29.60 -31.46 0.00 -> -1.30 -3.91
Nheac -> -29.50 -32.92 -17.68 i K> IP o -32.92 0.00 -> -0.10 -4.95
Rice »> -31.30 -J1.86 -14.91 0.82 -> 0.00 0.00 -» -31.40 -31.96
Oilseeds -34.21 -» -35. 10 -21.92 1.37 - > 0.00 o . n o 1.37 -> 0.00
Cotton -29.IB -> -32.40 -12.29 4.77 - > 0.00 0.00 -29. 18 -> -32.40
Suqar »> -29.20 -33.66 -24.71 6.72 - > 0.00 0.00 -> -32.50 -36.75
Tobacco -14.42 -> -16.70 -3.07 2.73 -> 0.00 0.00 -14.42 -> -16.70
Poultry -> -17.90 -22.49 -10.42 5.92 -> 0.00 0.00 -> -21.50 -25.89
VEAUX (Q : Millions de Tonnes - L: Ecus/Tonne - P: Ecus/Tonne)
Supply I Deriv Oem. I Fin. Oem.
Q L P 1 Q L p 1 0 L
Lamb 0.82 1.00 3260.39 0.00 1.00 3263.27 0.36 1.00
Milk 102.36 1.00 196.83 0.00 1.00 196.83 120.83 1.00
Corn 24.83 1.00 137.06 19.34 1.00 137.06 12.95 1.01
Nheat 70.85 1.00 156.62 23.05 1.00 156.62 50.40 1.00
Rice 1.72 1.00 300.09 0.00 1.00 299.59 2.11 1.00
Oilseeds 10.53 1.00 654.25 3.40 1.00 654.60 7.67 1.00
Cotton 1.49 1.00 1241.41 0.00 1.00 1240.90 1.44 1.00
Suqar 12.81 1.00 289.93 0.00 1.00 291.35 16.13 1.00
Tobacco 0.34 1.00 3149.74 0.00 1.00 3150.78 0.78 1.00
Poultry 6.68 1.00 1511.32 0.00 1.00 1511.48 8.04 1.00
VQ 
15.29 
4.13 
0.03 
-1.49 
16.<8 
-0.77 
18.42 
15.18 
6.43 
13.86
3261.06
196.62
138.20
156.40
299.65
654.60
1241.41
291.15
3149.74
1512.26
(Millions de tonnes - TAA: M
Bilan Initial 1 Bilan Final
Offre Demande Exp.Nee TAuto-A 1 Offre Demande Exp.Net TAuto-A
Lamb 1.12 0.31 0.81 3.613 0.82 0.36 0.46 2.283
Milk 121.79 116.04 5.75 1.050 102.36 120.83 -18.47 0.847
Corn 28.99 32.29 -3.30 0.89B 24.83 32.29 -7.46 0.769
Nheat 86.07 74.21 11.86 1.160 70.85 73.45 -2.59 0.965
Rice 2.02 1.81 0.21 1.116 1.72 2.11 -0.39 0.814
Oilseeds 13.49 11.13 2.36 1.212 10.53 11.07 -0.54 0.951
Cotton 1.70 1.22 0.48 1.393 1.49 1.44 0.05 1.032
Suqar 17.01 14.00 3.01 1.215 12.81 16.13 -3.32 0.794
Tobacco 0.35 0.73 i o LJ cc 0.479 0.34 0.78 -0.44 0.437
Poultry 7.46 7.06 0.40 1.057 6.68 8.04 -1.36 0.831
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INDICATEURS (Killians d’Ecus)
Coflt BudqAtaire
Lamb 
Hi Ik 
Corn 
Nheat 
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
DApenses
2134.83
933.28
505.60
4222.78
29.33
4704.03
272.89
105.10
Final
DApenses Recettes
1.53
21.12
15.4011.47
0.72
3.630.03
15.07
0.51
7.38
33.85 43.019. 17
Eccnomie BudqAtaire
2186.36
912.16
521.00
«H:ii
4707.66
272.86
120.18
-233.60
-431.57
12294.95
Lamb
Milk
corn
Nheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
Balance Comnerciale 
Initial Final
2357.10
999.64
-440.06
1768.33
62.40
1523.97
566.51
821.73
-1165.48
_57Q.80
*7066794
1495.88
-3630.80
-1021.93
-406.62
-117.76
-351.84
57.51
-966.82
-1379.10
-2049.31
-8370?79
Surplus commercial
-861.22 
-4630.44 
-581.87 
-2174.95 
-180.16 
-1875.81 
-511.00 
-1783.55 
-?13.62 -2o20.11
Valeur aioucAe : 
(Milliards d'Ecus)
Surplus du consomnateur
Surplus du producteur :
Lamb
Hilk
Corn
Nheac
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
Ob}eetif Gouvrt :
Revenus animaux :
Lamb
Milk
Poultry
Revenus vAqAtaux :
Corn
Nheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Cam social :
Effet Terme Echanqe :
30.43 (Initial)
-25701.33
-1822.07 
-7743.16 
*1550.87 
-5142.12
-iall:*!
-182.90 
-2313.51
-16107.56
0.00
0 . 0 0
0 . 0 0
-1114.54
-1510.63
0.00
30.080.000.00Q.0Q
1182.04
-520.18
0.11 (Final) -30.33 (Variation)
05/11/1999 A 13:28 - TURKEY-EU:1995 - Base : Turkey95
SCENARIO : Turkey - European Union: 1995 (Nom : SQ/FT - Fichier scenario n* : 1)
ZONE : R.du Honde
VARIATIONS (en i relatif A la base)
PMondial
Corn 2.71
Nheat 3.10
Rice 0.82
Oilseeds 1.37
Cotton 4.77
Sugar 6.72
Tobacco 2.73
Poultry 5.92
(QuantitAs) Supply Deriv Dem. Fin. Dem.
Lamb 1.15 0.00 -4.81
Milk 0.00 -3.50
Corn 0.00 -0.40
Wheat 1.50 0.00 -0.74
Rice 0. IB 0.00 -0.16
Oilseeds 0.56 0.00 -0.83
Cotton 1.50 0.00 -0.65
Sugar 2.50 0.00 -3.70
Tobacco 0.43 0.00 -0.54
Poultry 2.33 0.00 -2.61
NtVEAUX (Ecus/Tonnes - Millions de Tonnes)
Prix Mondial
Milk
Corn
Wheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
3263.20
206.95
130.45
623.43
1181.75
277.48
3000.85
1511.46
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(Quantitis) Supply Deriv Dem. Fin. Dem.
tj-h 5.67 0.00 4.52
Milk 263.91 0.00 242.82
Corn 487.35 0.00 454.95
Nheac 446.83 0.Q0 411.36
Rice 549.59 0.00 360.85
Oilseeds 240.82 0.00 238.50
Cotton 17.75 0.00 16.25
Sugar 95.88 0.00 94.27
Tobacco 5.85 0.00 6.01
Poultry 34.19 0.00 32.42
BILAN (Millions de tonnes - TAA: 4)
Bilan Initial
Offre Demande Exp.Net
Lamb 5.61 4.75 0.86
Milk 250.63 251.63 -1.00
Corn 483.82 456.78 27.04
Nheac 440.23 414.43 25.80
Rice 548.60 361.43 187.17
Oilseeds 239.48 240.50 -1.02
Cotton 17.49 16.36 1.13
Sugar 93.54 97.89 -4.35
Tobacco 5.82 6.04 -0.22
Poulcry 33.41 33.29 0.12
Bilan Final
TAuto-A 1 Offre Demande Exp.Net TAuto-A
1.181 5.67 4.52 1.15 1.255
0.996 263.91 242.82 21.09 1.087
1.059 487.35 454.95 32.40 1.071
1.062 446.83 411.36 35.47 1.086
1.518 549.59 360.85 IBB.74 1.523
0.996 240.82 238.50 2.32 1.010
1.069 17.75 16.25 1.50 1.092
0.956 95.88 94.27 1.61 1.017
0.964 S.95 6.01 -0.16 0.973
1.004 34.19 32.42 1.77 1.055
05/11/1999 A 13:31 TURKEY-EU:1995 Base : TurKey9S
Turkey
Turkey
European Union: 1995 (Nom : NTO/A2 - Fichier scenario n*
VARIATIONS (en * relatif A la base)
Supply Deriv Dem.
VP VL VQ VP VL VQ vp VL VQ
Lamb -2.56 - > -3.10 -L.23 0.55 -> 0.00 0.00 -> -4.90 -5.42 2.54
Milk -3.09 -> -4.90 -1.67 -3.09 -> -4.90 0.00 -> -7.20 -4.84 6.96
corn -> -1.70 -1.87 -0 69 -> -1.70 -1.87 0.00 -> 0.00 -Q. 18 -0.04
Nheat -> -I.00 -1.36 -0.26 -> -I.00 -1.36 0.00 -> 0.00 -Q .36 -0.10
Rice -> -3.80 -3.86 -0.54 0.06 -> 0.00 0.00 -> -3.50 -3.56 2.53
Oilseeds -3.51 -> -3. 80 -0.50 -0.50 -> -0.80 o . a o -> -0.80 -1.10 0.52
Cotton -0.99 -> -1. 10 -0.31 0. 11 - > 0.00 0.00 -> -1.80 -1. 91 0.55
Sugar -> -J.70 -3.71 -0.3B 0.01 -> 0.00 0.00 -> -4.70 -4.71 0.48
Tobacco - > -4.30 -4.36 -0.44 Q.Q7 - > Q.QQ 0.00 -> -7 .00 -7.06 0.73
Poultry -4.32 -> -4.40 -1.95 0.08 -> 0.00 0.00 -> -5.40 -5.48 2.25
VEAUX iQ : Millions de Tonnes - L: Ecus/Tonne - P: Ecus/Tonne)
Supply [ Deriv Oem. I Fm. Dem.
Q L P 1 Q L P 1 Q L P
Lamb 0.37 1.24 3629.44 0.00 1.00 2926.00 0.38 1.15 3376.24
Milk 7.38 1.39 245.98 0.00 1.39 245.98 9.02 1.27 224.25
Corn 1.89 1.16 154.68 1.70 1.16 154 .68 0.63 1.00 133.35
Nheat 17.96 1.03 153.51 0.60 1.03 153.51 14.89 0.80 119.28
Rice 0.25 1.25 371.62 0.00 1.00 297.33 0.38 i.ii 329.76
Oilseeds 1.00 1.28 828.70 0. 12 1.27 922.43 1.33 1.27 919.95
Cotton 0.85 1.07 1266.49 0.00 1.00 1185.70 0.89 1.08 1279.39
Suqar 2.04 1.29 352.28 0.00 1.00 273.03 1.97 1.21 330.41
Tobacco 0.20 1.33 4079.88 0.00 1.00 3069.20 0.11 1.33 4078.87
Poultry 0.33 1.30 1856.88 0.00 1.00 1428.14 0.35 1.22 1741.43
BILAN (Millions de tonnes - TAA: *)
Bilan Initial
Offre Demande Exp.Net
Lamb 0.37 0.37 0.00
Milk 7.51 7.50 0.01
Corn 1.90 2.33 -0.43
Nheat 18.01 15.50 2.51
Rice 0.25 0.37 -0.12
Oilseeds 1.00 1.44 -0.44
Cotton 0.85 0.89 -0.04
Suqar 2.05 1.96 0.09
Tobacco 0.20 0.11 0.09
Poultry 0.34 0.34 0.00
Bilan Final
TAuto-A 1 Offre Demande Exp.Net TAuto-A
1.000 0.37 0.38 -0.01 0.963
1.001 7.38 8.02 -0.64 0.921
0.815 1.99 2.33 -0.44 0.810
1.162 17.96 15.49 2.48 1.160
0.676 0.25 0.38 -0.13 0.655
0.694 1.00 1.45 -0.45 0.688
0.955 0.85 0.89 -0.05 0.947
1.046 2.04 1.97 0.07 1.037
1.818 0.20 0.11 0.09 1.797
1.000 0.33 0.35 -0.01 0.959
131
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
(Millions d'Ecus)
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheac
Rj.ce
Oilseeds
Coceon
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
Inicial
Depenses
64.60
92.07
4.80
45.81 
94.16 
33.96
CoOt Budgitaire
I Final
cces I Mpenses
86.25
130.30
4.09
5ll:H
48.84
89.38
34.02
918.21
833.41
Recectes Economie Budgetaire
-21.65
28.99
-0.37
22.15
-9.49
-3.03
4.78
-0.05
-16.20
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheac
Rice
Oilseeds
coceon
Sugar
Tobacco
Poulcry
Balance Commercials 
Inieial Final
0 . 0 0
1.74
-57.34
374.24
-35.66
-284.13
-47.38
24.57
276.030.00
252.0
-40.82
-112.81
-59.13
370.83
-38.86
-292.68
-So.36
19.88
271.05
-20.39
ToTn
Surplus commercial
-40.82 
-114.54
:l: ?
- 6 . 9 8
-4.69
-4.98
-20.39
- 2 1 1 . 3 7
Valeur ajoutee : 
(Milliards d'Ecus)
Surplus du consommaeeur
Surplus du producCeur :
Lamb
Milk
corn
Nheac
Rice
Oilseeds
coceon
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
ob^ectif Couvrc :
Revenus animaux :
Lamb
Milk
Poultry
Revenus v6g6eaux :
Corn
Nheae
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Gam social :
Effet Terme Echange :
1.53 (Inieial)
334.46
-263.35
-35.05 
-58.39 
-5.07 
-27.89 
- 3 . 6 6  
-30.07 
-10.75 
-27.69 
-36.58 
-28.20
-36.20
0 . 0 0
0 . 0 0
0 . 0 0
0.00
-5.97
-4.55 
-0. 93 
0 . 0 0  
-0.50 
0.00 0.C0 
0 . 0 0
54.91
-1.78
1.33 (Final) -0.20 (Variation)
05/11/1999 A 13:31 TURKEY-EU:1995 ” Base : Turkey9S
SCENARIO : Turkey - European Union: 1995 (Nom : NT0/A2 - Fichier scenario n* : 1)
ZONE : EU
relatif A la base)
Supply I Oeriv Dem. 1 Fin Dem.
VP VL VQ 1 VP VL VQ 1 VP VL VQ
Lamb -> 0.00 -0.55 0.55 -> 0.00 -0.55 0.00 -> Q. 00 -0.55 0.00
Milk -> •3.80 -5.50 -2.28 -> -3.80 -5.50 0.00 -> 0.00 -1.77 0.00
Corn -> -2.00 -2.17 -0.88 -> -2.00 -2.17 0.00 -> 0.00 -0.18 0.00
Nheac -> -2.00 -2.36 -1.17 -> -2.00 -2.36 0.00 -> O.QO -0.36 O.QO
Rice -> 0.00 -0.06 0.00 -> 0.00 -0.06 0.00 -> 0.00 -0.06 0.00
Oilseeds -6.82 -> -7.10 -5.46 0.30 -> 0.00 0.00 0.30 -> 0.00 -0.17
CoCCon 0.11 -> 0.00 0.04 0.11 -> 0.00 0.00 0.11 -> 0.00 -0.05
Sugar -> 0.00 -0.01 0.20 -> 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -> 0.00 -0.01 0.00
Tobacco 0.07 -> 0.00 0.01 0.07 -> 0.00 0.00 0.07 -> 0.00 -0.03
Poultry -> 0.00 -0.QB 0.16 -> 0.00 -0.08 0.00 *> O.QO -0.08 O.QO
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VEAUX (Q Millions de Tonnes - L: Ecus/Tonne - P: Ecus/Tonne)
Supply I Deriv Dem. 1 Pin. Dem.
Q L P 1 Q L p 1 Q L
Lamb 1.13 1.76 5150.70 0.00 0.99 2910.00 0.31 1.35 3957
Milk 119.01 1.45 255.88 0.00 1.45 255.88 116.04 1.48 262
Corn 28.73 1.43 190.80 19.34 1.43 190.80 12.95 1.05 140
Nheat 85.06 1.45 217.72 23.05 1.45 217.72 51.16 1.05 156
Rice 2.02 1.47 436.81 0.00 1.00 297.15 1.81 1.47 436
Oilseeds 12.75 1.43 926.63 3.40 1.00 647.69 7.72 1.00 647
Cotton 1.70 1.48 1754.84 0.00 1.00 1185.70 1.22 1.48 1754
Suqar 17.04 1.50 409.50 0.00 1 . 0 0 273.00 14.00 1.58 431
Tobacco 0.35 1.20 3683.04 0.00 1 . 0 0 3069.20 0.73 1.20 3683
Poultry 7.47 1.29 1840.83 0.00 1.00 1427.00 7.06 . 35 1926
BILAN (Millions de tonnes - TAA; M
B ila n  I n i t i a l
Offre Demande Exp.Nee
Lamb 1.12 0.31 0.81
Milk 121.79 116.04 5.75
Corn 28.99 32.29 -3.30
Nheac 86.07 74.21 11.86
Rice 2.02 1.81 0.21
Oilseeds 13.49 11.13 2.36
Coeeon 1.70 1.22 0.48
Suqar 17.01 14.00 3.01
Tobacco 0.35 0.73 -0.38
Poultry 7.46 7.06 0.40
: 3lian Final
TAuto-A 1 Offre Demande Exp.Net TAuto-A
3.613 1.13 0.31 0.82 3.633
1.050 119.01 116.04 2.97 1.026
0.898 28.73 32.29 -3.56 0.890
1.160 85.06 74.21 10.85 1. 146
1.116 2.02 1.81 0.21 1.116
1.212 12.75 11.12 1.64 1.147
1.393 1.70 1.22 0.48 1.395
1.215 17.04 14.00 3.04 1.217
0.479 0.35 0.73 -0.38 0.480
1.057 7.47 7.06 0.41 1.058
INDICATEURS (Millions d'Ecus)
CoOt BudqAtaire
Lamb
Milk
Corn
NheeC
Rice
Oilseeds
coceon
Sugar
Tooacco
Poultry
DApenses
21B4.S3
933.
12957.83
12285.79
OApenses
2185.47
3 d U l
10477.83
9275.39
434.49
"TSoiTH
Econonue BudqAtaire
0.04
1146.54
-1.03
-4.59
0.04
-4.45
3010.40
Milk
Corn
Nheac
Rice
Oilseeds
Coteon
sugar
Tooacco
Poulcry
Balance Comnereiale 
Inieial Pinal
2357.10
999.64
-440.06
1768.33
<2.40
1523.97
568.51
2388.18
1624.08
62.44
l«8;84
8 3 1 . 0 7
-1165.48
588.32
6010.58
Surplus commercial
31.08
-473.46
-34.86
-144.25
0.04
-463.94
2.16
9.34
- 0 . 0 0
17^ 52
-1056.36
Valeur ajoucAe : 30.43 (Inieial) 26.20 (Final) -4.24 (Variation)
(Milliards d'Ecus)
Surplus du consommateur : -19.19
Surplus du producteur : -2593.59
Lamb 0.51
Milk
Corn -112.38
Nheac -380.19
Rice ,0.00
Oilseeds -889.94
Cotton 3.2B
Sugar 0.00
ToBaccc 0.90
Poultry 0.68
Objectif Gouvrt : -957.76
Revenus animaux r 0.00
Lamb 5*99MU* 2*92Poultry 0.00
Revenus vAgAtaux : -171.13
Corn -75.31
Nheac “ l0 2 *52Rice 0.00
Oilseeds 6.59
Cotton 0-22
Sugar 2*52Tobacco 0.30
Sain social : 397.61
Effet Terme Echange : 31.15
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05/11/1999 A 13:31 " TURKEY-EU:1955 " Base Turkey95
SCENARIO : Turkey * European Union: 
ZONE : R.du Honde 1995 (Nom : NTO/A2 - Fichier scenario
VARIATIONS
Lamb
Milk
corn
Nheac
Rice
Oilseeds
Coceon
Sugar
Tooacco
Poulcry
(en 4 relatif d la base)
PMondial
0.55
1.30
0.18
0.36
0.06
0.30
0 . 1 1
0.01
0.0?
0.08
(Quaneit6s)
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheac
Rice
Oilseeds
cocton
Sugar
Tooacco
Poulcry
Supply Deriv Dem. Fin. Dem.
0.06 0.00 -0.240.75 0.00 -0.520.05 0.00 -0.03
0.11 0.00 -0.050.01 0.00 -0.010.12 0.00 -o .ie0.04 0.00 -0.02
0.00 0.00 0.000.01 0.00 -0.010.03 0.00 -0.04
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheac
Rice
Oilseeds
Coccon
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
(Ecus/Tonnes - Millions de Tonnes) 
Prix Mondial
1 2 ? . 2 2  
142.52
(Quantitis)
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheac
Rice
Oilseeds
Coceon
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
Supply Oeriv Oem. Fm. 
5.61
2lUl
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0. 00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00
361
240
.74 
.32 
. 64
:31
.07
.36
.89
.04
(Millions de tonnes * TAA: •)
Bilan Initial . Bilan Final
Offre Demande Exp.Net TAuto-A 1 Offre Demande Exp.Net TAuto-A
Lamb 5.61 4.75 0.36 1.181 5.61 4.74 0.87 1. 185
Milk 250.63 251.63 -I.00 0.996 252.51 250.32 2.19 1.009
Corn 483.82 456.78 27.04 1.059 484.06 456.64 27.42 1.060
Nheac 440.23 414.43 25.80 1.062 440.71 414.22 26.49 1.064
Rice 548.60 361.43 187.17 1.518 548.65 361.39 187.26 1.518
Oilseeds 239.48 240.50 -1.02 0.996 239.77 240.07 -0.30 0.999
Coccon 17.49 16.36 1.13 1.069 17.50 16.36 I. 14 1.070
Sugar 93.54 -j CD VS -4.35 0.956 93.54 97.89 -4.35 0.956
Tobacco 5.82 6.04 -0.22 0.964 5.82 6.04 -0.22 0.964
Poultry 33.41 33.29 0.12 1.004 33.42 33.28 0.14 1.004
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OS/11/1999 A 14:36 TURKEY-EU:1995 Base : Turkey95
SCENARIO : Turkey - European Union: 199S 
ZONE : Turkey (Nom : WTO/WTO - Fichier scenario n*
VARIATIONS (en * relatif A la base)
Supply Deriv Oem.
VP VL VQ 1 VP VL VQ vp VL
Lamb -0.34 -> -3.10 -0.12 2.85 -> 0.00 0.00 -> -4.90 -7.53
Milk -1.96 -> -4.80 -0.99 -1.96 -> -4.80 0.00 -> -7.20 -9.89
Corn *> -1.70 -2.29 -0.68 -> -1.70 -2.29 0.00 -> 0.00 -0.60
Wheat -> -1.00 -2.06 -0.31 -> -I.00 -2.06 0.00 -> 0.00 -1.07
Rice -> -3.80 -3.98 -0.54 0.18 -> 0.00 0.00 -> -3.50 -3.68
Oilseeds -3.54 -> -3.80 -0.50 0.27 -> 0.00 0.00 -> -0.80 -1.06
Cotton 0.14 -•> -1.10 0.20 1.26 -> 0.00 0.00 -> -1.80 -3.02
Sugar -> -3.70 -5.39 -0.38 1.79 - > 0.00 0.00 -> -4.70 -6.37
Tobacco -> -4.30 -5.23 -0.44 0.98 -> 0.00 0.00 -> -7.00 -7. 91
Poultry -1.93 -> -4.40 -0.73 2.59 -> 0.00 0.00 -> -5.40 -7.78
VQ 
2.54 
6. 96 
-0.04 
-0.10 
2.53 
0.52 
0.55 
0.48 
0.73 
2.25
VEAUX (Q : Millions de Tonnes - L: Ecus/Tonne - P: Ecus/Tonne)
Supply | Deriv Dem. 1 Fin. Dem.
Q L P | Q L p 1 Q L 1
Lamb 0.37 1.24 3712.14 0.00 1.00 2992.94 0.38 1.13 3376,
Milk 7.44 1.39 248.85 0.00 1.39 248.85 8.02 1.25 224.
Corn 1.89 1.15 154.68 1.70 1.15 154.68 0.63 0.99 133.
Nheat 17.95 1.02 153.51 0.60 1.02 153.51 14 .89 0. 79 119.
Rice 0.25 1.25 371.62 0.00 1.00 297.68 0.38 1. 11 329.
Oilseeds 1.00 1.28 828.44 0.12 1.28 828.79 1.33 1.27 819.
Cotton 0.85 1.07 1280.94 0.00 1.00 1199.32 0.89 1.07 1279,
Sugar 2.04 1.27 352.28 0.00 1.00 277.89 1.97 1.19 330.
Tobacco 0.20 1.32 4079.88 0.00 I.00 3097.11 0. 11 1.32 4078.
Poultry 0.34 1.30 1903.26 0.00 1.00 1463.96 0.35 1. 19 1741.
(Million* de tonnes - TAA: M
Bilan Initial I Bilan Final
Offre Oemande Exp.Net TAuto-A 1 Offre Demande Exp.Net TAuto-A
Lamb 0.37 0.37 0.00 1.000 0.37 0.38 -0.01 0.974
Milk 7.51 7.50 0.01 1.001 7.44 8.02 -0.59 0. 927
Corn 1.90 2.33 -0.43 0.815 1.89 2.33 -0.44 0.810
Wheat 18.01 15.50 2.51 1. 162 17.95 15.49 2.47 1.159
Rice 0.25 0.37 -0.12 0.676 0.25 0.30 -0. 13 0.655
Oilseeds 1.00 1.44 -0.44 0. 694 1.00 1.45 -0.45 0.688
Cotton 0.85 0.89 -0.04 0.955 0.85 0.89 -0.04 0.952
Sugar 2.05 1.96 0.09 1.046 2.04 1.97 0.07 1.037
Tobacco 0.20 0. U 0.09 1.818 0.20 0.11 0.09 1.797
Poultry 0.34 0.34 0.00 1.000 0.34 0.35 -0.01 0.971
INDICATEURS (Millions d'Ecus)
CoOt Budgetaire
Lamb
Milk
corn
Wheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultrv
Initial
OBpenses
64.60 
92.07 
4. B0
45.81
94.16
33.96
47.27
24.87
Final
Dtpenses
120.36
156.36 
4.35
516.49
6.22
48.49
86.90
51.81
70.54
2.14
Economic Budgetaire
-55.76
-64.29
0.45
31.66
-0.42
23.27
-22.74
-2.68
7.26
-17.85
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Wheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
Balance Cotsnwtrciale 
Initial Final
0.00 
l .74 
-57.34 
374.24 
-35.66 
-284.13 
-47.38 
24.57 
276.03 
0.00
252.08
-29.46
-104.98
-59.39
372.11
-38.91
-292.57
-51.80
20.23
273.54
-14.83
73?93
Surplus commercial
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Valeur ajoutie : 
(Milliards d'Ecus)
Surplus du consommaceur
Surplus du productaur :
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheac
Rice
Oilseeds
Coceon
Sugar
Tooaceo
Poulcry
Objectif Gouvrc :
Revenue animaux :
Milk
Poulcry
Revenue vtqftcaux :
Corn
Nheac
Rice
Oilseeds
Coccon
Sugar
Tcoacca
Gam social :
Effet Terme Echanqe :
I.S3 (Inicial)
334.46
-184.19
-4.67
-37.16
-5.07
-27.88
-3.66
-30.33
1.52
-27.65
-36.58
-12.67
-17.15
0.00
0.00
O.QO
0 . 0 0
-5.21
-4.55
-0.93
0.00
0.27
0.00
0.00
0.30
49.19
0.91
1.45 (Pinal) -0.08 (Variaeicn)
05/11/1999 1 14:36 TURKEY-EU:1995 Turkey95
Turkey - European Union: 1995 (Nom : NTO/NTO - Fichier scenario n“
(en *i relatif 1 la base)
Supply Deriv Oem. I Fin Oem.
VP VL VQ 1 VP VL VQ 1 VP VL
Lamb • > -6.40 -8.99 -4.36 2.8! -> 0.00 0.00 -•> -7.40 -9. 97
Milk -  > -4.80 -7.56 -2.80 -> -4.80 -7.56 0.00 -> -9.60 -12.22
Corn - > -6.30 -6.86 -2.95 -> -6.30 -6.86 0.00 -> -3.90 -4.48
Nheac • > -5.70 -6.71 -3.30 -> -5.70 -6.71 O.QO -> -3.90 -4.93
Rice -> -6.60 -6.77 -2.89 0.18 - 0.00 0.00 -> -11.40 -11.56
Oilseeds -6.85 -> -7.10 -4.13 0.27 - 0.00 0.00 0.27 —> 0.00
Cotton -5.63 -> -6.80 -2. 19 1.26 - 0.00 0.00 -11.10 -> -12.20
Suqar -> -5.10 -6.77 -4.21 1.79 - 0.00 0.00 -> -17.60 -19.24
Tobacco -2.35 -> -3.30 -0.47 0.98 G.00 0.00 -5.78 -> -6.70
Poulcry *> -2.30 -4.76 -t. 13 2.59 0.00 0.00 -> -17.10 -19.19
VQ 
4.85 
1.38 
0.50 
0. 38 
3.97 
-0.15 
5.93 
7.23 
2.41 
1 1 . 2 2
VEAUX (Q Millions de Tonnes - L: Ecus/Tonne - P: Ecus/Tonne)
Supply Deriv Dem. 1 Pin. Dem.
Q L P <3 L P 1 Q L
Lamb 1.07 1.61 4821.05 0.00 1.00 2992.94 0.33 1.22 3664
Milk 118.38 1.41 253.22 0.00 1.41 253.22 117.64 1.33 237
Corn 28.13 1.36 182.43 19.34 1.36 182.43 13.01 1.00 134
Nheac 83.23 1.39 209.50 23.05 1.39 209.50 51.35 1.00 150
Rice 1.96 1.37 407.98 0.00 1.00 297.68 1.88 1.30 387
Oilseeds 12.93 1.43 926.33 3.40 1.00 647.49 7.72 1.00 647
Cotton 1.66 1.38 1654.22 O.QO 1.00 1199.32 1.29 1.30 1558
Suqar 16.29 1.40 388.62 0.00 1.00 277.89 15.01 1.28 354
Tobacco 0.35 1.16 3593.97 0.00 1.00 3097.11 0.75 1.12 3467
Poulcry 7.38 1.23 1798.49 0.00 1.00 1463.96 7.85 1.09 1597
BILAN (Millions de eonnes - TAA: *>
Bilan Inicial
Offre Demande Exp.MeC
Lamb 1.12 0.31 0.81
Milk 121.79 116.04 5.75
Corn 28.99 32.29 -3.30
Nheac 86.07 74.21 11.86
Rice 2.02 1.81 0.21
Oilseeds 13.49 11.13 2.36
Coccon 1.70 1.22 0.48
Suqar 17.01 14.00 3.01
Tobacco 0.35 0.73 -0.38
Poulcry 7.46 7.06 0.40
Bilan Pinal
TAueo-A 1 Offre Demande Exp.Net TAuto-A
3.613 1.07 0.33 0.75 3.296
1.050 118.38 117.64 0.74 1.006
0.898 28.13 32.35 -4.22 0.870
1.160 83.23 74.40 8.83 1.119
1.116 1.96 1.88 0.08 1.042
1.212 12.93 11.12 1.81 1.163
1.393 1.66 1.29 0.37 1.287
1.215 16.29 15.01 1.28 1.085
0.479 0.35 0.75 -0.40 0.466
1.057 7.38 7.85 -0.48 0.939
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INDICATEURS (Millions d'Ecus)
CoQc BudqAtaire
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Wheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tooacco
Poulcry
DApenses
2184.83
§33.28
505.60
4222.78
29.33
4704.03
12957.83
12285.79
DApenses
1739.88
1926.55
419.30
3551.12
48.25
3606.25
292.51
653.16
1422.51
Econcmie BudqAtaire
444.95
-993.27
86.29
671.66
-18.93
1097.78
-19.62
-548.05
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Wheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
3ugar
Tobacco
Poultry
Balance Commerciale 
Initial final
2357.10 
999.64 
-440.06 
1768.33 
62.40 
1523.97 
568.51 
95’ 73 
-1165.48 
570.80
7066.94
2233.11
AMi13%-M
1174.82
444.45
356.J5
-1236.53
-697.45
3194.43
Surplus commercial
-123.99 
-867.41 
-126.08 
-438 .28 
-38 . 0 6  
-349.15 
-124.06 
-465.58 
-71.05 
-1268.25
”-3872751
Valeur aioutAe : 30.43 (Initial) 27.31 (Final) -3.13 (Vanati
(Milliards d'Ecus)
Surplus du consommaceur : 7471.37
Surplus du producteur : -5126.71
Lamb -359.63
Milk -1531.61
Corn -350.33
Wheat -1071.93
Rice -57.39
Oilseeds -899.97
Cotton -165.94
Sugar -347.77
Tooacco -30.20
Poultry -311.94
Objectif Gcuvrt ; -3729.89
Revenus animaux : O.QO
Lamb 0.00
Milk 0.00
Poultry 0 . 0 0
Revenus veqetaux : -523.17
Corn -237.22
Wheat -291.
.00Ri?e 9.OliSeoda 5.
Cotton 0.00
Sugar 0 . 0 0
Tobacco O.QO
Gain social : 1074.86
Effet Terme Echanqe : <1.80
05/11/1999 A 14:36 TURKEY-EU:1995 "
SCENARIO : Turkey - European Union: 1995 (Nom : WTO/WTO - fichier scAnanc n* : I)
ZONE : R.du Monde
VARIATIONS relatif A la base)
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheat
Rice
oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
2.85
2.99
0.60
1.08
0.18
0.27
1.26
1.79
0.98
2.59
(QuantitAs) Supply Oeriv Dem. Fin. Dem.
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Wheat
Rice
Oilseeds
cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
0.28
1.24
0.16
0.32
0.04
0.11
0.40
0.67
0.16
1.03
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
O.QO
0.00
O.QO
O.QO
0.00
-0.09 
-0.16 
-0.04 
-0.16 
-0.17 
- 1 . 0 2  
- 0 . 2 0  
-1.17
(Ecus/Tonnes
Corn
Wheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
Millions de Tonnes)
Prix Mondial
2992.91
188.46
127.77
143.53
2B3.S2
616.64 
1142.19
264.64 
2949.74 
1463.90
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(Quantitis) Supply Deriv Dem. fin. Dem.
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheac
Rice
Oilseeds
Coccon
sugar
Tobacco
Poulcry
5.63
253.74 
484.59 
441.64 
548.82
239.74 
17.56
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
4.69 
249.49 
456.37 
413.77 
361.29 
240.12 
16.33
96.89 
6.03
32.90
(Millions de eonnes - TAA: *)
Bilan Inicial 1 Bilan Final
Offre Demande Exp.Net TAuCo-A I Offre Demande Exp.Nec TAuCO-A
Lamo 5.61 4.75 0.86 1.191 5.63 4.69 0.93 1.199
Milk 250.63 251.63 -1.00 0.996 253.74 249.49 4.25 1.017
Corn 483.82 4S6.78 27.04 1.059 484.59 456.37 28.23 1.062
Nheac 440.23 414.43 25.80 1.062 441.64 413.77 27.87 1.067
Rice 548.60 361.43 187.17 1.518 548.82 361.29 187.53 1.519
Oilseeds 239.48 240.50 -1.02 0.996 239.74 240.12 -0.37 0.998
coceon 17.49 16.36 1.13 1.069 17.56 16.33 1.23 1.075
Sugar 93.54 97.89 -4.35 0.956 94.17 96.89 -2.72 0.972
Tooacco 5.82 6.04 -0.22 0.964 5.83 6.03 -0.20 0.967
Poulcry 33.41 33.29 0.12 1.004 33.75 32.90 3.85 1.026
05/11/1999 A 13:32 TURKEY-EU:1995 Base : Turkey95
European Union: 1995 (Mom : NTO/FT - Fichier scenario n*
VARIATIONS (en * relatif A la base)
Supply I Oerrv Dem. 1 Fin. Dem.
VP VL VQ 1 VP VL VQ 1 VP VL VQ
Lamb 9.01 -> -3.10 4.46 12.49 -> 0.00 0.00 -> -4.90 -15.46 2.54
Milk 8.06 -> -4.80 4.97 8.06 -> -4 .80 0.00 -7.20 -18.24 6.96
Corn -> -1.70 -4.31 -0.68 -> -1.70 -4.31 0.00 -> O.QO -2 .66 -0.04
Nheac -> -I.00 -5.82 -0.45 -> -1.00 -5.82 0.00 -> 0.00 -4.87 -0.10
Rice -> -3.80 -4.59 -0.54 0.83 -> 0.00 0.00 -> -3.50 -4.29 2.53
Oilseeds -2.48 -•» -3.80 -0.34 0.57 -> -0.80 0.00 -> -0.80 -2.15 0.52
CoCCon 3.69 -» -I.10 1.79 4.84 -> 0.00 0.00 -1. 80 -6.33 0.55
Suqar -> -3.70 -9.71 -0.38 6.66 - > 0.00 0.00 -> -4.70 -10.65 0.48
Tobacco -> -4.30 -6.91 -0.44 2.80 -> 0.00 0.00 -7.0Q -4.54 0.73
Poultry 1.32 -> -4.40 0.86 5.98 -> 0.00 0.00 -5.40 -10.74 2.25
VEAUX (Q : Millions de Tonnes - L: Ecus/Tonne - P: Ecus/Tonne)
Supply [ Deriv IOem. | Fin. Dem.
0 L P 1 Q L p 1 Q L P
Lamb 0.39 1.24 4060.40 0.00 1.00 3273.46 0.38 1.03 3376.24
Milk 7.88 1.39 274.28 0.00 1.39 274.28 8.02 1.14 224.25
Corn 1.89 1.13 154.68 1.70 1.13 154.68 0.63 0.97 133.35
Nheac 17.93 0.98 153.51 0.60 0.98 153.51 14.89 0.76 119.28
Rice 0.25 1.24 371.62 0.00 1.00 299.62 0.38 1. to 329.76
Oilseeds 1.00 1.28 837.55 0.12 1.27 831.27 1.33 1.25 819.95
Coccon 0.87 1.07 1326.35 0.00 1.00 1241.72 0.89 1.03 1279.39
Sugar 2.04 1.21 352.28 0.00 1.00 291.18 1.97 1.13 330.41
Tobacco G .20 1.29 4079.88 0.00 1.00 3152.93 0.11 1.29 4078.37
Poultry 0.34 1.30 1966.34 0.00 1.00 1512.33 0.35 1.15 1741.43
(Millions de Connes - TAA:
Bilan Initial
Offre Demande Exp.Net TAuto-A
Lamb 0.37 0.37 0.00 1.000
Milk 7.51 7.50 0.01 1.001
Corn 1.90 2.33 -0.43 0.815
Nheat 18.01 15.50 2.51 1.162
Rice 0.25 0.37 -0.12 0.676
Oilseeds 1.00 1.44 -0.44 0.694
Coccon 0.85 0.89 -0.04 0.955
Sugar 2.05 1.96 o o 10 1.046
Tobacco 0.20 0.11 0.09 1.818
PcuXtry 0.34 0.34 c o o 1.000
Bilan Final
Offre Demande Exp.NeC TAuto-A
0.39 0.38 0.01 1.019
7.88 8.02 -0.14 0.983
1.B9 2.33 -0.44 0.810
17.93 15.49 2.44 1.158
0.25 0.38 -0.13 0.655
1.00 1.45 -0.45 0.689
0.87 0.89 -0.03 0.967
2.04 1.97 0.07 1.037
oCMo 0.11 0.09 1.797
0.34 Q.3S o a a 0.986
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INDICATEORS (Millions d'Ecus)
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheac
R*ce
Oilseeds
coccon
sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
Initial
Otpenses
64.60 
92.07 
4.80
889.35
817.21
Codt Budqttaire
I final
ttes | Dtpenses
265.16
390.63
5.60
501.70
6.47
7.27
4.87 39.52
Economic Budgitaire
-200.56
-298.56
-0.80
46.46
-0.67
10.98
-64.39
-1.71
12.19
-42.08
-539.15
corn
wheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
Balance Commerciale 
Initial final
0.00 
1.74 
-57.34 
374.24 
-35.66 
-284.13
-47.38
24.57
-27.38 
-60.64 
383.04 
-39.16 
-294.76 
-36.85 
2 1 . 2 0  
278.46 
-7.15
240.00
Surplus commercial
23.26 
-29.12 
-3.30 
8.76 
-3.50 
-10.63 
10.52 
-3. 37 
2.43
-7.15
-12.0
Valeur aioutde : 
(Milliards d’Ecua)
Surplus du consoranateur
Surplus du producteur :
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Wheat
SiS..*.
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
Object!? Couvrt :
Revenue animaux :
Lamb
Milk
Poultry
Revenue v6q6taux :
Corn
Wheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Cam social :
Effet Terme Echange :
1.53 (Initial}
334.46 
211.55
126.96
157.47 
-5.07
-27.86 
-3.66 
-21.26 
40.48 
-27.69 
-36.58 
8.77
80.72
0.00
0.QC
0.00
0.00
-4.91
-4.55 
-0.93 
0.00 
0.57 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00
6.86
18.85
2.05 (final) 0.52 (Variation)
05/11/1999 A 13:32 TURKEY-EU:1995 Base : Turkey95
European Union: 1995 <Noa> : WTO/FT - Fichier scenario n*
VARIATIONS reiatif A la base)
Supply j Oeriv Dem. I fin Dem,
VP VL VQ I VP VL VQ 1 VP VL
Lamb -> -36.20 -43.29 -26.69 12.49 -> 0.00 0.00 -> -17.60 -26.75 15
Milk -> -26.00 -34.80 -15.95 -> -26.00 -34.80 0.00 -> -25.10 -34.01 4
Corn -> -29.60 -31.47 -14.34 -> -29.60 -31.47 0.00 -> -1.80 -4.41 0
Wheat -> -29.50 -32.93 -17.72 -> -29.50 -32.93 0.00 -> -0.10 -4.97 -I
Rice -> -31.30 -31.86 -14.91 0.83 -> 0.00 0.00 -> -31.40 -31.96 16
Oilseeds -34.21 -> -35.10 -21.92 1.38 -> 0.00 0.00 1.38 -> 0.00 -0
Cotton -29.13 -> -32.40 -12.26 4.84 -> 0.00 0.00 -29.13 -> -32.40 18
Sugar -> -28.70 -33.15 -24.23 6.66 -> 0.00 0.00 -> -32.50 -36.71 15
Tobacco -14.37 -> -16.70 -3.06 2 . e o -> 0.00 0.00 -14.37 -> -16.70 6
Poultry -> -17.90 -22.54 -10.42 5.98 -> 0.00 3.00 -> -21.50 -25.93 13
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VEAUX (Q : Millions de Tonnes - L: Ecus/Tonne - P: Ecus/Tonne)
Supply 1 Deriv Dem. 1 Fin. Dem.
Q L P 1 Q L p 1 Q L
Lamb 0.82 1.00 3286.15 0.00 1.00 3273.46 0.36 1.00
Milk 102.36 1.00 196.83 0.00 1.00 196.83 120.83 1.00
Corn 24.83 1.00 137.06 19.34 1.00 137.06 12.98 1.00
tfheac 70.82 1.00 156.62 23.05 1.00 156.62 50.38 1.00
Rice 1.72 1.00 200.09 0 . 0 0 L. 00 299.62 2.11 1.00
Oilseeds 10.53 1.00 654.25 3.40 1.00 654.66 7.67 1.00
Cotton 1.49 1.00 1242.29 0 . 0 0 1.00 1241.72 1.44 1.00
Sugar 12.89 l .QQ 291.97 0.00 i . o o 291.18 16.13 1 . 00
Tobacco 0.34 1.00 3151.58 0.00 1.00 3152.93 0.78 1 . 0 0
Poultry 6.68 l .QO 1511.32 0.00 1.00 1512.33 8.04 1.00
(Millions de Cannes * TAA: <)
Bilan Initial j
Offre Demande Exp.Net TAuto-A. 1 Offre Demande Exp.Met
Lamb 1.12 0.31 0.81 3.613 0.82 0.36 0.46
Milk 121.79 116.04 5.75 1.050 102.36 120.83 -18.47
Corn 28.99 32.29 -3.30 0.898 24.83 32.32 -7.49
Nheat 86.07 74.21 11.86 1.160 70.82 73.43 -2.61
Rice 2.02 1.81 0.21 1.116 1.72 2. U -0.39
Oilseeds 13.49 11.13 2.36 1.212 10.53 11.07 -0.54
Cotton 1.70 1.22 0.48 1.393 1.19 1.44 0.05
Suqar 17.01 14.00 3.01 1.215 12.89 16.13 -3.24
Tobacco 0.35 0.73 -0.38 0. 479 0.34 0.78 -0.44
Poultry 7.46 7.06 0.40 1.057 6.68 8.04 -1.36
INDICATEURS (Millions d'Ecus)
Code BudqAtaire
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheat
Alee
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
Initial
expenses
2184.83 
133.28 
505.60 
4222 .78
473?!o]
12957.83
12285.79
final
OSpenses
Q .03 
10.61 
0.62
6.16
4.32
6.13
"uTel
Economic Budqetaire
2170.03 898.69 
511.75 
4211.22 
28.60 
4708.35 
272.86 
94.49 
-233. 12 
-432.82
2229.46
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Wheae
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
Balance Commercials 
Initial final
2357. 10 
999.64 
-440.06 
1768.33 
62.40 
1523.97 
568.51 
an.73 
-1165.48 
570.80
1517.86
-3644.27
-1025.84-409.70
-117.77
-2050.56
Surplus commercial
-839.24 
-4643.91 
-585.79 
-2170.02 
-180.17 
-1875.32 
-509.72 
-1764.17 
-213.^4 
-2621.36
~*134ll746
Valeur aioutAe : 
(Milliards d’Ecus)
Surplus du conscttinateur :
Surplus du producteur :
Lamb
Milk
corn
Hheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
SugarTobacco
Poultry
Objectif Gouvrt :
Revenus animaux :
Lamb
Milk
Poultry
Revenus vigitaux :
oilseeds
Cotton
SugarTobacco 
Gain social :
Effet Terme Echange :
30.43 (Initial)
-1802.05
-5140.99
-255.59
-4086.35
-814.85
-1756.93
-182.28
-2319.51
-16090.56
0.20 (final) -30.24 (Variation)
0.00
0.00
0.00
-1114.54
-1510.63
0.00
30.30
0.00
0.00
0.00
1171.17
140
P
3261.06
196.62
137.50
156.40
299.65
654.66 
1242.29
291.15
3151.58
1512.26
TAuto-A 
2 .297 
0.847 
0.768 
0.964 
0.814 
0.952 
1.033 
0.799 
J.437 
0.831
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05/11/1999 A 13:32 • TtJAKEY-EU:1995 * Base Turkey95
(Ncm : WTO/FT - Fichier scenario .
(en i relatif A la base)
Milk
Corn
Nheac
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
12.49
li:?i
a:ti1.38 
4.84 
o. 66 
2.80 
5.98
(Quantitis)
Milk
Corn
Nheac
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
Supply Deriv Dem. fin. Oem.
1.18 0.00 -4.94
5.46 0.00 -3.61
0.73 0.00 -0.40
1.51 0.00 -0.75
rt T A 0.00 -0. 16o'.n 0.00 -0.83
1.52 0.00 -0.66
2.48 0.00 -3.67
0.44 0.00 -0.55
2.35 0.00 -2.64
MZVEAQX (Ecus/Tonnes - Millions de Tonnes)
Prix Mondial
Lamb
Milk
corn
Nheac
Rl?e
Oilseeds
Cotton
sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
130.47
149.27
285.34
§22.47
1102.61
277.31
3002.85
1512.38
(QuantitSs) Supply Oeriv Oem. Fm. Dem.
Lamb
Milk
corn
Nheac
Rice
OilJeeda
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
5.6B
48$IsS
17.7695.865.85
34.20
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
4.5?
itu l
238.50
16.25
94.30
6.01
32.41
(Millions de tonnes * TAA:
Bilan Initial Bilan Final
orrre Demande Exp.Net TAuto-A 1 Offre Demande Exp.Net
Lamb 5.61 4.75 0.86 1.181 5.68 4.52 1.16
Milk 250.63 251.63 -I.00 0.996 264.31 242.55 21.77
Corn 483.82 456.78 27.04 1.059 487.35 454.95 32.40
Nheac 440.23 414.43 25.80 1.062 446.88 411.32 35.56
Rice 548.60 361.43 187.17 1.518 549.59 360.85 188.74
Oilseeds 239.48 240.50 -1.02 0.996 240.82 238.50 2.32
Cotton 17.49 16.36 1.13 1.069 17.76 16.25 1.50
Sugar 93.54 97.89 -4.35 0.956 95.86 94.30 1.56
Tobacco 5.82 6.04 -0.22 0.964 5.85 6.01 -0.16
Poultry 33.41 33.29 0. 12 1.004 34.20 32.41 1.78
TAuto-A
1.25?
1.090
1.071
1.086
1.523
1 . 0 1 0
1.093
1.017
0.973
1.055
05/11/1999 4 13:29 TURKEY-EU:1995 - Turkey95
SCENARIO : Turkey - European Onion: 1995 (Nom : IN/A2 - Fichier scenario n* : 
ZONE : Turkey
VARIATIONS (en * relatif 4 la base)
Supply Oeriv Dem.
VP VL VQ 1 V? VL VQ
Lamb 38.20 -> 40.50 16.32 -1.64 -> 0.00 0.00
Milk 0.57 -> -0.70 -3.16 0.57 -> -0.70 0.00
Corn -> 21.20 21.21 7.99 -> 21.20 21.21 0.00
Nheac -> 40.00 40.37 9.30 -> 40.00 40.37 0.00
Rice -> 13.10 13.14 1.75 -Q.Q4 -> 0.00 0.00
Oilseede 7.88 —> 7.50 1.03 -21.52 -> -21.80 0.00
Cotton 35.08 -> 37.00 9.22 -1.40 -s 0.00 0.00
Sugar -> 11.80 11.93 1.12 -0.11 -> 0.00 0.00
Tobacco -> -13.50 -13.67 -1.44 0.19 -> 0.00 0.00
Poultry -5.22 «> -5.10 -4.65 -0.12 -> 0.00 0.00
Fin. Oem.
vp VL VQ
-> 11.10 12.95 -3.06
-> 8.90 7.52 -7.39
-> 4.50 4.51 -2.93
-> 30.90 31.24 -2.71
-> 27.80 27.85 -15.70
-> -21.60 -21.88 17.81
-> 32.60 34.48 -8.12
-> 24.30 24.44 -2.15
-> -15.90 -16.06 1.75
-> 4.60 4.73 -1.78
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(Q : Millions de Tonnes - L: Ecus/Tonne - P: Ecus/Tonne)
Supply 1 Oeriv Dem. 1 fin. Oem.
Q L P I Q L P 1 Q L
r -»w»K 0.43 1.80 5147.67 0.00 1.00 2862.28 0.36 1.38
Milk 7.27 1.45 255.27 0.00 1.45 255.27 6.95 1.49
Corn 2.05 1.43 190.71 1.70 1.43 190.71 0.61 1.05
Nheat 19.68 1.46 217.09 0.60 1.46 217.09 14.50 1.05
Rice 0.25 1.47 436.90 0.00 1.00 297.03 0.31 1.47
Oilseeds 1.01 1.43 926.52 0.12 1.00 648.68 1.56 1.00
Cotton 0.93 1.48 1727.88 0.00 1.00 1167.82 0.82 1.48
Sugar 2.07 1.50 408.99 0.00 1.00 272.70 1.92 1.58
Tobacco 0.20 1.20 3687.67 0.00 1.00 3072.88 O.lt 1.20
Poultry 0.32 1.29 1839.41 0.00 1.00 1425.29 0.33 1.35
LAN (Millions de tonnes - TAA: •)
Bilan Initial I Bilan final
Offre Demande Exp.Net TAuto-A 1 Offre Demande Exp.Met
Lamb 0.37 0.37 0.00 1.000 0.43 0.36 0.07
Milk 7.51 7.50 0.01 1.001 7.27 6.95 0.33
Corn 1.90 2.33 -0.43 0.815 2.05 2.31 -0.26
Nheat 18.01 15.50 2.51 1.162 19.68 15.10 4.59
Rice 0.25 0.37 -0.12 0.676 0.25 0.31 -0.06
Oilseeds 1.00 1.44 -0.44 0.694 1.01 1.68 •0.66
Cotton 0.85 0.09 -0.04 0.955 0.93 0.82 0.11
Sugar 2.05 1.96 0.09 1.046 2.07 1.92 0.16
Tobacco 0.20 0. 11 0.09 1.818 0.20 0.11 0.09
Poultry 0.34 0.34 0.00 1.000 0.32 0.33 -0.01
INDICATEUR3 (Millions d'Ecus)
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
Initial
expenses
64.60
92.07
4.80
45.81
94.16
33.96
*889735
CeOt Budqttaire
I final
ttea I Dtpenses
595.51
16.51
1197.35
281.31 
62.22
47.27
24.8?
72.14 2205. 16 
2114.50
7.95
2 1 . 0 0
32.79
90?66
Econoaie Budq^taire
-530.90 
120.99
-11.n
-649.20 
13.N  
-328.58 
-87.09 
66.81 
41. 89 
66. 75
-1297.29
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheac
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
Balance Commerciale 
Initial final
-35.66 
-294.13 
-47.38 24.57 
276.03 
0.00
2527o0
2?Hi
-34.63
682.39
129.21 
42.29 
261.80 
-13.91
Surplus commercial
308.15
18.66
-146.69
176.58
17.72
-14.23
-13.91
Valeur aioutee : 1.53 (Initial) 3.53 (final) 2.00 (Variation)
(Milliards d'Ecus)
Surplus du consoomateur : -1097.27
Surplus du producteur : 2235.18
Lamb 569.18
Milk 10.44
SSSSt niU \
§iS..da lUt
Cotton 399.00
Sugar 88.99
Tobacco -114.28
Poultry -33.88
Objectif Gouvrt : 117.06
Revenus animaux : 0.00
Lamb 0.00
Milk 0.00
Poultry 0.00
Revenus vtgttaux : 72.58
Corn §S*71Nheac 37.22
Rice 0.00
Oilseeds -21.35
Cotton 0.00
Sugar 0.00
Tobacco 0.00
Gain social : -159.38
Effet Terme Echange : -7.36
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P
3944.27
263.16
139.35
156.14
436.72
648.02
1727.57
430.96
3688.53
1925.51
TRutt-A
1 . 2 0 0
1.047
0.888
1.304
Q.B16
0.603
1.135
1.081
1.761
0.971
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05/11/1999 A 13:29 " TURKEY-£U:1995 - Base : Turkey95
SCENARIO : Turkey 
ZONE : EU * European Union: 1995 (Norn : IN/A2 - Fichier scenario n#
VARIATIONS (en * relatif A la base)
Supply j Oeriv Dem. | Fin. Dem
VP VL VQ 1 VP VL VQ I VP VL
Lamb -> 0.00 1.67 0.55 -1.64 -> 0.00 Q.00 -> 0.00 1.67
Milk -> -3.80 -5.02 -2.28 -> -3.80 -5.02 0.00 -> 0.00 -1.26
Corn -> -2.00 -1.99 -0.88 -> -2.00 -1.99 0.00 -> 0.00 0.01
Nheat -> -2.00 -1.74 -1.17 -> -2.00 -1.74 0.00 -> 0.00 0.26
Rice -> 0.00 0.04 0.00 -0.04 - 0.00 0.00 -> 0.00 0.04
Oilseeds -6.77 -> -7.10 -5.41 0.36 - 0.00 0.00 0.36 -> 0.00
Cotton -1.40 -> Q.00 -0.53 -1.40 - 0.00 0.00 -1.40 -> 0.00
Suqar -> 0.00 0.11 0.20 -0.11 - 0.00 0.00 -> 0.00 0.11
Tobacco 0.19 -> 0.00 0.04 0.19 - 0.00 0.00 0.19 -> 0.00
Poultry -> 0.00 0.12 0.16 -0.12 - Q.00 O.GQ -> 0.00 0.12
NIVEAUX (Q Millions de Tonnes - L: Ecus/Tonne - P: Ecus/Tonne)
Supply | Oeriv Oem. Fin. Dem
Q L P 1 Q L P Q L
Lamb 1.13 1.80 5150.70 0.00 1.00 2862.28 0.31 1.38
Milk 119.01 1.45 255.88 0.00 1.45 255.88 116.04 1.49
Corn 28.73 1.43 190.80 19.34 1.43 190.80 12.95 1.05
Nheac 85.06 1.46 217.72 23.05 1.46 217.72 51.16 1.05
Rice 2.02 1.47 436.81 0.00 1.00 297.03 1.81 1.47
Oilseeds 12.76 1.43 927.13 3.40 1.00 648.07 7.71 1.00
Cotton 1.69 1.48 1728.37 0.00 1.00 1167.82 1.23 1.48
Suqar 17.04 1.50 409.50 0.00 1.00 272.70 14.00 1.58
Tobacco 0.35 1.20 3687.45 0.00 1.00 3072.88 0.73 1.20
Poultry 7.47 1.29 1840.83 0.00 1.00 1425.29 7.06 1.35
VQ 
0.00 
0. 00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
-0.20 
0.69 
0.00 
-0.08 
0.00
P
3957.60
262.51
140.02
156.55
436.81
648.07
1728.37
431.34
3687.45
1926.45
(Millions de tonnes - TAA: *)
Bilan Initial Bilan Final
Offre Demande Exp.Net TAuto-A i Offre Demande Exp.Net TAutc-A
Lamb 1.12 0.31 0.81 3.613 1.13 0.31 0.82 3.633
Milk 121.79 116.04 5.75 1.050 119.01 116.04 2.97 1.026
Corn 28.99 32.29 -3.30 0.898 28.73 32.29 -3.56 0.890
Nheac 86.07 74.21 11.86 1.160 85.06 74.21 10.85 1.146
Rice 2.02 1.81 0.21 1.116 2.02 1.81 0.21 1.116
Oilseeds 13.49 11.13 2.36 1.212 12.76 11.11 1.65 1. 148
Cotton 1.70 1.22 0.48 1.393 1.69 1.23 0.46 1.377
Suqar 17.01 14.00 3.01 1.215 17.04 14.00 3.04 1.217
Tobacco 0.35 0.73 -0.38 0.479 0.35 0.73 -0.38 0.480
Poultry 7.46 7.06 0.40 1.057 7.47 7.06 0.41 1.058
INOICATEURS (Millions d'Ecus)
Coilt BudqAtaire
Lamb
MUk
Corn
Nheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tcoacco
Poultry
Initial
DApenses
2184.83
§33.28
505.60
4222.78
29.33
4704.03
272.89
105.10
12957.83
12285.79
Final
DApenses
2237.54
453.31
3877.91
29.35
3560.84
259.29
110.69
Ecanomie BudqAtaire
-52.71 
1465.41 
52.29 
344.87 
-0.02 
1143.19 
13.59 
-5.58 
-0.05 
-5.66
2955?33
Lamb
Milk
Coen
Nheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Suqar
Tobacco
Poultry
Balance Commercials 
Initial Final
2357.10
999.64
-440.06
1768.33
62.40
1523.97
568.51
2336.11
523.51
-474.02
1613.95
62.38
1066.47
540.20
830.08
-1165.52
587.11
S920.2B
Surplus commercial
-20.99-476.13
-33.96
-154.38
-0.02
-457.50
-28.31
8.35
-0.04
16.31
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Valeur ajoutAe :
(Milliards d’Ecus)
Surplus du consomraateur
Surplus du produeceur :
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheac
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
Objectif Gouvrc :
Revenus animaux :
Milk
Poultry
Revenus vAgicaux :
Corn
Nheac
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Gam social :
Effet Terme Echange :
30.43 (Initial)
6.99 
-2630.65
o.so
-1216.45 
-112.30 
-380.19 
0.00 
-883.64 
-41.61 
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
-169.82
-75.31
-102.42
0.00
7.90
0.00
0.00
0.00
331.67
-44.29
26.16 (Final) -4.27 (Variation)
05/11/1999 A 13:29 » TURKEY-EU:1995 " Base : Turkey95
SCENARIO : Turkey - European Union: 1995 (Non : IN/A2 - Fichier scenario n* : 1)
ZONE : R.du Monde
VARIATIONS (en • relatif a la base)
PMondial
:ii
.0’
.26
Lamb 
Milk 
Corn 
Nheat
Rice -u.o-i
Oilseeds 0.36
Cotton -1.40
Sugar -0.il
Tobacco 0.19
Poultry -0.12
(QuantitSs) Supply Oeriv Oem. Fin. Oem.
Lamb -0.17 0.00 0.71
Milk 0.54 0.00 -0.37
corn Q.00 0.00 0.00
Nheac -0.08 0.00 0.04
Rice -0.01 0.00 0.01
Oilseeds 0.15 0.00 -0.22
Cotton -0.45 0.00 0 .2 3
sugar -0.04 0.00 0.07
Tobacco 0.03 0.00 -0.04
Poultry -0.05 0.00 0.06
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
(Ecus/Tonnes - Millions de Tonnes)
Prix Mondial
2862.32 
185.34 
126.99 
141.63 
282.90 
617. 19 
1 1 1 2 . 2 1  
259.7;
2926.e7
1425.25
(QuantitAs) Supply Oeriv Oem. FLn. Oem.
Lamb 5.60 0.00 4.70
Milk 251.98 0.00 250.70
Corn 483.82 0.00 456.70
Nheat 439.88 0.00 414.60
Rice
Oilseeds
548.55 0.00 361.47
239.84 0.00 239.97
Cotton
Sugar kUh 0.000.00 m i
Tobacco
Poultry
5.82
33.39
0.00
0.00
6.04
33.31
BILAN (Millions de tonnes - TAA: M
Bilan Initial
offre Demande Exp.Net
Lamb 5.61 4.75 0.86
Milk 2S0.63 251.63 -1.00
Corn 483.82 456.78 27.04
Nheat 440.23 414.43 25.80
Rice 548.60 361.43 187.17
Oilseeds 239.48 240.50 -1.02
Cotton 17.49 16.36 1.13
Sugar 93.54 97.89 -4.35
Tobacco 5.82 6.04 -0.22
Poultry 33.41 33.29 0.12
Bilan Final
TAuto-A 1 Offre Oemande Exp.Net TAuto-A
1.181 5.60 4.78 0.82 1.171
0.996 251.9B 250.70 1.28 1.005
1.059 483.82 456.78 27.04 1.059
1.062 439.88 414.60 25.28 1.061
1.518 548.55 361.47 187.08 1.518
0.996 239.84 239.97 -0.13 0.999
1.069 17.41 16.39 1.02 1.062
0.956 93.50 97.96 -4.46 0.955
0.964 5.82 6.04 -0.22 0.964
1.004 33.39 33.31 0.08 1.003
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05/11/1999 * 13:29 • TURKEY-EU:1995 • Base Turkey95
SCENARIO : Turkey - European Union: 1995 (Nem : IN/A2 - Fichier scenario n* : I)
ZONE : Turkey
VARIATIONS (en * relatif A la base)
Supply | Oeriv Dem. I Fin. Dem.
VP VL VQ 1 VP VL VQ VP VL VQ
38.20 -> 40.50 16.32 -1.64 -> 0.00 0.00 - 11.10 12.95 -3.06
Milk 0.57 -> -0.70 -3. 16 0.57 -> -0.70 0.00 - 8.90 7.52 -7.39
Corn -> 21.20 21.21 7. 99 -> 21.20 21.21 0.00 - 4.50 4.51 -2.93
Nheac -> 40.00 40.37 9. 30 -> 40.00 40.37 0.00 - 30.90 31.24 -2.71
Rice -> 13.10 13.14 1.75 -0.04 -> 0.00 0.00 - 27.30 27.85 -15.78
Oilseeds 7.88 -> 7.50 1.03 -21.52 -21.80 0.00 - -21.60 -21.80 17.81
Cotton 35.08 -> 37.00 9.22 -1.40 -> 0.00 0.00 - 32.60 34.48 -8. 12
Suqar -> 11.80 11.93 I. 12 -0.11 -> 0.00 0.00 - 24.30 24.44 -2. 15
Tobacco -> -13.50 -13.67 -I . 44 0.19 -> 7.SC 7.00 - -15.90 -14.06 1.75
Poultry -5.22 -> -5.10 -4.65 -0.12 -> 0.00 0.00 - 4.60 4.73 -1.78
(Q : Millions de Tonnes - L: Ecus/Tonne - P: Ecus/Tonne)
Supply | Deriv Dem. I Fin. Dem.
Q L P I ■3 L p 1 Q L
Lamb 0.43 1.80 5147.67 0.00 1.00 2862.28 0.36 1.38
Milk 7.27 1.45 255.27 0.00 1.45 255.27 6.95 1.49
Corn 2.05 1.43 190.71 1.70 1.43 190.71 0.61 1.05
Nheac 19.68 1.46 217.09 0. 60 1.46 217.09 14.50 1.05
Rice 0.25 1.47 436.90 0.00 1.00 297.03 0.31 1.47
Oilseeds I.01 1.43 926.52 0. 12 1.00 648 .68 1.56 1.00
Cotton 0.93 1.48 1727.88 0.00 1.00 1167.82 0.82 1.48
Suqar 2.07 1.50 408.99 0.00 1.00 272.7Q 1.92 1.58
Tobacco 0.20 1.20 3687.67 0.00 1.00 3072.88 0.11 1.20
Poultry 0.32 1.29 1839.41 0.00 1.00 1425.29 0. 33 1.35
P
3944.27 
263.16 
139.35 
156.14 
436.72 
648.02 
1727.57 
430.96 
3688.53 
1925.51
BILAN (Millions de tonnes - TAA: •)
Bilan Initial
Offre Demande Exp.Net
Lamb 0.37 0.37 0.00
Milk 7.51 7.50 0.01
Corn 1.90 2.33 -0.43
Nheat 18.01 15.50 2.51
Rice 0.25 0.37 -0. 12
Oilseeds 1.00 1.44 -0.44
Cotton 0.85 0.89 -0.04
Suqar 2.05 1.96 0.09
Tobacco 0.20 0.11 0.09
Poultry 0.34 0.34 0.00
Bilan Final
TAutc-A 1 Offre Demande Exp.Net TAuto-A
1.000 0.43 0.36 0.07 1.200
1.001 7.27 6.95 0.33 1.047
0.815 2.05 2.31 -0.26 o.sse
I. 162 19.68 15.10 4.59 1.304
0.676 0.25 0.31 -0.06 0.816
0.694 1.01 1.68 -0.66 0.603
0.955 0.93 0.82 0.11 1.135
1.046 2.07 1.92 0.16 1.081
1.818 0.20 0.11 0.09 1.761
1.300 0.32 0.33 -0.01 0.971
INDICATEURS (Millions d'Ecus)
Lamb
Milk
corn
Nheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
Initial
DApenses
44.60
92.07
4.80
548.15
5.79
45.81
94.16
33.96
515.35
817.21
CoOt BudqAtaire
I Final
ttes i DApenses
595.51
28.92
7.95
2 1 . 0 0
32.79
~9o766
Economic Budqetaire
-530.90
120.99
-11.71
-849.20
13.74 
-328.58
-87.09
66.81
41.89
66.75
” 257755
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheat
Rice
Oilseeds
cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
poultry
Balance Commercials
Initial Final
0.00 205.25
1-74 57.56
-34.63
-17.00
-430.82
129.21
42.29
261.80
-13.91
’*882.14
3I:«
-284.13
-47.38
24.57
276.03
0.00
*252708
Surplus commercial
205.25
55.83
22.71 
308.15
18.e6 
-146.69 
176.58
17.72 
-14.23 
-13.91
630.06
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Valeur aioucte :
(Milliards d’Ecus)
Surplus du consommateur
Surplus du producceur :
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheac
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
Objectif Gouvrt :
Revenus animaux :
Lamb
Milk
Poultry
1.53 (Initial) 3.53 (Final) 2.00 (Variation)
Revenus vbqfttaux :
Coen
Nheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Gain social :
Effet Terme Echanqe :
-1097.27
2235.18
1169.03
12.76
68.03
399.00
88.99
-114.28
-33.88
117.06
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
56.71
37.22
0.00
-21.35
0.00
0 . 0 0
0.00
-159.38
-7.36
05/11/1999 4 13:29 * TURKEY-EU:1995 - Turkey95
(en *i relatif A la base)
IN/A2 - Fichier scenario n*
Supply | Oeriv Dem. 1 Fin Oem
VP VL VQ 1 VP VL VQ 1 VP VL
Lamo -> 0.00 1.67 0.55 -1.64 0.00 o.oc -> 0.00 1.67
Milk -> -3.80 -5.02 -2.28 -> -3.80 -5.02 0.00 -> 0.00 ■1.26
Corn - > -2.00 -1.99 -0.88 -> -2.00 -1.99 0.00 - > 0.00 0.01
Nheat -> -2.00 -1.74 -I. 17 -> -2.00 -1.74 0.00 -> 0.00 0.26
Rice - > 0.00 0.04 0.00 -0.04 0.00 0.00 -> 0.00 0.04
Oilseeds -4.77 -> -7.10 -5.41 0.36 0.00 0.00 3.36 -> o.oa
Cotton -1.40 -> 0.00 -0.53 -1.40 0.00 0.00 -1.40 -> 0.00
Sugar »> 0.00 o.ii 0.20 -0.11 0.00 0.00 -> o.oc o.tt
Tobacco 0.19 -> 0.00 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.19 - > 0.00
Poultry -> 0.00 0.12 0. 16 -0.12 0.00 0.00 - > 0.00 0.12
VQ 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
- Q  . 2 0  
0.69 
0.00 
-0.08 
0.00
Millions de Tonnes - L: Ecus/Tonne - P: Ecus/Tonne)
Supply Denv Oem.
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
0
1.13
119.01
28.73
85.06
2.02
12.76
1.69
17.04
0.35
7.47
L
1.80
1.45
1.43
1.46
1.47
1.43
1.48 
1.50 
1.20 
1.29
5150
255
190
217
436
927
1720
409
3687
1840
80
.72
I
.13
.37
.50
.45
.83
Q 
0.00 
0.00 
19.34 
23.05 
0.00 
3.40 
0.00 
0.00 
3.00 
0.00
L
1.00
1.45 
1.43
1.46 
1.00 
1.00 
1 . 0 0  
1.00 
1.00 
1.00
P
2862.28
255.88
190.80
217.72
297.03
448.07
1167.82
272.70
3072.88
1425.29
Fin.
Q
0.31
116.04
12.95
51.16
1.81
7.71
1.23
14.00
0.73
7.06
L
1.38
1.49
1.05
1.05
1.47 
1.00
1.48 
1.58 
1.20 
1.35
P
3957.60
262.51
140.02
156.55
436.81
648.07
1728.37
431.34
3687.45
1926.45
BILAN (Millions de tonnes - TAA: M
Bilan Initial
Offre □emande Exp.Net
Lamb 1.12 0.31 0.81
Milk 121.79 116.04 5.75
Corn 28.99 32.29 -3.30
Nheac 86.07 74.21 11.86
Rice 2.02 1.81 0.21
Oilseeds 13.49 11.13 2.36
Cotton 1.70 1.22 0.48
Suqar 17.01 14.00 3.01
Tobacco 0.35 0.73 -0.3B
Poultry 7.46 7.06 0.40
Bilan Final
TAuto-A 1 Offre □emande Exp.Net TAuto-A
3.613 1.13 0.31 0.82 3.633
1.050 119.01 116.04 2.97 1.026
0.898 28.73 32.29 -3.56 0.890
1.160 85.06 74.21 10.85 1.146
1.116 2.02 1.81 0.21 1.116
1.212 12.76 11.11 1.65 1.148
1.393 1.69 1.23 0.46 1.377
1.215 17.04 14.00 3.04 1.217
0.479 0.35 0.73 -0.38 0.480
1.057 7.47 7.06 0.41 1.058
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IMDICATEURS (Millions d'Ecus)
CoQt Budqicaire
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheac
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
Mpenses
2184.83 
933.28 
505.60 
4222.78 
29.33 
4704.03 
272.89
iqS.io
12957.83
12285.79
D4penses
2237.54
453.31 
3877.91 
29.35 
3560.84 
259.29 
110.q9
Economic Budqbcaire
-52.71
1465.41
52.29
344.87
-0.02
1143.19
13.59
-5.58
-O.05
-5.66
2955.33
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheac
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
Balance Commercials 
Initial Final
2357.10 
999.64 
-440.06 
1768.33 
62.40 
1523.97 
568.51 
821.73 
-1165.48 
570.80
*7066794
2336.11
1613.95
62.38
1066.47
540.20
630.08
-1165.52
587.11
**5920.28
Surplus commercial
-20.99
-476.13
-33.96
-154.38
-0.02
-457.50
-28.31
8.35
-0.04
16.31
30.43 (Initial) 26.16 (Final) -4.27 (Variation)
3urplus du consommateur
Surplus du producteur :
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
poultry
Objectif Gouvrt :
Revenus animaux :
Lamb
Milk
Poultry
Revenus v6q6caux :
Corn
Nheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Sain social :
Effet Terme Echanqe :
6.99
-2630.65
0.50
-1216.45
-112.38
-380.19
0.00
-883.64
-41.61
!:S3
0.67
-1049.14
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
-102.42
0 . 0 0
7.30
0.00
0.00
0.00
331.67
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OS/ll/1999 A 13:29 * TUHKEY-EU:1995 » Base Turkey95
VARIATIONS (en * relatif A la base)
PMondial
Lamb -l .64
Milk 1.28
corn -o.Ql
Nheac ->0.26
Rice -0.04
Oilseeds 0.36
Cotton -1.40
Sugar -0.11
Tobacco 0.1§
Poultry -0.12
(QuantitAs) Supply Denv Oem. Fin.
Lamb -0.17 0..00 0
Milk 0.54 0..00 -0
Corn 0.00 0..00 0
Nheac -0.08 0..00 0
Rice -0.71 .00
Oilseeds 0.1 i o;.00 -0
Cotton -0.45 0..00 0
Sugar
Tobacco
-0.04 0..00 0
0.03 0..00 -0
Poultry -0.05 0..00 0.
VEAUX (Ccus/Tonnes - Millions de Tonnes)
Prix Mondial
Lamb 2862.32
Milk 185.34
Corn 126.99
Nheat 141.63
Rice 282.90
Oilseeds 617.19
Cotton 1112.21
Sugar 259.71
Tobacco 2926.67
Poultry 1425.25
iQuancitts) Supply Oeriv Dem. Fin. Oem.
Lamb 5.60 0.00 4.7B
Milk 251.98 0.00 250.70
Corn 483.82 0.00 456.78
Nheat 439.88 0.00 414.60
Rice 548.55 0.00 361.47
Oilseeds 239.84 0.00 239.97
Cotton 17.41 0.00 16. 39
Sugar 93.50 0.00 97. 96
Tobacco 5.82 0.00 6.04
Poultry 33.39 0.00 33.31
BILAN (Millions de tonnes - TAA: * 1
Bilan Initial | Bilan Final
offre Demande Exp.Net TAuto-A i Offre □emande Exp.Net TAuto-A
Lamb 5.61 4.75 0.86 I. 181 5.60 4.78 0.82 1.171
Milk 250.63 251.63 -1.00 0.996 251.90 250.70 1.28 1.005
Corn 483.82 456.78 27.04 1.059 483.82 456.78 27.04 1.059
Nheat 440.23 414.43 25.80 1.062 439.88 414.60 25.28 1.061
Rice 548.60 361.43 187.17 1.518 548.55 361.47 187.08 1.518
Oilseeds 239.48 240.50 -1.02 0.996 239.81 239.97 -0.13 0.999
Cotton 17.49 16.36 I. 13 1.069 17.41 16.39 1.02 1.062
Suqar 93.54 97.89 -4.35 0. 356 93.50 97.96 -4.46 0.955
Tobacco 5.82 6.04 *0.22 0.964 5.82 6.04 -0.22 0.964
Poultry 33.41 33.29 0. 12 1.004 33.39 33.31 0.08 1.003
05/11/1999 A 13:30 TURKEY-EU:1995 * Base : Turkey95
Turkey - European Union: 1995 
Turkey
<Ncm : INNNTO - Fichier scenario n*
VARIATIONS relatif a la base)
Supply I Oeriv Sen. 1 Fin. Dem.
VP VL VQ 1 vp VL VQ 1 VP VL VQ
Lamb 28.86 -> 27.00 12.49 1.46 -> 0.00 0.00 - 3.50 2.01 0.10
Milk 0.05 -> -2.70 -2.94 0.05 -> -2.70 0.00 - -1.30 -4.01 1.18
Corn -> 16.00 15.48 6.12 -> 16.00 15.48 0.00 - 0.40 -0.05 -1.37
Nheat -> 35.70 35.01 8.51 -> 35.70 35.01 0.00 - 25.60 24.96 -2.41
Rice -> 5.50 5.38 0.74 a.11 -> 0.00 0.00 - 13.10 12.97 -8.26
Oilseeds 7.84 -> 7.50 1.08 -21.65 -> -21.90 0.00 - -21.60 -21.85 17.20
Cotton 28.11 -> 27.80 7.12 0.24 -> 0.00 0.00 - 18.30 18.02 -4.92
Suqar -> 6.30 4.51 0.61 1.72 -> 0.00 0.00 - 2.20 0.47 -0.22
Tobacco -> -15.30 -16.27 -1.65 1.16 -> 0.00 0.00 - -21.10 -22.00 2.40
Poultry -7.32 -> -9.60 -5.46 2.53 -> O.OC 0.00 - -13.40 -15.53 5.92
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:VEAUX (Q : Millions de Tonnes - L: Ecus/Tonne - P: Ecus/Tonne)
3upply t Oeriv Dem. 1 Fin. Dem.
0 L P 1 Q L P | 0 L
Lamb 0.42 1.63 4799.78 0.00 1.00 2952.49 0.37 1.24
Milk 7.29 1.42 253.95 0.00 1.42 253.95 7.59 1.33
Corn 2.02 1.36 182.53 1.70 1.36 182.53 0.62 1.00
Wheat 19.54 1.40 210.42 o o 1.40 210.42 14.54 1.00
Rice 0.25 1.37 407.54 0.00 1.00 297.48 0.34 1.30
Oilseeds i.Ol 1.43 926.18 0.12 1.00 647.61 1.55 1.00
Cotton 0.91 1.38 1638.72 0.00 1.00 1187.24 0.85 1.30
Suqar 2.06 1.40 388.87 0.00 1.00 277.70 1.96 1.28
Tobacco 0.20 1.16 3610.93 0.00 1.00 3102.63 0.11 1.12
Poultry 0.32 1.23 179B.66 0.00 1.00 1463.10 0.36 1.09
p
3674.46 
238.SI 
133.88 
149.82 
386.49 
648.02
1541.26
354.34
3460.46
1594.16
BILAN (Millions de tonnes - TAA: *)
Bilan Initial
Offre Qemande Exp.Net
Lame 0.37 0.37 0.00
Milk 7.51 7.50 0.01
Corn 1. 90 2.33 -0.43
Wheat 18.01 15.20 2.51
Rice Q.2S 0.37 -0.12
Oilseeds 1.00 1.44 -0.44
Cotton 0.85 0.89 -0.04
Suqar 2.05 1.96 0.09
Tobacco 0.20 0.11 0.09
Poultry 0.34 0.34 0.00
Bilan final
TAuto-A i Offre Demande Exp.Net TAuto-A
1.000 0.42 0.37 0.05 1.124
1.001 7.29 7.59 -0.30 0.961
0.815 2.02 2.32 -0.31 0.869
1.162 19.54 15.14 4.40 1.291
0.676 0.25 0.34 -0.09 0.742
0.694 1.01 1.67 -0.66 0.606
0.955 0.91 0.85 0.06 1.076
1.046 2.06 1.96 0.11 1.055
1.818 0.20 0.11 0.08 1.746
1.000 0.32 0.36 -0.04 0.893
INDICATEURS (Millions d'Ecus)
CoQt BudqAtaire
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Wheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tooaeeo
Poultry
DApenses
64.60
92.07
4.80
H:!i33.96
"siiTJs
817.21
47.27
24.87
DApenses
201.07
111.51
2351.68 
2349.18
Economie BudqAtaire
-436.87
-2.57
-10.61
-599.68
8.29
-328.34
-136.38
- 3 3 . 5 9
34.47
-26.70
-1531.98
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Wheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
Balance Coranerciale 
Initial Final
0.00 
1.74 
-67.34 
374.24 
-35.36 
-234. 13 
-47.38 
24.57 
276.03 
0.00
425.11
76.35
29.66
252.
Surplus commercial
135.35
-55.24
16.47
285.42
9.60
-140.98
123.73
5.09
-15.24
-56.61
307.59
1.53 (Initial) 3.42 (final) 1.89 (Variation)
Surplus du consommateur :
Surplus du producteur :
Lamb
Milk
corn
Wheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
Gbjectif Gouvrt :
Revenus anunaux :
Lamb
Milk
Poultry
Revenus vAqAtaux :
corn
Wheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Gain social :
Effet Terme Echanqe :
422.39
0.74
49.30
1039.42
-129.38
-47.14
147.97
0.00
Q.00
O.OC
54.54
42.80
33.21
0.00
-21.47
0.00
0.00
O.OC
-24.33
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11/1999 A 13:30 • TURKEY-EU:1995 " Base : Turkey9S
SCENARIO : Turkey - European Union: 199S (Non : INXNTO - fichier scenario n- : 1)7 nu? * pr?
VARIATIONS (en 4 relatif A la base)
Supply | Oer.V a A 9 I fin Dem.
VP VL VQ I VP VL VQ 1 VP VL
Lamb -> -6.40 -7.75 -4.36 1.46 -> 0.00 0.00 -> -7.40 -8.73
Milk -> -4.80 -7.41 -2.80 -> -4.80 -7.41 0.00 -> -9.60 -12.08
Corn -> -6.30 -6.72 -2.95 -> -6.30 -6.72 0.00 -> -3.90 -4.33
Nheac -> -5.70 -6.18 -3.30 -> -5.70 -6.18 0.00 -> -3.90 -4.39
Rice •> -6.60 -6.70 -2.89 0.11 - 0.00 a . 00 -> -11.40 -11.50
Oilseeds -6.80 -> -7.10 -4 .08 0.32 - 0.00 0.00 0.32 -> 0.00
Cotton -6.58 -> -6.80 -2.55 0.24 - 0.00 0.00 -11.99 -> -12.20
Suqar -> -5.10 -6.70 -4 .21 1.72 - 0.00 0.00 -> -17.80 -19.19
Tobacco -2.18 -> -3.30 -0.44 1.16 - 0.00 0.00 -5.62 -> -6.70
Poultry -> -2.30 -4.71 -1.13 2.53 - 0.00 0.00 -> -17.10 -19.14
VEAUX (Q : Millions de Tonnes - L: Ecus/Tonne - P: Ecus/Tonne)
Supply j Deriv Dem. 1 Pin. Oem.
Q L P 1 0 L p i Q L
Lamb 1.07 1.63 4821.05 0.00 1.00 2952.49 0.33 1.24
Milk 118.38 1.42 253.22 0.00 1.42 253.22 117.64 1.33
Corn 28.13 1.36 182.43 19.34 1.36 182.43 13.01 1.00
Nheat 83.23 1.40 209.50 23.05 1.40 209.50 51.35 1.00
Rice 1.96 1.37 407.98 0.00 1.00 297.48 1.88 1.30
Oilseeds 12.94 1.43 926.83 3.40 1.00 647.32 7.72 1.00
Cotton 1.66 1.38 1637.57 0.00 1.00 1187.24 1.30 1.30
Suqar 16.29 1.40 388.62 0.00 1.00 277.70 15.01 1.28
Tobacco 0.35 1.16 3600.23 0.00 1.00 3102.63 0.75 1.12
Poultry 7.38 1.23 1798.49 0.00 1.00 1463.10 7.85 1.09
LAN (Millions de tonnes - TAA: •)
Bilan Initial | Bilan final
offre Demande Exp.Net TAuto-A 1 Offre Demande Exp.Net
Lamb 1.12 0.31 0.81 3.613 1.07 0.33 0.75
Milk 121.79 116.04 5.75 1.050 118.38 117.64 0.74
Corn 28.99 32.29 -3.30 0.89B 28.13 32.35 -4.22
Nheat 86.07 74.21 11.86 1.160 83.23 74.40 8.83
Rice 2.02 1.81 0.21 1.116 1.96 1.88 0.08
Oilseeds 13.49 11.13 2.36 1.212 12.94 11.12 1.82
Cotton 1.70 1.22 0.48 1.353 1.66 1.30 0.36
Suqar 17.01 14.00 3.01 1.215 16.29 15.Ot 1.28
Tobacco 0.35 0.73 -0.38 0.479 0.35 0.75 -0.40
Poultry 7.46 7.06 0.40 1.057 7.38 7.85 -0.48
INDICATEURS (Millions d'Ecus)
Coflt BudqAtaire
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
DApenses
21(94.93 
933.29 
50*.ftO 
4222.78 
29.33 
4704.03 
272.89 
109.10
DApenses
1770.01
1926.76
418.43
3558.58
48.27
3610.38
284.31
653.40
1422.11
Econonue BudqAtaire
414.92
-993.48
87.17
664.20
-18.94
1093.65
-11.42
-1961.05 
-1302.63
LamC
Milk
Corn
Nheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Balance Commercials 
Initial final
1768.33
62.40
1523.97
132.02
-565.26
1322.59
23.73
1181.28
424.84
355.91
-1236.72
Surplus commercial
:«!:«-38.67
-342.69
-147.67
-465.82
-71.24
Poultry 570.80 
3144T32
150
VQ
4.85
1.38
0.50
0.38
3.97
-0.18
6.46
7.23
2.34
1 1 . 2 2
P
3664.74 
237.31
134.56 
150.45 
387.01 
647.82
1542.74
354.56 
3473.62 
1597.03
TAuto-A
3.296
1.006
0.870
1.119
1.042
1.164
1.276
1.085
0.466
0.939
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lBii35r3l°8*&i| 30*'3 (IniCial) 27-29 tFlwi) -3.H (Variation.
surplus du consommateur : 7484.75
surplus du producteur : -5145.83
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
-359.63
-1531.61
-350.33
-893.62
-193.58
-347.77
-28.02
-311.95
Objectif Gouvrt : -3781.76
Revenus animaux : 0.00
Lamb
Milk
Poultry
0.00
0.00
0.00
Revenus vOqitaux : -522.07
Corn
Nheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
sugar
Tobacco
-237.22
-291.88
0.00
7.03
0.00
0.00
0.00
Cain social : Lu36.29
Effet Terme Echanqe : 19.06
05/11/1999 A 13:30 - TURKEY-EU:1995 " Base : Turkey95
SCENARIO : Turkey - European Union: 1995 (Ncm : IN\NTO - fichier scenario n* : !)
ZONE : R.du Monde
VARIATIONS ten «• relatif a la base}
PMondial
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
i'.&2
8:4i
IM
hit
(Quantit6s) Supply Oeriv Dem. rtn. Dem.
Lamb 0.15 0.00 -0.62
Milk 1.18 0.00 -0. 80
Corn 0.12 0.00 -0.07
Nheat 0.15 0.00 -0.08
Rice 0.02 0.00 •0.02
Oilseeds 0.00 -0.19
Cotton 0.08 0.00 -0.03
Sugar 0.65 0.00 -0. 98
Tobacco 0.18 0.00 -0.23
Poultry 1.00 0.00 -1.14
NIVEAUX (Ecus/Tonnes - Millions de Tonnes.
Prix Mondial
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
2952.53
142.73
203.32
616.35
1130.72
264.46
2954.75
1463.05
iQuantltts) Supply Denv Dem. fin. Oem.
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
5.62 
253.59 
484 .40 
440.89 
548.71 
239.79 
17.50 
94.15 
5.83 
33.74
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
4.72
249.62
456.46
414.10
361.36
240.04
16.36
96.93
6.03
32.91
(Millions de tonnes - TAA: M
Bilan Initial 1 Bilan final
Offre Demande Exp.Net TAuto-A 1 Offre Oemande Exp.Net TAuto-A
Lamb 5.61 4.75 0.86 1.181 5.62 4.72 0.90 1.190
Milk 250.63 251.63 -1.00 0.996 253.59 249.62 3.97 1.016
Corn 483.82 456.78 27.04 1.059 484.40 456.46 27.94 1.061
Nheat 440.23 414.43 25.80 1.062 440.89 414.10 26.79 1.065
Rice 548.60 361.43 187.17 1.518 548.71 361.36 187.35 1.518
Oilseeds 239.48 240.50 -1.02 0.996 239.79 240.04 -0.25 0.999
Cotton L7.49 16.36 1.13 1.069 17.50 16.36 1.15 1.070
Sugar 93.54 97.89 -4.35 0.956 94.15 96.93 -2.78 0.971
Tobacco 5.82 6.04 -0.22 0.964 5.83 6.03 -0.20 0.968
Poultry 33.41 33.29 0.12 1.004 33.74 32.91 0.83 1.025
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05/11/1999 4 13:31 * TtJRKEY-EU: 1995 » Base : Turkey95
SCENARIO : Turkey - European Union: 1995 (Non : IN/FT - fichier scenario n* : 1)
ZONE : Turkey
IRIATIOtfS (en 4 relatif A la base)
Supply I Oeriv Oem. 1 Fin. Dem.
VP VL VQ 1 VP VL VQ 1 VP VL
Lamb -il.il -> -21.90 -5.49 13.82 -> 0.00 0.00 - -6.70 -18.03 5
Milk -21.58 -> -31.50 -12.70 -21.58 -> -31.50 0.00 - -17.60 -28.02 19
Corn -> -12.70 -15.03 -5.29 -> -12.70 -15.03 0.00 - 2.70 -0.04 -2
Nheac -> 1.30 -3.50 0.49 -> 1.30 -3.50 0.00 - 31.70 25.46 -3
Rice -> -22.40 -23.04 -3.51 0.83 -> 0.00 0.00 - -12.30 -13.02 9
Oilseeds -23.70 -> -24.80 -3.76 -20.76 -> -21.90 0.00 - -20.90 -22.04 16
Cotton -2.60 -> -7.40 -1.36 5.18 -> 0.00 0.00 - -4.30 -9.02 1
Sugar -> -20.50 -25.52 -2.27 6.74 -> 0.00 0.00 - -15.70 -21.02 1
Tobacco -> -25.80 -28.05 -2.94 3.12 -> 0.00 0.00 - -27.80 -29.99 3
Poultry -21.92 -> -26.50 -10.22 6.24 -> 0.00 0.00 - -17.50 -22.34 a
VEAUX (0 : Millions de Tonnes - L: Ecus/Tonne - P: Ecus/Tonne)
Supply | Oeriv Dem. I Fin. Dem.
Q L p 1 Q L p 1 n L
Lamb 0.35 1.00 3310.97 0.00 1.00 3312.16 0.39 1.00
Milk 6.56 1.00 199.05 0.00 1.0C 199.05 8.93 I. 00
corn 1.80 1.00 137.37 1.70 1.00 137.37 0.62 1.00
Nheac 18.10 1.00 157.08 0.60 1.00 157.08 14.44 1.00
Rice 0.24 1.00 299.76 0.00 1.00 299.62 0.41 1.00
Oilseeds 0.96 1.Q0 655.30 0. 12 1.00 454.97 1.54 1.00
Cotton 0.84 1.00 1245.89 0.00 1.00 1245.75 0.90 1.00
Sugar 2.00 1.00 290.83 0.00 1.00 291.40 1.99 1.00
Tobacco 0.19 1.00 3163.29 0.00 1.00 3162.74 0. 11 1.00
Poultry 0.31 1.00 1515.31 0.00 1.00 1516.04 0.37 1.00
3312.34 
199.12 
136.95 
157.09 
299.69 
653.81 
1246.82 
292.28 
3166.61 
1518.68
BILAN (Millions de tonnes - TAA: M
Bilan Initial
Offre Demande Exp.Net
Lamb 0.37 0.37 0. 00
Milk 7.51 7.50 0.01
Corn 1.90 2. 33 -0.43
Nheat 18.01 15.50 2.51
Rice 0.25 Q.37 -0.12
Oilseeds 1.00 1.44 -0.44
Cotton 0.85 0.89 -0.04
Sugar 2.05 1.36 0.09
Tobacco 0.20 0.11 0.09
Poultry 0.34 0.34 0.00
Bilan Final
TAuto-A | Offre Demande Exp.Net TAuto-A
1.000 0.35 0.39 -0.04 0.893
1.001 6.56 8.93 -2.37 0.734
<3.815 1.80 2.32 -0.52 0.777
1. 162 18.10 15.04 3.06 1.204
0.676 0.24 0.41 -O. 16 0.595
0.694 0.96 1.66 -0.70 0.579
0.955 0.84 0.90 -0.06 0.930
1.046 2.00 1.99 0.01 1.005
1.81R 0.19 0.11 0.08 1.708
1.000 0.31 0.37 -0.06 0.831
INDICATEUR3 (Millions d'Ecus)
CoOt BudgBtaire
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Rheac
Rice
Oilseeds
Coccon
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
Oipenses
64.60
92.07
4.80
45.81
94.16
33.96
47.27
24.87
final
DApenses
0.07
1.57
0 . 0 1
2.27
Economic BudgAtaire
65.09
92.80
4.73
546.58
5.79
-49.54
-24.03
48.71
94.50
35.16
8tiT7B
Milk
corn
Nheac
Rice
Oilseeds
coccon
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
Balance Commerciale 
Initial final
0.00
1.74
-57.34
374.24
-35.66
-284.13
-47.38
24.57
276.03
0.00
252.08
-138.72
-471.88
-70.78
479.42
-iK:H-78.98
2.84
254.54
-93.91
-625.55
Surplus commercial
-138.72
L3.59
-174.70
-31.60
21.73
21.49
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(Milliardi°d'Ecua) ’" 53 IInicia11 ~a -22 (Final) -1.15 (Variation)
Surplus du consonsnateur : SS4.67
Surplus du produeteur : -1289.22
Lamb -148.79
Milk -385.11
Corn -36.98
Nheac 36.39
Rice -21.25
Oilseeds -199.72
CoCCon -28.08
Sugar -151.99
Tobacco
Poulcry
-216175 
-136.97
Objectif Gcuvrt : -409.92
Revenus animaux : 0.00
Lamb 0.00
Milk 0.00
Poulcry 0.00
Revenus v6q6Caux : -53.35
Corn -33.97
Nheae 1.21
Rice 0.00
Oilseeds -20.59
coccon 0 . 0 0
Sugar 0.00
Tobacco 0.00
Cam social : 85.23
Effet Terme Echanqe : -64.25
05/11/1999 A 13:31 TURKEY-EU:1995 Base : Turkey95
SCENARIO : Turkey - European Union: 1995 (Nom : IN/FT - Fichier scenario n* : 1)
ZONE : EU
(en t relatif A la base)
Suppiy 1 Oeriv Oem. I Fin Oem.
VP VL VQ I VP VL VQ 1 VP VL
Lamb -> -35.50 -43.33 -26.08 13.82 -> 0.00 0.00 -> -16.40 -26.72
Milk -> -25.50 -34.92 -15.61 -> -25.50 -34.92 0.00 -  > -24.50 -34.05
Corn *> -29.60 -31.48 -14.34 -> -29.60 -31.48 0.00 -> -2.00 -4.62
Nheac -> -29.50 -32.84 -17.75 -> -29.50 -32.84 0.00 -> -0 10 -4.83
Rice -31.30 -31.87 -14.91 0.83 -> 0.00 0.00 -  > -31.40 -31.97
Oilseeds -34.15 *> -35.10 -21.86 1.46 -> 0.00 0.00 1.46 -> 0.00
coeeon -28.90 -> -32.40 -12.16 5.18 -> 0.00 0.00 -28.90 -> -32. 10
Suqar -> -28.80 -33.29 -24.35 4.74 -> 0.00 0.00 -> -32.50 -36.76
Tobacco -14.10 ■»> -16.70 -2.99 3. 12 -> 0.00 0.00 -14.10 -> -16.70
poultry • > -17.90 -22.72 -10.42 4.24 -> 0 .00 0.00 -> -21.50 -26.11
VQ
14.10
4.01
0.33
-1.51
16.68
-0.82
18.19
L5.18
6.27
13.96
VEAUX (Q : Millions de Tonnes - L: Ecus/Tonne - P: Ecus/Tonne)
Supply I Oeriv Dem. 1 Fin. Dem.
Q L p 1 Q L p 1 Q L p
Lamb 0.83 1.00 3322.20 0.00 1.00 3312.16 0.35 1.00 3300.64
Milk 102.78 1.00 198.16 0.00 1.00 198.16 120.69 1.00 198.20
corn 24.83 1.00 137.06 19.34 1.00 137.06 12.99 1.00 137.22
Nheat 70.79 1.00 156.62 23.05 1.00 156.62 50.39 1.00 156.40
Rice 1.72 1.00 300.09 0.00 1.00 299.62 2.11 1.00 299.65
Oilseeds 10.54 1.00 654.85 3.40 1.00 655.18 7.67 1.00 655.18
Coeton 1.49 1.00 1246.32 0.00 1.00 1245.75 1.44 1.00 1246.32
Suqar 12.87 1.00 291.56 0.00 1.00 291.40 16.13 I.00 291.15
Tobacco 0.34 1.00 3161.52 0.00 1.00 3162.74 0.78 1.00 3161.52
Poultry 6.68 1.00 1511.32 0.00 1.00 1516.04 8.05 1.00 1512.26
BILAN (Millions de connes - TAA: *>)
Bilan Initial
Offre Demande Exp.Net
Lamb 1.12 0.31 0.81
Milk 121.79 116.04 5.75
Corn 2B.99 32.29 -3.30
Nheac 96.07 74.21 11.96
Rice 2.02 1.81 0.21
Oilseeds 13.49 11.13 2.36
Cotton 1.70 1.22 0.48
Suqar 17.01 14.00 3.01
Tobacco Q.35 0.73 -0.38
Poultry 7.46 7.06 0.40
Bilan Final
TAuto-A I Offre Demande Exp.Net TAuto-A
3.613 0.83 0.35 0.47 2.341
1.050 102.78 120.69 -17.91 0.852
0.898 24.83 32.33 -7.50 0.768
1.160 70.79 73.44 -2.64 0.964
1.116 1.72 2.11 -0.39 0.814
1.212 10.54 11.07 -0.53 0.953
1.393 1.49 1.44 0.05 1.036
1.215 12.87 16.13 -3.26 0.798
0.479 0.34 0.78 -0.44 0.438
1.057 6.68 8.05 -1.36 0.831
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INDICATEURS (Killians d'Ecus)
CofiC Budqitaire
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheac
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poulcry
DApenses
aHi:HSOS.60 
4222.78 
29.33 
4704.03 
272.89
1 0 5 .1 0
12957.83
12285.79
Final
DApenses
10.98
0.74
0.03
6.03
0.S8
1 . 2 2
7.09
Economic BudgAcaire
2172.39
922.12
S08.01
4211.80
28.59
4707.49
272.86
99.08
-233.68
-437.73
12250794
Milk
Corn
Nheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
Balance Commercials 
Initial Final
2357.10
999.64
-440.06
1768.33
62.40
1523.97
568.51
1570.55
-3565.37
-1027.55
-1379.75
-2Q66.15
Surplus commercial
-786.55 
-4565.00 
-587.50 
-2182.29 
-180.18 
-186B.30 
-504.52 
-1770.82 
-214.27 
-2636.95
-15296.37
Surplus du consommateur
Surplus du produeteur :
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheat
Rice
oilseeds
Cotton
SugarTobacco
Poultry
Objectif Couvrt :
Revenus animaux :
Lamb
Milk
Poulcry
Revenus veqAtaux :
Corn
Nheat
Oifseeds
Cotton
Suqar
Tobacco
Sain social :
Effet Tertne Echanqe :
30.43 (Initial)
14376.30
-25477.74
-1773.30 
-7608.14 
-1550.87 
-5140.14 
-255.$9
-178.92
-2319.53
0.29 (Final) -30.14 (Variatton)
0.00
0.00
0 . 0 0
0.00
32.06
0 . 0 0
0.00
0 . 0 0
5/11/1999 4 13:31 TURKEY-EU:1995 - Turkey95
SCENARIO
ZONE
(Ncm : IN/FT - Fichier scenario n*
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheac
cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
(en « relatif 4 la base)
PMondial
13.82
14.48
2* ' i4 .97 
0.83 
1.46 
5.18 
6.74 
3.12 
6.24
(QuantitAs) Supply Oeriv Oem. Fin. Oem.
Lamb
Milk
corn
Nheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
1.30
5.84
0.73
1.47
0.18
0.60
1.63
2.51
0.49
2.45
0 . 0 0
0 . 0 0
0.00
0.00
0.00
O.QQ
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
-5.
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
(Ecus/Tonnes - Millions de Tonnes)
Prix Mondial
3312.05
209.49
130.48
624.00
1186.48
277.51
3012.23
1515.99
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Supply Deriv Oem, Fin. Oem.
Lamb 5.68 0.00 4
Milk 265.27 0.00 241
corn 487.35 0.00 454
Nheat 446.70 0.00 411
Rice 549.59 0.00 360
Oilseeds 240.92 0.Q0 238
Cotton 17.78 0.00 Issugar 95.89 0.00 §4.
Tobacco 5.85 0.00 6.
Poultry 34.23 0.00 32.
BILAN (Millions de tonnes - TAA: 4)
Bilan Initial | Bilan Final
Offre Demande Exp.Net TAuto-A 1 Offre □emande Exp.Net TAuto-A
Lamb 5.61 4.75 0.86 1.181 5.68 4.49 1.19 1.265
Milk 250.63 251.63 -1.00 0.996 265.27 241.94 23.32 1.096
Corn 483.82 456.78 27.04 1.059 487.35 454.91 32.44 1.071
Nheat 440.23 414.43 25.80 1.062 446.70 411.40 35.30 1.086
Rice 548.60 361.43 187.17 1.518 549.59 360.82 188.77 1.523
Oilseeds 239.48 240.50 -1.02 0.996 240.92 238.38 2.53 1.011
Cotton 17.49 16.36 1.13 1.069 17.78 16.24 1.53 1.094
Suqar 93.54 97.89 -4.35 0.956 95.89 94.26 1.63 1.017
Tobacco 5.82 6.04 -0.22 0.964 5.85 6.00 -0.15 0.974
Poultry 33.41 33.29 0.12 1.004 34.23 32.38 1.85 1.057
05/11/1999 i  13:31 " TURKEY-EU:1995 " Base : Turkey95
SCENARIO : Turkey - European Union: 1995 (Norn : IN/FT - Fichier scenario n* : 1)
ZONE : Turkey
VARIATIONS (en • relatif a la base)
Supply 
VP VL
Lamb -11.11 -> -21.90
Milk -21.58 -> -31.50
Corn *> i -j o -15.03
Nheat -> 1.30 -3.50
Rice -> -22.40 -23.04
Oilseeds -23.70 -> -24.80
Cotton -2.60 - > -7.40
Sugar -  > -20.50 -25.52
Tobacco -> -25.80 -28.05
Poultry -21.92 -> -26.50
t Denv Dem.
VQ 1 VP VL
-5.49 13.82 -> 0.00
-12.70 -21.58 -> -31.50
-5.29 -> -12.70 -15 .03
0.49 -> 1.30 -3.50
-3.51 0.83 - > 0 .00
-3.76 -20.76 -» -21.90
-1.36 5.18 - > 0.00
-2.27 6.74 -  > 0.00
-2.94 3.12 -> 0.00
-10.22 6.24 -> 0 .00
| Fin. Dem.
VQ I VP VL VQ
0.00 -> *6.70 -IB.03 5.83
0.00 -> -17.60 -28.02 19.03
0.00 -> 2.70 -0.04 -2.21
0.00 -> 31.70 25.46 -3.12
0.00 -> -12.30 -13.02 9.62
0.00 -> -20.90 -22.04 16.87
0.00 -> -4.30 -9.02 1.33
0.00 -■» -15.70 -21.02 1.72
0.00 -> -27.80 -29.99 3.31
0.00 -17.50 -22.34 8.00
VEAUX (Q : Millions de Tonnes
Supply
Q
Lamb 0.35
Milk 6.56
Corn 1.80
Nheat 18.10
Rice 0.24
Oilseeds 0.96
Cotton 0.84
Sugar 2.00
Tobacco 0.19
Poultry 0.31
L: Ecus/Tonne - P: Ecus/Tonne)
Denv Dem.
L 
1.00 
1 . 0 0  
1 . 0 0  
1 . 0 0  
1.00 
1.00 
1 . 0 0  
1 . 0 0  
1.00 
1 . 0 0
p
3310.97
199.05
137.37
157.08
299.76
655.30
1245.89
290.83
3163.29
1515.31
4
0.00
0 . 0 0
1.70
0.60
0 . 0 0
0 . 1 2
0 . 0 0
0 . 0 0
0 . 0 0
0 . 0 0
L 
1 . 0 0  
1.Q0 
1 . 0 0  
1 . 0 0  
1 . 0 0  
1 . 0 0  
1 . 0 0  
1 . 0 0  
1 . 0 0  
1 . 0 0
p
3312.16
199.05
137.37
157.08
299.62
654.97
1245.75
291.40
3162.74
1516.04
rtn.
Q 
0.39 
9.93 
0.62 
14.44 
Q.41 
1.54 
0.90 
1.99 
Q. 11 
0.37
L 
1 . 0 0  
1 . 0 0  
1 . 0 0  
1 . 0 0  
1 . 0 0  
1 . 0 0  
1 . 0 0  
1 . 0 0  
1 . 0 0  
1 . 0 0
P
3312.34
199.12
136.95
157.09
299.69
653.81
1246.82
292.28
3166.61
1518.68
BILAN (Millions de tonnes - TAA: M
Bilan Initial
Offre Demande Exp.Net
Lamb 0.37 0.37 0.00
Milk 7.51 7.50 0.01
Corn 1.90 2.33 -0.43
Nheat 18.01 15.50 2.51
Rice 0.25 0.37 -0.12
Oilseeds 1.00 1.44 -0.44
Cotton 0.85 0.89 -0.04
Sugar 2.05 1.96 0.09
Tobacco 0.20 0.11 0.09
Poultry 0.34 0.34 0.00
Bilan Final
TAuts-A 1 Offre Demande Exp.Net TAuto-A
1.000 0.35 0.39 -0.04 0.893
1.001 6.56 8.93 -2.37 0.734
0.815 L.80 2.32 -0.52 0.777
1.162 18.10 15.04 3.06 1.204
0.676 0.24 0.41 -0.16 0.595
0.694 0.96 1.66 -0.70 0.579
0.955 0.84 0.90 -0.06 0.930
1.046 2.00 1.99 0.01 1.005
1.818 0.19 0.11 0.08 1.708
1.000 0.31 0.37 -0.06 0.831
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INDICATORS (Millions d'Ecus)
Code Budgitaire
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheat
Rice
oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
DApenses
64.60 
92.07 
4.80 
548.15 
5.79 47.27
24.87
DApenses
o.oi
2.27
0.49
0.73
0.84
2.90
0.34
1 . 2 0
Economic Budgitaire
65.09
92.80
4.73
S46.58
5.79
-49.54
-24.03
48.71
94.50
35.16
819.78
Lamb
Milk
corn
Nheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poulcry
Balance Comaerciale
Initial final
0.00 -138.72
1.74 
-57.34
-35.66
2?ii03
0 . 0 0
"252T08
479.42 
-49.25 
-458.83 
-78.98 
2.84 
254 .54 
-93.91
"-625755
Surplus commercial
-138.72
-473.62
-13.44
105.18
-13.59
-174.70
-31.60
- 2 1 . 7 3
-21.49
-93.91
-877.63
1.53 (Initial} -0.22 (final) -1.75 (Variation)
Surplus du consommateur : 554.67
Surplus du produeteur : -1289.22
-148.79Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nneat 3o.39
Rice -21.25
Oilseeds -199.72
Cotton -28.08
Sugar -in.99
Tooacco -2le.75
Poultry -136.97
0b}ectif Gouvrt : -409.92
Revenus animaux : 0.00
ftTS 8:88
Poultry Q . 0 0
Revenus veq*taux : -53.35
corn -33.97
Nheat 1.21
Rice 0.00
Oilseeds -20.59
Cotton 0.00
sugar 0 . 0 0
Tooacco 0.00
Gain social : 85.23
Effet Terrae Echanqe : -64.25
05/11/1999 A 13:31 TURKEY-EU:1995 Base : Turkey95
SCENARIO : Turkey - European Union: 1995 (Nom : IN/FT - Ficnier scenario n* : I)
ZONE : EU
VARIATIONS (en * relatif a la base)
Supply I Deriv Dem. I Fin Dem.
VP VL VQ 1 VP VL VQ ! vp VL
Lamb -> -35.50 -43.33 -26.08 13.82 -> 0.00 0.00 --> -16.60 -26.72 14
Milk -> -25.50 -34.92 -15.61 -> -25.50 -34.92 0.00 -> -24.50 -34.05 4
Corn -> -29.60 -31.48 -14.34 -> -29.60 -31.48 0.00 -> -2.00 -4.62 0
Nheat -> -29.50 -32.84 -17.75 -> -29.50 -32.84 0.00 -> -0.10 -4.83 -I
Rice -> -31.30 -31.87 -14.91 0.83 - 0.00 0.00 -> -31.40 -31.97 16
Oilseeds -34.15 -> -35.10 -21.86 1.46 - 0.00 0.00 1.46 -> 0.00 -0
Cotton -28.90 -> -32.40 -12.16 5.18 - 0.00 0.00 -28.90 -> -32.40 18
Suqar -> -28.80 -33.29 -24.35 6.74 - 0.00 0.00 -> -32.50 -36.76 15
Tobacco -14.10 -> -16.70 -2.99 3.12 - 0.00 0.00 -14.10 -> -16.70 6
Poultry -> -17.90 -22.72 -10.42 6.24 - 0.00 0.00 -> -21.50 -26.11 13
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VEAUX (Q : Millions de Tonnes - L: Ecus/Tonne - P: Ecus/Tonne)
Supply f Deriv Dem. 1 fin. Dem.
Q L p 1 Q L p 1 Q L
Lamb 0.83 1.00 3322.20 0.00 1.00 3312.16 0.35 1.00
Milk 102.78 1.00 198.16 0.00 1.00 198.16 120.69 1.00
Corn 24.83 1.00 137.06 19.34 1.00 137.06 12.99 1.00
Nheat 70.79 1.00 156.62 23.05 1.00 156.62 50.39 I. 00
Rice 1.72 1.00 300.09 0.00 1.00 299.62 2.11 1.00
Oilseeds 10.54 1.00 654.85 3.40 I. 00 655.18 7.67 1.00
Cotton 1.49 1.00 1246.32 0.00 1.00 1245.75 1.44 1.00
Suqar 12.87 1.00 291.56 0.00 1.00 291.40 16.13 1.00
Tobacco 0.34 1.00 3161.52 0.00 1.00 3162.74 0.78 1.00
Poultry 6.68 1.00 1511.32 O.QO 1. 00 1516.04 8.05 1.00
(Millions de tonnes - TAA:
Bilan Initial | Bilan final
Offre Demande Exp.Net TAuto-A ■ Offre Oemanae Exp.Net
Lamb 1.12 0.31 0.81 3.613 0.83 0.35 0.47
Milk 121.79 116.04 5.75 1.050 102.78 120.69 -17.91
corn 28.99 32.29 -3.30 0.898 24.83 32.33 -7.50
Nheac 86.07 74.21 11.86 1.160 70.79 73.44 -2.64
Rice 2.02 1.81 0.21 I. 116 1.72 2.11 -0.39
Oilseeds 13.49 11. 13 2.36 1.212 10.54 11.07 -0.53
Cotton 1.70 1.22 0.48 1.393 1.49 1.44 0.05
Suqar 17.01 14.00 3.01 1.215 12.87 16.13 -3.26
Tobacco 0.35 a. 73 -0.38 0.479 0.34 0.78 -0.44
Poultry 7.46 7.06 0.40 1.057 6. 68 8.05 -1.36
1NDICATEUR3 (Millions d'Ecus)
CoOt Budq4taire
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tooacco
Poultry
Initial
oepenses
2194.83
933.28
505.60
4222.78
475?:o5
12957.83
12285.79
final
oepenses
0.03
6.03
0.58
2.41
3.46
1 . 2 2  
”7? 09
Econcmie Budgdtaire
2172.19 
922.12 
508.01 
4211.80 
28.59 
4707.49 
272.86 
99.08
’”I225o794
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tobacco
Poultry
Balance Commerciale 
Initial Pinal
2357.10
399.64
-440.06
1768.33
62.40
- 1 him
570.80
*7066.94
1570.55
-413.96
-117.78
-2066.15 
-8229.43
Surplus commercial
-786.55
-4565.00
-587.50
-2182.29
-180.18
-2636.95
”-15296.37
Valeur aioutee : 
(Milliards d'Ecus)
Surplus du conscmmateur
Surplus du produeteur :
Milk
Corn
Nheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tooacco
Poultry
Objectif Gouvrt :
Revenus animaux :
Lamb
Milk
Poultry
Revenus vtgteaux :
Corn
Nheac
Rice
Oilseeds
Cotton
Sugar
Tooacco
Gain social :
Effet Terrne Echange :
30.43 (Initial)
-1773.3Q 
-7608.14 
-1550.87 
-5140.14 
-255.59 
-4080.56 
-SOB.84 
-1761.85 
-178.92 
-2319.53
0.29 (Pinal) -30.14 (Variation)
-L5950.70
-2593.11
-1114,54
-1510.63
0 . 0 0
32.06
0 . 0 0
0 . 0 0
0 . 0 0
1149.49
157
P
3300.64
198.20
137.22
156.40
299.65
655.18
1246.32
291.15
3161.52
1512.26
TAuto-A
2.341
0.852
0.768
0.964
0.814
0.953
1.036
0.798
0.438
0.831
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05/11/1999 4 13:31 " TURKEY-EU:1995 " Base Tuckey95
SCENARIO : Ju§*eg0"dfuroPean Union: (Nora : IN/FT - Fichier scenario n* : i)
VARIATIONS (en * relaeif 4 la base)
PMondial
Lamb 13.02
Milk 14.48
Corn 2.74
Nheac 4.97
Rice 0.83
Oilseeds 1.46
Coccon 5.18
Sugar 6.74
Tooacco 3.12
Poulcry 6.24
(Quancicts) Supply Oeriv Oem. Fin. Oem.
Mifk
Corn
Nheac
Coteon
Sugar
Tooacco
Poulcry
1.30
5.84
0.73
1.47
2.18
0.60
1.63
2.51
0.49
2.45
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
3:H
3:41
--UI
-0.71
-3.71
-0.61
-2.74
NIVEAUX (Ecus/Tonnes - Millions de Tonnes)
Prix Mondial
Lamb
Milk
Corn
Nheac
Rice
Oilseeds
Coccon
Sugar
Tobacco
Poulcry
3312.05
209.49
130.48 
149.06 
285.35 
624.00
1186.48 
277. $ I 
3012 .23 
I5l3.§9
(Quancicis) Supply Oeriv Oem. Fin. Oem.
Lamb 
Milk 
Corn 
Nheac
otv"««ti3 259-H 0:06 aia'.iaCoCCon 17.78 0.00 16.24
Sugar 95*§? 0-00 9^.26Tobacco 5.85 0.00 e.00
Poulcry 34.23 0.00 32.38
5.68 0.00265.27
487.35
0.00
0.00446.70 0.00
549.59 0.00
2^9*2? 0. 017.78 0.00
95.89 0.00
5.85 0.00
34.23 0.00
BILAN (Millions de connes - TAA: M
Bilan IniCial 1 Bilan Final
offre Demande Cxp.NeC TAueo-A I Offre □emande Exp.NeC TAuCo-A
Lamb 5.61 4.75 0.86 I. 181 5.68 4.49 1.19 1.265
Milk 250.63 251.63 -I.00 0.996 265.27 241.94 23.32 1.096
Corn 483.82 456.78 27.04 1.059 487.35 454.91 32.44 1.071
Nheac 440.23 414.43 25.80 1.062 446.70 411.40 35.30 1.086
Rice 548.60 361.43 187.17 1.518 549.59 360.82 18B.77 1.523
Oilseeds 239.48 240.50 -1.02 0.996 240.92 238.38 2.53 L.Oll
CoCCon 17.49 16.36 1.13 1.069 17.78 16.24 1.53 1.094
Sugar 93.54 97.89 -4.35 0.956 95.89 94.26 1.63 1.017
Tobacco 5.82 6.04 -0.22 0.964 5.85 6.00 -0. 15 0.974
Poulcry 33.41 33.29 0.12 1.004 34.23 32.38 1.85 1.057
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